Neville Golwalla

The appellant, a health care professional, appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault.

The Crown cross-appealed against the lenient three-month jail sentence.

The appellant argued unreasonable verdict, misapprehension of evidence, and unfairness due to improper re-examination of the complainant.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of credibility reasonable, no misapprehension of evidence, and proper re-examination procedures.

The court also dismissed the Crown's cross-appeal against sentence, noting the Crown was not seeking re-incarceration and the sentence, while lenient, was not a reversible error in the circumstances.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to permit three complainants (RF, GR, and RG) to testify by video link in a sexual abuse trial.

The accused, William Robert Metcalfe, consented to RF testifying by video link but opposed for GR and RG.

The court granted the application for RF and RG, but dismissed it for GR.

For GR, the court found that his willingness to travel and the relatively low cost did not justify video testimony.

For RG, the court balanced factors including his reluctance to attend, fear of job loss, and the limited value of in-person demeanour assessment, concluding that video link was appropriate to ensure the truth-seeking function of the trial without negatively impacting the accused's right to a fair trial.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for assault and sexual assault of a minor.

The Superior Court found the original sentence manifestly unfit, emphasizing that denunciation and general deterrence are primary considerations for serious crimes involving the abuse of a person under 18, as per ss. 718.01 and 718.1 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge erred by overemphasizing rehabilitation, failing to adequately consider aggravating factors, and not explaining why a conditional discharge was not contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was allowed, and a four-month custodial sentence was substituted.

The appellant, Jose Manuel Lopes-Cabral, appealed his impaired driving conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to stay charges for unreasonable delay under *R. v. Jordan*.

The appellant contended the 18-month presumptive ceiling was breached, or alternatively, that the delay was unreasonable even if below the ceiling.

The court found the total delay did not exceed 18 months, placing the onus on the defence to show unreasonable delay and meaningful steps to expedite.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the defence failed to take meaningful and sustained steps, particularly by refusing to schedule a Crown pre-trial meeting while awaiting disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding impairment by alcohol, relying on the toxicologist's evidence, and dismissing his Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her Charter rulings, concluding that the appellant was not detained prior to arrest and that the breath demand was made as soon as practicable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons.

The conviction was based on an incident in a grocery store checkout line, where the complainant alleged the appellant touched her inappropriately.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to address three material inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and the store security video.

Because the trial judge did not provide cogent reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite these contradictions, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Following convictions for aggravated sexual assault, assault with weapons, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault with a weapon, and forcible confinement, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court found a long-standing pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive violence, substantial indifference to the reasonably foreseeable consequences of that violence, and brutality in the predicate offence, all driven in significant part by chronic crack cocaine addiction and repeated treatment failure.

Although the Crown did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that future harm would arise through failure to control sexual impulses under s. 753(1)(b), the court held the offender met the dangerous offender criteria under ss. 753(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii).

Applying the lesser-measure analysis, the court found no reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence or long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public, and imposed concurrent indeterminate sentences.

The appellant, Michael Johnston, appealed his conviction for Over 80.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to address a conceded Section 10(a) Charter breach and to provide reasons for rejecting it, thereby denying counsel an opportunity to make submissions on the point.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by not notifying counsel of her intention to reject the concession and by failing to provide adequate reasons for her decision regarding the Charter breaches.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a trial judge's refusal to issue a publication ban protecting the identity of a doctor who testified at the accused's trial for disrupting an abortion clinic.

The Superior Court found the trial judge made a jurisdictional error by applying the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test instead of the statutory test under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code.

Although the trial judge was functus officio following the accused's conviction, the Superior Court invoked its inherent jurisdiction to grant the publication ban, finding a real and substantial risk of harm to the doctor.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus to compel a justice of the peace to issue process on a private information charging three police officers and a paralegal with forcible entry, theft, and unlawful interception of private communications.

The charges arose from an incident where the applicants were removed from their daughter's condominium.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the justice of the peace made no jurisdictional error in concluding that the applicants failed to establish a prima facie case for any of the offences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to nine counts of fraud and was sentenced to an 18-month conditional sentence.

He later discovered this was an illegal sentence, as the maximum for a summary conviction under s. 380(1)(b) of the Criminal Code is six months, and it carried unanticipated immigration consequences.

On consent, the court extended the time to appeal and varied the sentence to nine consecutive two-month conditional sentences.

The court also corrected the trial judge's concurrent victim fine surcharges, imposing a $100 surcharge on each count but extending the time to pay until 2050 due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

The offender, Mitchell Irwin, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death, failing to stop, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a four-year and fourteen-day term of imprisonment, which the court accepted.

The primary contested issue was the length of the driving prohibition.

Considering aggravating factors such as excessive speed, aggressive driving, prior infractions, and leaving the scene to dispose of evidence, alongside mitigating factors including youth, prior good character, and remorse, the court imposed a total sentence comprising the agreed imprisonment, a 6-year driving prohibition (effective 8 years), a DNA order, a no-contact order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant, Imtiaz Bakhash, appealed his convictions for assault and threatening death, arguing the trial was unfair due to the trial judge's management, curtailing of cross-examination, and reliance on prior misconduct evidence.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge's extensive interventions, while well-intentioned to assist the self-represented accused, compromised the appearance of fairness by usurping defence counsel's function and forcing the disclosure of defence strategy.

The court also found that the trial judge's actions undermined the duty of confidentiality between court-appointed counsel and the accused, even if a full solicitor-client relationship did not exist.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

Walter Creglia appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that his Charter rights were violated due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for both dismissing the Charter motion and convicting on impaired driving were convoluted, difficult to understand, and failed to demonstrate a clear path to conviction by linking the evidence, law, and conclusions.

The court also noted the trial judge's irrelevant discussion of "care and control." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as meaningful appellate review was not possible, and the curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The applicant, Christopher Goulbourne, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for serious offences (robbery, use of imitation firearm, breaking and entering) based on alleged Charter breaches under sections 7 and 24(1).

He claimed he was assaulted by court officers and that police failed to investigate the incident.

The court found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility and that the force used by correctional officers was reasonable and necessary given his disruptive and aggressive conduct.

The court also found no intentional or malicious failure to investigate, but rather a miscommunication.

Ultimately, the court concluded that no Charter breach occurred, and therefore no remedy, including a stay of proceedings, was warranted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five offences arising from a shooting incident: possession of a firearm without a licence, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, aggravated assault, reckless intentional discharge of a firearm, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The victim was shot in the face and suffered permanent scarring, disfigurement, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, 10 months, and 7 days, after crediting 13.75 months of pre-trial detention.

The sentence reflected the serious nature of the offence, the defendant's significant criminal history, and aggravating factors including the public nature of the shooting and proximity to family members, while considering mitigating factors including the guilty plea, remorse, and Gladue considerations regarding the defendant's Aboriginal status and intergenerational trauma.

The defendant was found guilty of mischief for video recording women's buttocks at Woodbine Beach without consent and acquitted of voyeurism and criminal harassment.

At sentencing, the court imposed seven days intermittent incarceration and 24 months probation with conditions including non-attendance at Woodbine Beach and no contact with the victims.

The court rejected a conditional discharge despite mitigating factors, finding that the defendant's prior 2009 conditional discharge for identical conduct, combined with the significant impact on victims and the defendant's lack of insight, warranted a custodial sentence to protect the public interest and deter similar offences.

The defendant was charged with three offences arising from incidents on Woodbine Beach in Toronto: voyeurism, mischief, and criminal harassment.

The Crown presented evidence of similar conduct in 2010 and 2013, involving surreptitious filming of women's buttocks using a concealed camera with zoom capability.

The court admitted similar fact evidence to establish identity.

The voyeurism charge was dismissed because the Crown failed to prove the essential element of "for a sexual purpose" beyond a reasonable doubt.

The criminal harassment charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence that the defendant's actions caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety and concerns regarding the "watching or besetting" element.

The mischief charge resulted in a conviction, as the court found the defendant willfully interfered with the lawful enjoyment of public property.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a shooting death committed by a co-accused.

The Crown sought a sentence of six to eight years, arguing the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm applied.

The court found the offender did not know the co-accused had a gun and held that the mandatory minimum does not apply in such circumstances.

Weighing the offender's lack of prior record, strong prospects for rehabilitation, and lesser degree of responsibility against the gravity of the offence, the court imposed a sentence of four years (credited as time served) followed by two years' probation.

In a first degree murder trial arising from a fatal shooting outside an apartment elevator, the Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased and multiple prior statements of a key eyewitness who fled to the United States before trial.

Applying the principled hearsay framework, the court found necessity established for both categories because the deceased had died and the eyewitness had deliberately removed herself from the court's reach despite diligent efforts to secure her attendance.

The deceased's statements were admitted because their temporal proximity, surrounding circumstances, partial corroboration, and available cross-examination of the reporting witnesses provided threshold reliability.

The eyewitness's statements were excluded because she had repeatedly lied under oath and to police, had a possible motive to deflect blame, and her prior preliminary inquiry testimony offered no meaningful substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination.