Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal from the denial of certification of a class action alleging systemic negligence in the use of seclusion and restraint at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The court found that the motion judge did not err in concluding that the claims lacked commonality, as the alleged wrongdoing could only be determined on an individual basis.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims against individual hospital administrators and affirmed the costs award, finding no reversible error in the motion judge’s analysis.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Binance's appeal from the certification of a class action brought by Canadian investors who purchased cryptocurrency derivatives through Binance.

The court upheld the motion judge’s finding that the claim disclosed reasonable causes of action under both the Securities Act and at common law, and that the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act were met.

The court rejected Binance’s arguments regarding the statutory and common law causes of action, the commonality of issues, and the appropriateness of class-wide remedies, finding no reversible error in the motion judge’s analysis.

The appellant insurer challenged a trial judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages to the respondents for a stolen jewellery claim.

The insurer had denied the claim and defended the action by requiring the insureds to prove pre-policy ownership, despite having accepted their ownership at policy issuance and admitting no material misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of bad faith warranting punitive damages, ruling that the insurer's conduct was an unreasonable and unfair interpretation of the policy.

The Court also affirmed the compensatory damages award based on appraised replacement value, as the insurer failed to provide evidence that actual cash value was lower.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against the provincial government for its response to COVID-19 in long-term care homes, asserting claims in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter s. 7.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim against the Minister of Long-Term Care (MLTC) but struck the other claims.

This appeal and cross-appeal challenged that decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appellants' appeal (seeking to certify the struck claims) and the respondent's cross-appeal (seeking to decertify the negligence claim against the MLTC), thereby upholding the motion judge's original certification decision.

This appeal addresses the role of "public correction" in secondary market misrepresentation class actions under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act.

The appellant sought leave to pursue a statutory remedy, which the motion judge denied by requiring a discrete and identifiable public correction that explicitly revealed the misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal, following its own decision in *Barrick OCA*, found that the motion judge applied an unduly onerous standard for public correction.

The Court clarified that public correction does not require "facial symmetry" with the misrepresentation and must be understood in context by the secondary market.

The appeal was allowed, and the leave motion remitted for redetermination.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their claims for breach of privacy, breach of confidence, and punitive damages against an insurer and its counsel.

The claims arose after the appellant's friend attended a Licence Appeal Tribunal case conference as a witness, and the insurer's counsel reported this to the insurer, who subsequently terminated the friend's employment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the attendance at the tribunal and the provision of a witness list did not constitute private information, and that the insurer's counsel owed no duty to the appellants.

Furthermore, any claim regarding the insurer's bad faith handling of the accident benefits claim was barred by section 280 of the Insurance Act.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal from a motion judge's order refusing to stay a court proceeding in favour of arbitration.

The moving party argued that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act barred the appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wellman to argue that the Huras line of cases should be overruled.

The Court of Appeal held that Wellman did not overrule Huras, affirmed that Huras was correctly decided, and found that because the motion judge had no statutory authority under section 7(5) to refuse to stay the arbitrable claims, his decision was not made under section 7.

Therefore, section 7(6) did not bar the appeal.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

A realtor appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a summary judgment motion in a negligence and improvident sale claim.

The key issue was when a two-year contractual limitation period commenced: at the time the Agreement of Purchase and Sale was signed or at closing.

The motion judge found the limitation period began at closing because no damage occurred prior to that time.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that while negligent acts may have occurred before the agreement was signed, damage is an essential element of negligence and did not accrue until title transferred at closing.

The plaintiff sued the estate of a deceased priest and a Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation for damages arising from sexual assault.

The corporation cross-claimed against the estate for contribution and indemnity.

The motion judge applied section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the two-year limitation period ran from service of the plaintiff's claim on the corporation.

The estate appealed, arguing section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applied, with the limitation period running from the priest's death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applies to cross-claims and prevails over section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 by virtue of section 19(4) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The cross-claim was statute-barred.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for malicious prosecution and awarding $550,000 in punitive damages to the respondent estate.

The deceased had been wrongfully dismissed from his position as a building inspector, after which the municipality withheld exculpatory evidence from the police, leading to criminal charges of which he was ultimately acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of malicious prosecution, concluding the municipality initiated the proceedings by withholding evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on punitive damages in part, reducing the award to $450,000 because the trial judge failed to account for the punitive elements of the substantial compensatory damages and costs already awarded.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering against the defendants.

The motion judge found that the appellant failed to demonstrate a genuine triable issue regarding whether he suffered a 'visible illness' as a result of the defendants' conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the lack of medical evidence, and dismissed the appeal, including the appeal of the costs order.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a bar order in a class proceeding.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act to make the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bar order appropriately limited the plaintiff's claim against non-settling defendants to their proportionate liability, in accordance with established principles.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents for defamation over a newspaper article reporting on a costs award against him and fraud charges against his former client.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim regarding the costs award report based on common law privilege, but allowed the claim regarding the remaining words to proceed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in bifurcating the claim, but agreed that the report of the costs award was protected by privilege.

The Court further held that coupling the report of the costs award with the report of the client's fraud charges was not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning linking the appellant to the fraud.

The appeal was allowed to set aside the motion judge's order, and the action was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellant appealed a decision, arguing a trial was required for its claim that the respondent intentionally interfered with its economic relations with a tenant through the tort of nuisance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant suffered damages as a result of the respondent's conduct, particularly regarding lease renewals.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given in a related file endorsement, awarding costs to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The court reviewed the parties' written submissions and largely agreed with the appellant's position, finding it fair and reasonable.

The court slightly increased the award to the main respondent to reflect its greater participation.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $30,000.

The plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident and initially named the municipality as a defendant in their notice of action.

They subsequently filed a statement of claim and simultaneously filed a notice of discontinuance against the municipality.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiffs sought to add the municipality back as a defendant, citing the discoverability principle upon learning that a dangerous shoulder drop-off may have contributed to the accident.

The motion judge declared the notice of discontinuance invalid but alternatively allowed the municipality to be added as a defendant.

The Court of Appeal held that the notice of discontinuance was valid, but upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to add the municipality as a defendant based on the discoverability principle.

The appellant, a woman of colour, sued her former employer for constructive dismissal, alleging racial discrimination.

The motions judge struck paragraphs of her statement of claim that alleged systemic discrimination against employees of colour, holding that only discriminatory acts directed specifically at the appellant could be pleaded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no principled basis to distinguish between direct discrimination and systemic discrimination for the purpose of pleading discriminatory conduct to support a wrongful dismissal claim.

The court issued an endorsement to settle the terms of its orders following an appeal.

The court determined that interest on costs should run from September 29, 2004, the date the costs order was made, rather than the date of the main judgment.

The court declined to alter the trial judge's order regarding carriage of the reference, noting it was not argued and should not be modified absent agreement or if affected by the appeal reasons.

The court also declined to cross-reference the orders in the two separate actions, noting the agreement that there can be no double recovery.

The appellants sued their former lawyer, alleging he entered into a settlement with their property insurer without proper authority and breached his fiduciary duty by providing a statement to the insurer's counsel confirming the settlement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the appellants had made an informed decision to settle and that, even if the lawyer had been negligent, the appellants suffered no damages because the settlement amount exceeded what they could have reasonably recovered under the policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and there was no palpable and overriding error.