Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to fairly and fully assess his alibi defence before finding guilt based on the credibility of the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed the alibi and provided several valid reasons for rejecting it, including the strength of the Crown's case and the appellant's failure to testify.

The appellant appealed a decision confirming the downgrading of his driving licence from Class B to Class G due to a diagnosis of congestive heart failure.

The appellant argued that the decision-makers failed to consider all medical evidence and improperly applied the legislation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence or its reliance on nationally recognized medical standards.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of cannabis resin, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him following a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant after he received the package and left the residence shortly after with a bag capable of carrying it.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of no Charter breaches under sections 8 and 9.

However, the court quashed the appellant's summary conviction for simple possession of marijuana on consent, as it should not have been tried together with exclusively indictable offences.

The appellant appealed an order declaring its registered lien against the respondent's equipment invalid.

The respondent had leased equipment to a related company of the appellant under an agreement that expressly prohibited the creation of any liens without prior written consent.

The appellant, knowing of this prohibition, performed work on the equipment and registered a lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew of the prohibition, the respondent did not consent to the lien, and the contractual prohibition applied to all types of liens, including those under the Act.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence.

She abandoned her conviction appeal, which was consequently dismissed.

Despite commending the appellant's sincere efforts at rehabilitation and addressing her drug addiction, the Court of Appeal found the original sentence to be fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after he asked to speak to a specific lawyer.

The trial judge found the appellant was eager to tell his story and only wanted to ensure his lawyer was available for his bail hearing the next day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant was not interested in consulting counsel before speaking to the police and therefore his rights were not violated.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking portions of its statement of claim and restricting leave to amend.

On consent, the order was amended to preserve a misrepresentation claim against two defendants.

The Court of Appeal also narrowed a restriction on amending the claim, holding that the appellant was only precluded from pleading facts that would amount to a collateral attack on a prior approval decision, rather than all facts known prior to that decision.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, upholding the motion judge's decisions to strike references to settlement discussions and to refuse leave to amend an oppression claim.

The appellant was convicted of incest against his developmentally challenged daughter.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in handling the issue of the complainant's motive to fabricate and that Crown counsel engaged in misconduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined witnesses on the complainant's motive to fabricate, made inflammatory comments in closing, and improperly injected personal opinion.

The trial judge failed to provide necessary corrective instructions.

The cumulative effect of these errors undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiffs appealed a Divisional Court decision that restored a master's order requiring them to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the standard of review on an appeal from a master is the same as from a judge, as set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen.

The court found no basis to interfere with the master's analysis of the evidence or application of principles regarding security for costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and in refusing to allow him to show his arms to demonstrate he had no tattoos.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fully appreciated the evidence, acknowledged the complainant's lies, and gave adequate reasons for accepting her testimony.

The court also held that the ruling on demonstrative evidence was a matter of the trial judge's discretion.

The appellants appealed a judgment finding them in breach of a vehicle lease for failing to maintain insurance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was entitled to act on the default and was not obligated to exercise its option to place the insurance itself or accept proposed replacement insurance, especially after learning the entities arranging the insurance were under investigation for fraud.

The appellant's vehicle was seized by police as proceeds of crime and held under a detention order.

The appellant, claiming to be an innocent third party, commenced a civil action to recover the vehicle and seek damages for its detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to dismiss the action, agreeing that the Criminal Code provisions for innocent third party remedies constitute a complete code, precluding parallel civil proceedings absent allegations of actionable police misconduct.

Manitoba Public Insurance (MPI) brought a motion for directions regarding an unpaid costs award of $12,000 from a priority dispute over accident benefits.

MPI was successful in the underlying arbitration and application, but took no part in the subsequent appeal between Allstate and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court of Appeal ordered Allstate, as the unsuccessful party on the appeal, to pay MPI's $12,000 costs from the lower proceedings, plus $1,000 for the costs of the motion.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his young nephew and niece.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the use of evidence from multiple complainants, as the Crown did not allege similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to keep the evidence of each complainant separate and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The misdirection constituted an error in law.

The convictions were quashed, a new trial was ordered on five counts, and an acquittal was directed on one count due to an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against the thirteen-year-old daughter of his former partner.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the trial judge rejecting the appellant's evidence based on three perceived inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence underlying all three bases for rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent raised a jurisdictional issue, arguing that the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court under section 10(1) of the Estates Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, awarding costs of $3,000 to the respondent.

The respondent bank sought a writ of possession for mortgaged residential premises.

The application judge granted the writ, finding the appellants were occupants and the appellant wife was the beneficial owner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the order, finding the bank's application was deficient because it failed to join the named mortgagor as a party and lacked the necessary documentary evidence to establish its right to possession.

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside without prejudice to the bank's right to pursue further remedies.

The deceased and his first wife entered into a separation agreement requiring him to designate her as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy until March 1995.

He subsequently married the appellant and later developed Alzheimer's disease.

The deceased never revoked the first wife's beneficiary designation, and the appellant continued paying the premiums under a power of attorney.

After the deceased's death, the appellant claimed the policy proceeds, arguing unjust enrichment and seeking a constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the beneficiary designation constituted a juristic reason for the enrichment and that the general release in the separation agreement did not override the Insurance Act requirements for changing a beneficiary.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Michigan and brought an action in Ontario against the Michigan driver and owner, an unidentified driver, and her own Ontario insurer.

The defendants successfully moved to stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing Michigan was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by failing to give weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum and by not considering the claim as a whole, including the necessary claim against the Ontario insurer.

The appeal was allowed and the stay was set aside, allowing the action to proceed in Ontario to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the respondents.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as an abuse of process and found no genuine issue for trial, as the underlying issue of forged guarantees had already been adjudicated in a previous action.

The appellant argued she was denied natural justice because the motion judge proceeded in her absence after she left the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, agreeing that the action was an abuse of process, and upholding the substantial indemnity costs awarded by the motion judge due to the serious allegations of dishonesty.