Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application to remove a construction lien registered by the respondent for sewage backup remediation work.

Prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal or if it should have been brought to the Divisional Court under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act.

The parties agreed that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that decisions made in reliance on the Construction Act, including orders discharging or refusing to discharge a lien, must be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred accordingly.

The appellant tenant appealed an order granting relief from forfeiture of a commercial lease, challenging findings regarding its use of the premises, the landlord's refusal to consent to a lease assignment, an order to remove an abandoned truck, and an allegation of judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's findings that the tenant breached the lease's use provisions by constructing kitchen cabinets, that the landlord was entitled to refuse the assignment due to the breach, and that the truck removal order was valid.

The court also dismissed the bias allegation, interpreting the motion judge's comments as an attempt to minimize future acrimony.

The appeal on costs was denied as leave was not sought and the award was within the motion judge's discretion.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellants sought to set aside an order of the Deputy Registrar dismissing their appeal for delay and to extend the time for perfecting the appeal.

The underlying motion had resulted in the striking of the appellants' statement of defence due to their failure to comply with a discovery plan order.

The appellants did not attend the motion before the motion judge and did not file materials.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion on two grounds: first, the appellants were in the wrong court as they had failed to exhaust their remedies in the court of first instance under Rules 37 and 19; and second, even if the court had jurisdiction, the appellants failed to meet the test for setting aside the Deputy Registrar's order, as the delay was long and largely unexplained, prejudice to the respondent was evident, and there was no merit to the underlying appeal.

The applicant sought to determine whether an order granting a conditional stay of enforcement of an arbitration award was final or interlocutory, as this determination established jurisdiction.

The arbitration concerned ownership of software, with the arbitrator awarding ownership to the respondent, granting injunctive relief, and ordering costs exceeding $1.5 million.

The applicant commenced an application to set aside parts of the award.

The application judge granted a conditional stay of enforcement pending the disposition of the application, conditioning the stay on monthly payments of $25,000.

The court determined that the stay order was interlocutory because the merits of the underlying application remained to be determined and the matter was pending under the relevant statutory provisions.

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The appellant guaranteed a loan made by the respondent bank to a corporation.

After the corporation defaulted on its obligations, the bank demanded payment and successfully moved for summary judgment against the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge misinterpreted the guarantee, failed to consider whether the corporation was given a reasonable time to pay, and erred in rejecting his claim for an equitable discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's interpretation of the guarantee and concluding that the appellant failed to establish that the bank's conduct caused the corporation's default.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his claims regarding damages under the Line Fences Act and a dispute over the sale of certain parcels of land.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant failed to prove damages regarding the fence and that the land sale agreement excluded the disputed parcels.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the trial costs order was refused.

The plaintiff expert witness sued the defendant law firm for unpaid fees and subsequently served a Rule 49 offer to settle for $50,000 plus HST 'in full and complete satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim'.

The defendant accepted the offer days before trial and argued the settlement amount was inclusive of costs.

The motion judge agreed, finding the offer unambiguous.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by adopting a literal interpretation and failing to consider the factual matrix, including the Rule 49 context and the timing of the offer.

The Court concluded the offer did not dispose of costs, entitling the plaintiff to costs under Rule 49.07(5)(b).

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits well beyond the policy's time limits.

The appellant insurer denied the claim and moved for summary judgment.

The motion judge granted the respondent relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding minimal prejudice to the insurer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the motion judge reasonably applied the three-part test for relief from forfeiture given the abundance of medical information available and the insurer's failure to request independent assessments.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering the return of the respondent's investment funds.

The appellant argued the trial was unfair because he was self-represented, that there was insufficient evidence the respondent made the advances, and that there was no legal justification for returning the investment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfairness in the trial process, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's findings, and that the appellant's failure to account for the advanced funds justified the order for their return.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the at-fault driver.

Years later, upon discovering the tortfeasor was underinsured, the appellant sued his own insurer under the OPCF 44 Family Protection Endorsement.

The insurer successfully moved to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued the limitation period should only begin when damages are quantified by judgment or settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period begins when the insured has accumulated a body of evidence that would give a reasonable chance of persuading a judge that the claim exceeds the minimum liability limits.

The appellant's action was dismissed by the motion judge for failing to comply with discovery undertakings to produce an allergist's medical records.

The motion judge found the respondents were prejudiced because the records were allegedly destroyed after the 2006 discovery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal, finding no evidence to support the assertion that the records were destroyed during that specific time period, and thus no basis for the finding of actual or potential prejudice.

The appellant appealed a civil forfeiture order regarding a property where police discovered a sophisticated marijuana grow operation.

The appellant claimed he had leased the property to a man he met at a casino and had no knowledge of the operation, which the application judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's factual findings, his conclusion that there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of unlawful activity, or his determination that forfeiture was in the interests of justice.

The appellant requested an adjournment of the appeal, which was denied because the appellant had known for five months that new counsel was needed and a previous order made the appeal peremptory.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's judgment and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the order under appeal was interlocutory and its character was unaffected by the passage of time.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to approve the discontinuance of the respondents' national class action and dismiss the appellant's claim for an anti-suit injunction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's determination that the interests of absent class members would not be prejudiced by the discontinuance under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal had previously adjourned the appeal on terms, directing that the appeal be dismissed if the terms were not met within 45 days.

As the appellants failed to meet the terms capable of performance within the specified time, the appeal was dismissed.

The court also set a schedule for written submissions on costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $85,000 in damages for lost profits resulting from a one-month delay in the installation of a new printing press due to a breach of contract.

The appellant argued the damage award lacked evidentiary foundation and that the trial judge erred in admitting the respondent's accountant's evidence without qualifying him as an expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the loss of profits and concluding that the trial judge's assessment was not mere guesswork.

The Court also held that while it would have been preferable to qualify the accountant as an expert, admitting his evidence was not a reversible error.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contract regarding liability.

The Court also agreed that cross-examination was not necessary on the issue of mitigation of damages, as the evidence was not solely available to the plaintiff.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.