Employment and Labour Law - OCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal stemming from a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The appellant, Davide Giacomodonato, appealed the damages award, contending the trial judge erred by applying the second employment contract instead of the first.

The court dismissed his appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of fresh consideration for the second contract, including a $40,000 payment and additional vacation time.

The respondents, PearTree Securities Inc. and PearTree Financial Services Ltd., cross-appealed the costs award.

Their motion for leave to appeal costs was dismissed, as the court found no error in principle in the trial judge's discretionary costs award, which was justified by the respondents' litigation conduct.

The appellant, Avaya Canada Corporation, appealed a summary judgment decision that awarded the respondent, John Lynch, 30 months' notice for wrongful dismissal.

Avaya contended the motion judge erred by awarding a notice period exceeding the relief sought, misapplying Bardal factors for reasonable notice, and incorrectly concluding Lynch took reasonable steps to mitigate damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in Avaya's arguments.

The court affirmed that a notice period could exceed the initial claim if argued on that basis without prejudice, upheld the 30-month notice period as justified by "exceptional circumstances" under Bardal, and found no error in the motion judge's mitigation findings.

The appellants (defendants at trial) appealed a judgment that awarded damages to the respondent (plaintiff at trial) for breach of a fixed-term independent contractor agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the contract was clear and unambiguous, including the 72-month fixed term and the absence of a termination clause.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in holding that independent contractors do not have a duty to mitigate damages, distinguishing them from employees in fixed-term contracts.

Despite this error, the appeal was dismissed because the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving that the respondent did not mitigate his damages.

The appellant, an unsalaried truck driver, appealed the dismissal of his constructive dismissal claim.

He alleged a new compensation plan introduced by the respondent substantially and detrimentally changed his terms of employment.

The trial judge found insufficient evidence of detriment.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: improper admission of hearsay evidence, striking of an affidavit without applying *Farber v. Royal Trust Co.*, and refusal to allow impeachment of a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay objection was untimely, the trial judge's assessment of the affidavit's probative value was reasonable, and the impeachment attempt did not comply with the *Evidence Act* and was on a peripheral point.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as unnecessary.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment concerning a breach of an employment contract.

The appellants, Verge Insurance Brokers Ltd. and Mark Sherk, challenged the trial judge's findings on liability and damages.

The core dispute revolved around the interpretation of a contractual provision allowing the respondent, Ryan Lindsay, to purchase his book of business upon resignation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that Verge breached the contract by failing to provide accurate account information and sufficient time for Lindsay to close the transaction.

The court affirmed the trial judge's damages award, applying a standard of substantial deference to contractual interpretation and factual findings on loss of profits.

This appeal concerned an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant, a medical resident, sued an investigation firm and its investigator for defamation based on executive summaries of a workplace harassment investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the summaries related to a matter of public interest, were protected by qualified privilege, and lacked evidence of malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the expressions related to public interest due to the nature of the educational institution, media attention, and public safety concerns, and were protected by qualified privilege.

The National Organized Workers Union appealed the denial of an interlocutory injunction to prevent Sinai Health System from enforcing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The union argued that the policy compelled vaccination without informed consent, constituting irreparable harm not remediable by arbitration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in declining to exercise the Superior Court's residual jurisdiction in labour relations.

The court affirmed that the potential harm of unpaid leave or termination due to non-compliance with a workplace policy is fundamentally related to employment and is remediable by a labour arbitrator through reinstatement and compensation for lost wages, thus not creating a 'remedial gap' that would warrant Superior Court intervention.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion by 94 former employees (proposed interveners) to intervene as an added party in an appeal between 2505243 Ontario Limited and Princes Gates GP Inc. The employees sought to protect a $2.063 million fund set aside for their potential termination claims by the trial judge.

The motion was opposed by Princes Gates GP Inc., while 2505243 Ontario Limited took no position.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that although the proposed interveners had a direct financial interest, their submissions would largely duplicate those of 2505243 Ontario Limited and risked introducing a new, unlitigated issue (common employer) from a separate class proceeding.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, arguing that his responsibilities had changed following the hiring of a new senior employee, which he contended amounted to a constructive dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's argument directly contradicted the trial judge's factual findings.

The trial judge had expressly found that the appellant maintained his role as general manager, that there was no change in the company's hierarchy, and no evidence of a change in his remuneration or bonus package.

The appellate court concluded that the trial judge made no legal error and that her well-supported factual findings were fatal to the appellant's position.

The moving party (appellant) sought to amend or vary a previous appeal decision to include severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, arguing that evidence of the respondent's payroll was implicitly in the trial record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it did not fall under Rule 59.06(1) for accidental slips or omissions, nor Rule 59.06(2) for new facts or fraud, as the moving party was attempting to re-argue an issue already considered and declined.

The court reiterated that it is not its role to scour the record for evidence not relied upon by parties.

The respondent's attempt to introduce fresh evidence without leave was also rejected.

This appeal concerned whether public school teachers are protected from unreasonable search and seizure by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when the search is performed in the workplace by their employers.

The case involved a school principal reading and taking screenshots of a private, password-protected log maintained by two teachers on their personal Google account, accessed via a workplace laptop, which was then used by the school board for disciplinary action.

The Court of Appeal found that the labour relations arbitrator and the Divisional Court erred in their interpretation and application of section 8, concluding that the teachers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their log, which was violated by the principal's actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award was quashed.

Nylene Canada Inc. appealed a wrongful dismissal damage award, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating the reasonable notice period by including pre-retirement service and by exceeding a 24-month maximum.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's findings that the "retirement/re-hiring" was solely for pension access and did not constitute a break in service.

The court also upheld the 26-month notice period, finding it justified by the employee's unique circumstances, including long tenure, specialized skills, age, and difficulty finding new employment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Dik Lee, appealed an order refusing him leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim of gross negligence against the directors and officers of Magna International Inc., his former employer.

The proposed amendments sought to assert a duty of care based on s. 32 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, related to a workplace harassment investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that there is no tort of negligent investigation by an employee against an employer in Ontario, nor tort liability for breach of a statutory duty.

The court also upheld the refusal to permit claims against unnamed defendants using pseudonyms due to lack of material facts.

This appeal addressed whether pension payments divided at source for family law purposes can continue to a non-member spouse's estate after their death for the balance of the retired member spouse's life.

The motion judge had ruled this was precluded by the Pension Benefits Act (PBA).

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that nothing in the PBA, Family Law Act (FLA), or the Family Law Matters Regulation (O. Reg. 287/11) prevents such an arrangement.

The court emphasized that the "Family Law Matters" sections of the PBA (ss. 67.1-67.9) and the Regulation govern these issues, not general pension provisions.

The appeal was allowed, clarifying that such continuation is permissible if provided for by agreement, court order, or arbitration award.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim for constructive dismissal and other related relief.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision to focus on the constructive dismissal claim, as it was central to all other claims (intentional infliction of mental distress, human rights violation, punitive damages).

The court also upheld the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment and her approach to summary judgment, noting that the employer had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the appellant, which were frustrated by the appellant's non-compliance.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal concerned the scope of common employer liability and director liability for unpaid wages under the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge had found Tornado Medical Systems, Inc. liable as a common employer and Jae Kim liable as a director for unpaid wages and vacation pay.

The Court of Appeal allowed Tornado's appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in her articulation and application of the common employer doctrine by effectively finding liability based on corporate affiliation rather than an intention to create an employment relationship.

The Court dismissed Dr. Kim's appeal, but varied the judgment to make his director liability conditional on the statutory requirements of execution against the corporation being returned unsatisfied or corporate insolvency.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their defamation action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from allegedly defamatory statements made by the respondents in an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) pleading.

The motion judge found the expression related to a matter of public interest and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by characterizing the expression too broadly and by concluding that the specific impugned statements, which concerned a private dispute between competitors, related to a matter of public interest.

The Court clarified that purely private disputes, even if involving allegations of tortious conduct, do not automatically qualify as matters of public interest for anti-SLAPP purposes.

This appeal concerned the valuation of federally regulated pensions for equalization purposes in family law, specifically addressing the determination of the "normal retirement date." The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by using case-specific intentions for retirement dates instead of applying the functional meaning of "normal retirement date" as defined under the provincial Pension Benefits Act (PBA) scheme, which represents the age at which any member is entitled to unreduced pension benefits (age 60 for these parties under the Public Service Superannuation Act).

The court emphasized that the provincial valuation methodology should be applied to federal pensions with only "necessary modifications." The appeal was allowed in part, remitting the matter for recalculation of the equalization payment based on the corrected normal retirement date.

Other grounds of appeal regarding survivor benefits, contingent survivor benefits, date of marriage deductions, notional disposition costs, and the method of equalization payment were dismissed.

The appellant, Barry Weisleder, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation action against the respondent union.

The motion judge had found the allegedly defamatory speech was protected by qualified privilege and that malice was not established.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, upholding the finding of qualified privilege and the absence of malice, noting that the ample evidentiary record allowed for a summary judgment decision on malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the proper calculation of cost-of-living adjustments under a pension plan, specifically the rounding policy for the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

The motion judge had found the respondents were entitled to round the CPI increase to two decimal points (1.49%), resulting in a 1% pension increase.

The appellant argued the plan required adherence to Statistics Canada's one-decimal policy (1.5%), which would result in a 2% pension increase.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact by ignoring uncontradicted evidence that the two-decimal rounding provision in the plan would still have meaning even with the Statistics Canada one-decimal policy for the Pension Index, particularly for recently retired pensioners.

The court held that the plan's language required adopting Statistics Canada's one-decimal policy for both the annual percentage increase and the CPI.

The appeal was allowed, and summary judgment was granted in favour of the appellant, leading to a 2% pension increase for 2017.