OCJ 2014

The court ruled on a pre-trial motion regarding the qualification of an expert witness, Ms. Donna Lee, who testified regarding intellectual disabilities and communication issues.

The Crown sought to have the witness qualified as an expert, while the defence challenged her qualifications.

The court applied the four-part test from R. v. Mohan to determine admissibility of expert evidence: relevance, necessity, absence of exclusionary rules, and proper qualification of the expert.

The court found that the witness met all four criteria and allowed her to be qualified as an expert.

An employee of a car dealership was convicted of unauthorized use of a dealer plate while driving a vehicle with a dealer plate on her way to work.

The trial judge relied on erroneous evidence from the arresting officer that dealer plates could only be used by the owner, a family member of the owner, or for purposes related to the sale of a vehicle.

On appeal, the court found that the regulation permits private use of dealer plates by persons other than the owner and owner's family, and that the trial judge erred in law by accepting the officer's incorrect interpretation of the regulation.

The offender, an Aboriginal Canadian aged 50, pleaded guilty to driving while disqualified and breaching a recognizance (curfew condition).

The Crown sought jail time, but the court imposed a conditional sentence consisting of fines totaling $65 with six months to pay, a 12-month driving prohibition, and a DNA order.

The court applied section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and considered the offender's participation in Drug Treatment Court, his background of abuse and addiction, and the non-violent nature of the offences.

Walter Carter pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death (Dean Hancock Jr.), impaired driving causing bodily harm (Daniel Cassio), and breach of undertaking.

The accused had been charged with impaired driving in January 2014 and released on an undertaking not to consume alcohol.

Despite this condition, he consumed excessive alcohol at a festival on August 21, 2014, and subsequently drove his truck in the wrong direction on Highway 17, colliding head-on with the victim's vehicle and causing his death.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment less pre-trial custody, with concurrent sentences on the other counts, a ten-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order.

In this child protection summary judgment motion, the Catholic Children's Aid Society sought an order making a child with a rare medical condition (Congenital Myasthenic Syndrome) a crown ward.

The child had been in the society's care for over two years following a finding of need for protection.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to resume care with proposed supports including daycare, trained caregivers, and night nursing.

The court found that despite the mother's genuine love for the child and her completion of medical training, she had failed to present a concrete and viable plan to meet the child's complex medical needs over the two-year period.

The court granted the society's motion and made the child a crown ward with access to the mother in the society's discretion.

The accused was charged with luring contrary to section 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused pleaded guilty to the offense and subsequently raised the defense of entrapment.

The court found that the police officer conducting the investigation was engaged in a bona fide, proactive investigation with reasonable suspicion that the accused was engaged in prohibited activity.

The court determined that the police did not induce the commission of the offense but merely provided an opportunity, which the accused freely pursued on multiple occasions without coercion.

The entrapment defense was rejected and a conviction was registered.

The defendant, a bank employee, pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud involving the theft of over $11,000 from the bank and its clients.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a discharge.

The defendant claimed he committed the frauds to raise money to save his sister from kidnapping and rape threats by a Syrian militia group.

The court found the defendant's testimony credible and accepted that his motivation was to protect his sister from serious harm.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with two years' probation, finding that the exceptional circumstances of the case—involving duress-like conditions and a humanitarian motivation—warranted a departure from the typical sentencing range for breach of trust frauds.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The defendant was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a flower bed with a bent front axle.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath samples on Charter grounds and argued that the vehicle's inoperability defeated the presumption of care and control.

The court found no Charter breach, upheld the presumption of care and control, but acquitted on the impairment charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

The accused was charged with fail to stop, impaired operation, and excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision in a parking lot on September 16, 2011.

The Crown proved the fail to stop charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on eyewitness evidence and vehicle identification.

However, the impaired operation charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence of impairment, with the court finding the observations of impairment were inconsistent and could be explained by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The excess alcohol charge was also dismissed as a consequence of excluding the breath sample evidence due to a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that police failed to ensure the accused, who had significant language limitations, understood his right to counsel and had a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel.

The accused was convicted of preventing or endeavouring to prevent an elector from voting at the federal election held on May 2, 2011, contrary to the Canada Elections Act.

The accused, as communications director for the local Conservative candidate in Guelph, was a major and active participant in a scheme involving approximately 7,000 automated telephone calls directing targeted non-Conservative supporters to false polling locations.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 months imprisonment followed by 12 months probation, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation were the primary sentencing principles given the serious nature of interference with the democratic electoral process.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 milligrams.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically in the early morning hours near a bar in Toronto's Entertainment District, exhibiting signs of impairment including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and poor coordination.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing 133 mgs per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused testified he had consumed only 3-4 shots of vodka and attributed his appearance and behavior to fatigue and nervousness rather than alcohol impairment.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand, the Intoxilyzer was functioning properly, and the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with possessing 2 grams of marijuana contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, allegedly discovered during a strip search at a detention centre.

The accused challenged the legality of the search under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the strip search was unauthorized and based on insufficient grounds, constituting a serious breach of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud over $5,000, having defrauded her employer, the Toronto Dominion Bank, of $1,778,543.57 over approximately 14 years while employed as a senior manager with authority over internal accounts.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while defence counsel sought a lengthy conditional sentence with probation.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 17 months (14 months on count 1 and 3 months consecutive on count 2), rejecting a conditional sentence despite significant mitigating factors including full restitution, guilty plea, and evidence of major depressive illness.

The court also imposed a five-year employment prohibition under section 380.2.

The defendant was charged with four counts of sexual offences against a girl aged 11 to 13 years old between 1993 and 1995.

The Crown alleged a pattern of sexual abuse including sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The defendant denied all allegations, claiming he was merely a "big brother" figure to the children in the household.

The court found the complainant credible and her testimony corroborated by a former friend who witnessed inappropriate physical contact and the defendant and complainant's secretive behaviour.

The defendant's evidence was rejected due to significant credibility issues, including his admitted heavy drug use, his demonstrated capacity for secretive relationships, and his implausible denials regarding the complainant's expressed feelings.

The court convicted the defendant on three of four counts.

The applicant mother sought an order denying the respondent father any access to their son, Caleb, born in 2008.

The parties separated in 2009 when Caleb was nine months old.

The father had a history of violence toward the mother, criminal convictions including assault and breach of probation, and failed to pay child support.

The father initially missed supervised access visits and then failed to pursue access for several years.

When supervised access was eventually arranged, the child refused to see his father due to the passage of time and lack of encouragement from the mother.

The court found both parents' conduct concerning but ultimately granted the father limited contact through correspondence and gifts, with access at the mother's discretion, recognizing that the passage of time and the mother's lack of encouragement had made a meaningful relationship impossible to establish.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana under 3 kg for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and possession of break-in instruments contrary to section 351(1) of the Criminal Code.

Police discovered 211 grams of marijuana in the accused's vehicle, along with digital scales, cash, and break-in tools.

The accused held a valid medical marijuana authorization permitting possession of 45 grams only.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including text messages, packaging of marijuana in multiple baggies, and expert testimony regarding street jargon and drug pricing.

The accused testified that all marijuana was for personal use due to chronic pain management.

The court found the accused guilty of trafficking but acquitted him of the break-in tools charge.

The accused was stopped for using a cell phone while driving.

During the stop, the officer detected a strong odour of burnt marijuana and arrested the accused for possession of a controlled substance.

The accused was subsequently arrested for impaired driving based on the odour of alcohol detected when being released from the police cruiser.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for possession of marijuana based solely on the odour of burnt marijuana.

The court determined there was a breach of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the blood-alcohol readings under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charge.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample at the roadside.

The Crown alleged that Constable Uppal made lawful demands for a breath sample, which the accused refused.

The central issue was whether the demands were lawful under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, considering the "forthwith" requirement and the accused's right to counsel.

The court found that both an informal demand and a formal demand were lawful and timely, and that the accused's refusal constituted the offence.

The court rejected arguments that the absence of specific language rendered the demands invalid and found that the realistic availability of duty counsel did not support a finding that the demands were premature.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought 60 to 90 days imprisonment on an intermittent basis, while defence counsel sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court imposed a 60-day intermittent sentence (served on weekends over approximately five months), three years probation with 100 hours of community service, and a three-year driving prohibition.

The court balanced the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and general deterrence against the offender's personal circumstances, remorse, and rehabilitation prospects.