Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it and ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (AMD) jointly and severally liable for damages arising from periodic flooding of the respondent National Steel Car Limited's industrial property caused by wastewater discharge into a clogged drainage channel.

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5.3 million (apportioned equally between the defendants), punitive damages of $400,000 against the City and $500,000 against AMD, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring remediation and maintenance of the channel.

The City appealed on four grounds: (1) the equal apportionment of liability; (2) failure to find mitigation by National; (3) the punitive damages award; and (4) the terms of the injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal except for a clarification to the injunction language.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Ms. Yan’s motion to stay a vexatious litigant order made against her under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, as she had not obtained leave from a judge of the Superior Court of Justice as required.

The court held it was not appropriate to grant leave in its ex officio capacity, especially where procedural requirements, including notice to the Attorney General, had not been met.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Tanya Rebello’s appeal from the order of Justice Robert Centa, which struck her statement of claim and dismissed her action regarding the erroneous transfer of her vehicle’s registration by ServiceOntario.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s findings that the claims were duplicative, constituted an abuse of process, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court also upheld the costs award against Ms. Rebello and declined to grant leave to appeal the costs order.

This decision addresses motions for leave to appeal a costs order issued by the Superior Court of Justice.

Robert Mark Roe, the appellant in the underlying appeal concerning a will challenge, sought leave to appeal the costs award.

Randall Scott Roe, a respondent, brought a cross-motion for leave to appeal the same costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Randall Scott Roe's cross-motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary costs award, which involved a holistic review of the litigation and parties' conduct.

Robert Mark Roe's motion for leave to appeal the costs order was dismissed as abandoned.

No costs were awarded on the motions for leave to appeal.

The appellant sought to overturn a security for costs order issued by a motion judge, arguing that two deposits related to a purchase agreement and an assignment should satisfy the security concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's entitlement to these funds was vigorously challenged and formed part of the underlying litigation, thus providing no basis to deny the security for costs claim.

The court affirmed the motion judge's proper application of legal principles.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal and a motion to quash.

The respondent, successful on the appeal, sought substantial indemnity costs of over $230,000.

The appellants argued for a net award of $30,000.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity, agreeing that costs for the unsuccessful motion to quash should be deducted.

The court ultimately awarded the respondent $90,000 in all-inclusive partial indemnity costs, finding the amounts and issues involved in the appeal significant.

The appellant, Anne Elizabeth Fair, appealed the dismissal of her action against BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and the estate/children of her deceased husband, Lloyd Fielder Fair.

She alleged BMO Nesbitt had a duty to inform her of a change in beneficiary designations on her husband's investment accounts (from her to his children) and sought a constructive trust over the proceeds based on an alleged agreement with her husband.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no duty on BMO Nesbitt to disclose beneficiary changes to a third party and insufficient evidence to establish a clear agreement with the deceased husband to maintain beneficiary designations, distinguishing the case from Moore v. Sweet.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action, which was brought against the respondent under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the respondent's expression (a complaint to a volunteer organization about the appellant's conduct) related to a matter of public interest, the appellant's action lacked substantial merit as the respondent had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege), and the harm to the appellant did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion judge also awarded damages and full indemnity costs, characterizing the defamation action as a reprisal brought in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact and application of the anti-SLAPP test, dismissing the appeal and affirming the damages and costs awards.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict and a trial judge's decision dismissing her action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The jury found that the appellant had recovered from her injuries and awarded $58,000 for loss of competitive advantage, while the trial judge ruled she did not meet the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's conclusion on causation was supported by the evidence and not internally inconsistent, and that the trial judge properly dismissed the action because the appellant failed to establish that her ongoing medical issues were caused by the accident.

Following a partially successful appeal, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The appellant was awarded $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes for the costs of the appeal.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the trial judge hearing the new trial.

The respondent lessor sued the appellant lessee for damages arising from an oil spill from an above-ground storage tank.

The appellant brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to determine whether the commercial lease contained a covenant by the respondent to insure against the loss, which would bar the action.

The motion judge found no such covenant and allowed the action to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the jurisprudence was unsettled and it was not plain and obvious whether the lease contained such a covenant.

The court set aside the motion judge's determination on the covenant issue, leaving it for trial, but upheld the dismissal of the appellant's motion to dismiss the action.

The appellant's action was dismissed by the motion judge for failing to comply with discovery undertakings to produce an allergist's medical records.

The motion judge found the respondents were prejudiced because the records were allegedly destroyed after the 2006 discovery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal, finding no evidence to support the assertion that the records were destroyed during that specific time period, and thus no basis for the finding of actual or potential prejudice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that on the undisputed facts, the respondent was entitled to summary judgment based on the authority of Finlayson v. GMAC Leaseco Ltd.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting possession of his property to the first mortgagee and dismissing his counterclaim against the first and second mortgagees, as well as an order striking his claim against the mortgagees' lawyer.

The appellant argued that the two mortgages were intrinsically linked and the second mortgagee's failure to advance funds caused his default on the first mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the mortgages were separate, the failure to advance funds was due to the appellant's own failure to remove an execution and provide an appraisal, and the lawyer owed no duty of care to the appellant.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that it owed a duty to defend the respondents.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded under a clause for claims arising from damage to property the insured owns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion clause was written in the present tense and did not apply to property that the respondents formerly owned but no longer owned at the time of the claim.

The respondents were awarded costs on a full indemnity scale.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal on liability and partial success on the costs appeal, the respondents sought costs of the appeal totaling $675,880.87.

The appellant argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to divided success and duplication of counsel by the amalgamated municipal respondents.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents one set of costs, fixed at $125,000, reflecting the straightforward nature of the legal issues, the duplication of argument, and the appellant's partial success on the costs appeal.

The appellants brought an application for a stay, which was dismissed, and the appeal was stayed pending the appointment of a new trustee of the family trust.

The appointment process was subsequently resolved on consent and the appeal was abandoned.

The respondent sought costs for the stay motion.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, noting that the appellants could have achieved their desired result without bringing an unsuccessful stay application.

Costs were fixed at $15,000.

The appellants, police officers and a police services board, were wholly successful on appeal in an action brought by the respondent regarding her treatment in police custody.

The appellants sought costs of $150,000 for all levels of court.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the successful appellants, finding that the case raised complex issues of general public importance regarding police duties to detainees.

Given the public interest nature of the litigation and the respondent's severe financial hardship, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial was unfair because their counsel was discharged mid-trial, a mistrial was not declared, and the trial judge relied on the appellant's conduct in court outside the witness box to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to justify the removal of counsel, no error in proceeding after a two-week adjournment for the appellant to prepare to represent himself, and sufficient additional basis for the trial judge's credibility findings.