Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and simple assault against his stepson and son, respectively.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her assessment of the complainants' motive to fabricate and the potential tainting of their evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's explanation of the motive issue was problematic, it did not amount to a palpable and overriding error, and there was no evidence of collusion or tainting between the complainants.

The respondent sold his funeral home business to the appellant and was retained as general manager under a ten-year fixed-term contract.

Following a deterioration in the relationship, the appellant engaged in a course of conduct that included removing the respondent's company vehicle, tracking his time, and changing the locks.

The respondent went on medical leave due to depression and anxiety caused by the appellant's conduct and eventually sued for constructive dismissal.

The trial judge found the respondent was constructively dismissed and awarded damages for the remainder of the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent had not condoned the conduct despite the delay in bringing the action, nor in the calculation of damages.

The moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a $40,000 costs award arising from an unsuccessful motion to remove the responding party's counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the underlying order was interlocutory and therefore appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

Furthermore, the costs award was under the $50,000 threshold, which also directs the appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, previously found NCRMD for assault with a weapon and robbery, appealed a conditional discharge disposition by the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant argued the Board failed to fulfill its inquisitorial role and improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding whether he posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had sufficient evidence to make an informed decision and did not shift the burden of proof, as its concerns about the appellant's stability were amply supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and the mandatory victim fine surcharge following convictions for criminal harassment and breaching a Long-Term Supervision Order.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on a victim impact statement without cross-examination, and by finding his conduct met the threshold for a serious personal injury offence and the criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the designation, finding no error in the sentencing judge's reliance on the victim impact statement or his application of the dangerous offender provisions.

The appeal against the victim fine surcharge was allowed on consent.

The appellant sued the respondents in negligence, alleging that the respondents improperly obtained an enforcement order during garnishment proceedings which caused the appellant's employer to terminate his employment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no duty of care was owed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that a judgment creditor seeking to realize on a judgment through garnishment proceedings does not owe a duty of care to the debtor to avoid causing harm to the debtor's ongoing employment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Securities Commission appointed a receiver over Money Gate Mortgage Investment Corporation.

The appellant, a shareholder in a company that granted a second mortgage to Money Gate, challenged the validity of the mortgage on a motion for advice and directions brought by the receiver.

The motion judge summarily determined that the mortgage was valid and ordered the sale proceeds paid to the receiver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge had the authority to decide the matter summarily by analogy to summary judgment rules, and correctly found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of her former boyfriend.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined its own key witness on a prior inconsistent statement without bringing an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and subsequently used the inconsistency to impeach the witness's credibility during closing submissions.

The trial judge permitted this use and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held that this improper cross-examination and the subsequent use of the evidence prejudiced the appellant's defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order of $125,000 per month following a 24-year marriage.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the respondent's needs and means, misapplied the Halliwell principle for high-income earners, and erred in awarding indefinite support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's compensatory entitlement, needs, and means, and confirming that the trial judge properly conducted an individualized fact-specific analysis.

Ten days after the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment authorizing the responding party to enforce its mortgage, the moving parties brought a motion seeking to declare the enforcement proceedings null and void.

The moving parties argued they were commercial farmers and had not received the required notice under s. 21 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the moving parties were barred from raising the issue at this late stage since mortgage enforceability was squarely at issue on the appeal.

The court found no credible evidence that the moving party was a commercial farmer and deemed the motion an abuse of process intended to delay creditors.

The plaintiffs moved for a stay of a Divisional Court order that reinstated the defendants' jury notices, pending their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The original motion judge had struck the jury notices due to COVID-19 delays in Ottawa, but the Divisional Court overturned this, finding the decision arbitrary.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test and Sault Dock principles, the Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding a serious question to be tried regarding the Divisional Court's interference with the motion judge's discretion, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs if their scheduled judge-alone trial date was lost, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences after police found cocaine during a search incident to arrest.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no section 10(b) Charter breach when police delayed his access to counsel for 3.5 hours while preparing a search warrant for his residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified by officer and public safety concerns due to credible information that the appellant possessed a long firearm.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding them only $5,000 in damages against their former real estate lawyer for a title defect error.

The trial judge found the lawyer breached his duty of care but concluded the appellants' significant claims for reduction in property value, carrying costs, and business losses were not caused by the title defect, but rather by the appellants overpricing the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation, damages, or the exclusion of expert evidence.

The infant plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling from a balcony.

The plaintiffs moved to extend the time to set the action down for trial, and the defendant cross-moved to bifurcate the trial on liability and damages.

The Master granted the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections, which was upheld by the Superior Court and Divisional Court on the basis that the court retained inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate non-jury trials without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly requires the consent of the parties to bifurcate any proceeding, whether jury or non-jury, thereby ousting the court's inherent jurisdiction to do so without consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The complainant, who was heavily intoxicated and found to be unconscious at the start of the sexual activity, testified that he awoke to being fellated by the appellant and did not consent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding Browne v. Dunn was immaterial, as the appellant's own evidence showed he took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent, depriving him of the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences relating to a residential break-in and theft of firearms.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in denying him standing to challenge a warrantless search of his girlfriend's vehicle, unfairly dismissed his s. 8 Charter challenges and Garofoli application, and erred in finding reasonable grounds for search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge acted unfairly in summarily dismissing the Garofoli application and standing arguments without hearing submissions, no miscarriage of justice occurred because the applications had no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 6-year sentence for internet luring, sexual interference, and sexual assault of a developmentally delayed child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which relied on corroborating electronic messages showing grooming behaviour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the exploitation of a highly vulnerable child.

However, the court stayed the sexual assault charge to avoid double jeopardy.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearms offences and was sentenced to four years in custody.

At sentencing, he sought additional credit for pre-sentence custody due to harsh conditions at the detention centre, specifically that his leg injuries prevented him from accessing the yard.

The sentencing judge granted standard 1.5:1 credit but refused additional credit, disbelieving the appellant's claims.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of complaints made to the Ombudsman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test and the sentencing judge made no error in principle in exercising her discretion.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for arson in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a mental health facility.

He argued the Board erred by failing to consider all relevant factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code and that a conditional discharge was the least onerous disposition necessary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that the appellant's risk of violent confrontations and inability to manage the stresses of community living required the supervision of a detention order.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs, which were reduced to reflect a lack of success on a residential tenancy issue.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 for the appeal and $15,000 for the application, inclusive of disbursements and HST.