Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim against the respondent on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

He argued procedural unfairness because he did not attend the motion hearing, but the court found no prejudice because his written submissions were before the motion judge and he failed to seek a rehearing under r. 37.14(1)(b).

The court agreed that the pleaded claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, although it noted the motion judge's reference to s. 9 of the Law Society Act may have been misplaced.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, but the original costs award was reduced and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party brought an urgent motion to stay a deportation order pending the release of the Court of Appeal's decision in an appeal concerning habeas corpus applications for lengthy immigration detention.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no serious question to be tried because the deportation order is an independent immigration determination that would not be affected by the outcome of the habeas corpus appeal.

The court noted that deportation would actually bring an end to the detention the moving party sought to review.

The appellant sued an employment agency after paying a fee for a promised job that never materialized.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondents credible.

After the initial appeal was dismissed, a television program broadcast an undercover investigation exposing the respondents' deceptive practices.

The appellant moved to re-open the trial to adduce this fresh evidence, but the motion judge dismissed the request.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's reasons inadequate and holding that the fresh evidence met the test for re-opening the trial as it was cogent, previously unavailable, and could have affected the trial's outcome.

The Ontario Review Board granted the respondent an absolute discharge.

The hospital appealed, relying entirely on fresh evidence of the respondent's conduct following his release, which included resuming marijuana use, engaging in threatening behaviour, and facing new criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it overwhelmingly demonstrated that the respondent remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing before the Board was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment after police found nearly 100,000 Ecstasy tabs in his vehicle.

On appeal, he argued that his arrest, based on a confidential informant's tip, lacked reasonable and probable grounds, rendering the subsequent search unlawful under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot factors, finding the tip compelling, the informant credible, and the information corroborated.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to declare a mistrial after jurors observed him in the courthouse lobby.

He also appealed the sentence, arguing it violated the parity principle because two co-accused received conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the mistrial application and concluding the sentence was appropriate given the appellant's major role in the smuggling enterprise compared to his co-accused.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 21, 2014.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ordering the Board to conduct a new and expedited hearing within 60 days and make a new disposition order.

The interim disposition order dated March 30, 2015, remains in effect until the new order is made.

The appellant appealed a one-year sentence for possession of 97 grams of marijuana.

The Crown conceded the sentence was unfit as it was imposed due to a misapprehension of law that a mandatory minimum applied.

The Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to 12 days imprisonment, equating to time served.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the three-year delay between his indictment and the extradition request, during which his parole in Canada was revoked, rendered the surrender an abuse of process and unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Minister erred in stating that bad faith or improper motive were prerequisites for abuse of process, the surrender decision was ultimately reasonable.

The delay did not amount to an abuse of process, and the Minister did not err in assessing prejudice or the application of s. 64(1) of the Extradition Act.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug production and trafficking charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence found during a search incident to arrest and subsequent condominium searches, finding the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, thereby violating the accused's Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess the objective reasonableness of the grounds for arrest through the lens of an experienced police officer.

When viewed from that perspective, the totality of the evidence, including extensive surveillance, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence arising from a conviction for possession of child pornography, and also challenged the length of a ten-year long-term offender supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge imposed an illegal custodial sentence because the sentence, when combined with pre-sentence custody expressly treated as additional time, exceeded the then-applicable five-year statutory maximum under s. 163.1(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Re-sentencing afresh, the court imposed a fit sentence of 4.5 years' imprisonment and granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5:1 under Summers, leaving 16 days remaining.

The challenge to the ten-year supervision order was dismissed because the record amply supported the appellant's very high risk of reoffending and need for close supervision and gradual reintegration.

Following a successful appeal based on the respondent's failure to properly serve the originating documents, the parties could not agree on the disposition of costs below.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the costs below, fixed at $100,000, be in the cause of the new application, provided the respondent proceeds with the application within three months.

The appellant sought to appeal an order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as his legal representative after he was found to be a special party.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory as it related to a procedural question and not the merits of the proceeding, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions, raising issues regarding the disclosure of police protocols for confidential informants, the validity of a search warrant, and the finding of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the protocols were not relevant when requested, the search warrant was properly granted based on compelling information, and there was ample evidence to support the finding of possession.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge should have granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody rather than 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and appropriately considered the appellant's repeated serious misconduct while in custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, assault, choking, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical notions of common sense and conducted an unbalanced credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or reliance on common sense, noting the trial judge meticulously reviewed the evidence, including security video and independent witness testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence of 18 months minus a day was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for assault, mischief, and failure to comply with an undertaking.

The charges arose from an altercation where the appellant evicted his teenage daughter, grabbed her, and threw her computer, as well as a subsequent breach of a no-contact order regarding another daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the daughter was not a trespasser, the trial judge properly inferred damage to the computer, and the appellant could not use an unauthorized third party to communicate.

The 45-day sentence was upheld as reasonable.

The United States sought to extradite the respondent for his alleged role in a fraudulent scheme involving ATM skimming devices.

The extradition judge dismissed the application, finding the identification evidence manifestly unreliable and insufficient evidence of possession or knowledge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the extradition judge's conclusions unreasonable.

The Court held that the identification evidence, when viewed in conjunction with supplemental records, was sufficiently reliable, and that circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable inference of possession and knowledge.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was committed for surrender.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder for sending tampered water bottles and letter bombs.

Seventeen months after the convictions, during dangerous offender proceedings, the trial judge amended his reasons to add an alternative theory of liability for the water bottle counts.

The Court of Appeal held that the late amendment rebutted the presumption of integrity and excised it from the reasons.

Based on the original reasons, the court found the attempted murder convictions for the water bottles unreasonable and entered acquittals.

The letter bomb convictions were upheld.

A new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two bank robberies and sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The primary issue at trial was identity, with the Crown relying on DNA evidence found on a tissue in a discarded sweatshirt, video surveillance, and similar fact evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize weaknesses in the Crown's case regarding the continuity of the tissue, rendering the verdict unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 9-year sentence was fit for a repeat offender with a lengthy record of robbery convictions.