OCA 2010

The appellants were convicted of possession of firearms found in a vehicle but acquitted of possessing over-capacity magazines.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including inconsistent verdicts, improper jury instructions, and Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reconcilable and the jury instructions proper.

The court also dismissed one appellant's sentence appeal, upholding his nine-year sentence due to his persistent criminality and prior firearms convictions.

The appellants appealed their convictions for a home invasion motivated by a mistaken belief about a marijuana grow operation.

The Crown's case relied on K.G.B. statements from two accomplices who recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable and upholding the trial judge's decision to take judicial notice of the general location and movement of cell phones based on cell tower signals without expert evidence.

However, the sentence appeal for one appellant was allowed, reducing his sentence from 10 years to 8 years due to his younger age, lesser criminal record, and the parity principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting prior consistent statements made by the complainant to her school friends and by failing to properly resolve inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior statements were properly admitted to rebut the defence's allegation of recent fabrication and that the trial judge's resolution of the evidentiary inconsistencies was reasonably supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he was denied a fair trial because he was unrepresented and the trial judge failed to adequately assist him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had chosen to proceed without counsel rather than delay the trial further, and that the trial judge's assistance was adequate and did not result in an unfair trial.

An Ontario resident insured by the respondent was injured in a car accident in North Carolina caused by a driver insured by the appellant.

The respondent paid statutory accident benefits and demanded arbitration for loss transfer under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant refused, arguing the scheme did not apply because the accident occurred outside Canada and the policy was issued in North Carolina.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant is an Ontario insurer, it is required to arbitrate the claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's questioning of a recanting Crown witness demonstrated a prejudgment of the witness's credibility and the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the manner and timing of the questions, the absence of objection by trial counsel, and the nature of the witness's testimony did not establish prejudgment.

The appellant and an accomplice went to a drug dealer's home to purchase marijuana, both armed with handguns.

During a struggle, the dealer was fatally shot.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, the recklessness component of murder under s. 229(a)(ii), and the failure to give a W. (D.) instruction.

The appellant also argued his absence from a preliminary pre-charge conference in the judge's chambers violated his right to be present at his trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions and concluding that the procedural error of the appellant's absence from the chambers discussion was cured by s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to traffic and import cocaine, arguing the trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction on bad character evidence and gave an insufficient Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the defence made a tactical decision to put bad character in issue and specifically requested that no limiting instruction be given.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning was sufficient to alert the jury to the dangers of relying on the unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank.

The appellant, who was self-represented at the motion, sought to adduce fresh evidence explaining his failure to defend the motion due to personal circumstances and asserting that his employer was responsible for two of the three loans in dispute.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the appellant's self-represented status and personal circumstances justified his failure to adduce the evidence earlier.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the judgment regarding the two disputed loans and remitting the matter back to the Superior Court.

The appellant declarant registered a condominium declaration requiring the respondent condominium corporation to purchase a manager's unit.

After a turnover meeting, the newly elected board of directors purported to terminate the purchase agreement pursuant to s. 112 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application to enforce the purchase.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the power to terminate agreements under s. 112 does not extend to obligations arising from a condominium declaration, which has a distinct and higher legal status under the Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a young complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny, and erred in admitting the complainant's statements to his parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and that the statements were properly admitted under the Khan exception to the hearsay rule.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to order the respondent to register under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by relying on impermissible speculation about the impact of registration on the respondent.

The respondent failed to meet the high statutory threshold of demonstrating that the impact of registration would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

A 20-year SOIRA registration order was imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach when police seized drugs from his home without a warrant.

The police had attended a domestic dispute, and the appellant's common law spouse volunteered the drugs to them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the breach was inadvertent and minor, and that the trial judge did not err in balancing the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof or provided inadequate reasons.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that pierced the corporate veil and set aside a transaction under s. 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act.

The respondents cross-appealed regarding $8,000 taken by the appellant following the deceased's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct test from Wildman v. Wildman.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, noting the appellant admitted to taking the $8,000, which was an asset of the estate.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside a destruction order for a pit bull under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The appeal judge had interpreted section 4(8) of the Act as requiring the court to find that destruction was necessary for the protection of the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary and natural meaning of section 4(8) is clear and unambiguous: once a pit bull is found to have bitten or attacked, the court is mandated to order its destruction.

The original destruction order was reinstated.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of six years, less pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit given the respondent's incorrigibility, his prior firearms convictions, and his illegal presence in Canada following a deportation order.

The Court allowed the appeal and increased the sentences to 7.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the breach, less pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a title insurance claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge and finding that the claim was barred by the exclusions and exceptions relating to leases in the insurance policy.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for non-compliance with the governing limitation period.

She argued that the action should proceed because the motion judge did not find actual prejudice to the defendants, despite the statement of claim being served more than two years late.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the complete lack of explanation for the delay by the appellant's solicitor.

The appellant was convicted of causing a disturbance by using obscene language after yelling obscenities at police officers outside a bar at closing time.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the test for a public disturbance.

The court held that the crowd's presence was typical for the area at closing time and that the appellant's actions did not cause an externally manifested disturbance interfering with the ordinary use of the premises.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the trial judge erred by charging the jury on both the 'but for' and 'material contribution' tests for causation.

The Court of Appeal agreed that charging on both tests was an error of law, as only one test applies.

However, the court found no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the trial judge's explanation of 'material contribution' effectively amounted to a further instruction on the 'but for' test.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's guidance on the quantum of damages was also dismissed.