Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-00000005-00AP; CR-17-10000082-00AP DATE: 20181207 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – MARK LANNARD
Counsel: Neville Golwalla, Counsel for the Crown Ken Berger, Counsel for the Appellant Lannard
HEARD: November 19, 2018
M.A. CODE J.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
A. OVERVIEW
[1] The Appellant Mark Lannard (hereinafter Lannard) was charged in an Information alleging two counts of sexual assault against V.F.. The accused Lannard was a health care professional who provided various massage and acupuncture treatments. He saw Ms. V.F. on two separate dates – October 31, 2015 and November 3, 2015 – and it was alleged that he committed sexual assaults on both occasions, while also providing massage and acupuncture treatments to Ms. V.F..
[2] The Crown proceeded summarily and Lannard was tried by Ritchie J. in the Ontario Court of Justice. The trial proceeded over three days during April 2017 and over three further days during June 2017. The accused did not testify. On June 26, 2017, Ritchie J. issued written Reasons for Judgement convicting Lannard on both counts. On December 15, 2017, Ritchie J. sentenced Lannard to three months in jail, concurrent on each count, followed by one year of probation.
[3] Lannard appealed to this Court against conviction and the Crown cross-appealed against sentence. Lannard served the three month custodial sentence and was released on February 15, 2018. The two appeals were heard on November 19, 2018. I reserved judgement at the end of oral argument. These are my Reasons for dismissing both appeals.
B. FACTS
[4] Mr. Berger, counsel for the Appellant, argued three grounds of appeal in relation to conviction, as follows: unreasonable verdict; misapprehension of evidence; and unfairness in the trial due to the Crown’s improper re-examination of the complainant. All three grounds of appeal require some appreciation of the facts of the case.
[5] The facts were accurately summarized by Ritchie J. as follows:
The complainant, V.F., was the sole witness for the Crown. She testified through a Portuguese interpreter. She came to Canada in 2014, and she has been attending school. Ms. V.F. is young, intelligent, petite and attractive, and she looks much younger than her years (age 24). Ms. V.F. was on the witness stand for almost three days, so I had ample time to assess her credibility and the reliability of her testimony.
Ms. V.F. testified that she has a spine problem, and she suffers from lower back pain. She had received physiotherapy in Portugal, perhaps eight years earlier. In late October 2015, the back pain was very bad. Ms. V.F. had heard good things about acupuncture and massage therapy, and she decided to try them.
Ms. V.F. described the treatments she received on her first visit, including acupuncture needles down her right side and the use of an electrical device that gave a kind of shock. Dr. Lannard also massaged her feet and her legs.
Then Dr. Lannard pulled Ms. V.F.’s underpants down to her knees and massaged her groin area. He told her to bend one leg to the side while he was massaging the groin area. He told her there was a tendon in that area that was linked to the spine. After massaging Ms. V.F.'s legs and groin area and removing the acupuncture needles, Dr. Lannard pulled her underpants up again. Ms. V.F. trusted that she was receiving legitimate medical treatment, but she thought differently of her initial experience after the second visit.
The November 3 visit was a repeat of the first one, except that the treatment (on the front part of her body) went a lot further. At the start of the treatment, Ms. V.F. was wearing only her underpants and a patient’s medical gown. Dr. Lannard put oil on Ms. V.F.’s legs and stomach before massaging those areas. Before the groin massage, Dr. Lannard took off Ms. V.F.’s underpants “so your clothes won’t get dirty” (he said). The gown was pushed up to Ms. V.F.’s waist for the groin massage. Dr. Lannard then put more oil on his hands before massaging Ms. V.F.’s chest area and breasts. He pushed the gown up to Ms. V.F.’s neck (just one shoulder was in the gown) for the chest and breast massage.
While Dr. Lannard was massaging Ms. V.F.’s groin area, he touched her vagina. The evidence on this issue was very detailed, but suffice it to say that Dr. Lannard’s finger penetrated the labia but not the vaginal canal. Ms. V.F. said that she cringed and pulled away to signal that she did not like it. Ms. V.F. also said that while Dr. Lannard was massaging her breasts, “he said nothing, he just made sounds, like moaning”.
Ms. V.F. was looking for an excuse to leave. ·She said she had to go to the bathroom. Dr. Lannard grabbed a hot towel and wiped the oil off Ms. V.F.’s legs, stomach and chest. Ms. V.F. put the medical gown on and went to the bathroom to collect her thoughts.
When Ms. V.F. returned, she asked if she could put her underwear on. Dr. Lannard said “No, I haven't finished the treatment”. He then did some more acupuncture and used the electrical device.
After Ms. V.F. had got dressed, Dr. Lannard wanted her to book another appointment, and she did. Before Ms. V.F. left, Dr. Lannard wanted to show her an exercise for back pain. Ms. V.F. testified that “he insisted on me doing it. I had said I knew how to do it and I wanted to leave because I was late for [an appointment with my family] doctor”. The exercise involved Ms. V.F. putting her back against a wall and bending her legs at the knee (in a chair position). Ms. V.F. said that Dr. Lannard “put his legs between mine, held my shoulders firmly against the wall with his hands, put his face against mine and whispered in my ear to breathe calmly”.
[6] It can be seen that Ritchie J. referred to Lannard as “Dr. Lannard”, although there was no evidence at trial as to his professional training or status. At the time of sentencing, Lannard was 55 years old. The Pre-Sentence Report stated that he was born and raised in Brazil where he “attended a professional college and graduated from the naturopathy program”. He then worked in “an internship program at a local lab that focused on naturopathy work”. He moved to Canada in 1987, at age 25, and worked in a variety of jobs that were unrelated to his training in naturopathy. In 1998, at age 36, he “found work with a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner” and in 2004, at age 42, he “began his own naturopathic clinic… out of his personal residence”. In 2013, at age 51, he “became certified by the professional association that governs Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists”. He closed his practice and returned to Brazil from 2013 to 2015. “Upon his return to Canada in 2015 he rented space in an established naturopathic clinic and operated that practice for approximately eight months until he was forced to close it as a result of his criminal charges”. Lannard’s two appointments with Ms. V.F., in late 2015, would have taken place during the eight month period after his return from Brazil when he rented space in Toronto at “an established naturopathic clinic”. Lannard spoke Portuguese, which is Ms. V.F.’s first language.
C. ANALYSIS
(i) The conviction appeal
[7] Turning to the first ground of appeal against conviction, the test for an “unreasonable verdict” is whether the verdict is one “that a properly instructed jury acting judicially could reasonably have rendered”, as explained in R. v. Biniaris (2000), 2000 SCC 15, 143 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at paras 36-42 (S.C.C.). The argument on this point evolved somewhat during submissions. Mr. Berger initially submitted that the evidence established that there was full and free consent to all of the touching and that it was all for proper medical purposes, absent any expert evidence about departures from the appropriate standard of care. However, when pressed, Mr. Berger conceded that the viva voce evidence at trial and the written patient consent form indicated that the scope of consent was as follows: “voluntary consent to Traditional Chinese Medicine, Acupuncture, Massage” and “Before any of these procedures are performed, my practitioner will discuss my treatment options and only proceed if my consent is given”. In other words, the initial written consent was very general, and more specific oral consent was to be obtained at each step, as the specific “treatment options” were explained to the patient. Mr. Berger further conceded that there was never consent to any kind of sexual touching, sexual massage, or sexual exercises that might accompany legitimate treatments. Finally, Mr. Berger conceded that expert testimony is not required if the trial judge is drawing reasonable common sense inferences, and not engaging in speculation, as to whether certain kinds of touching are objectively sexual and are not part of the contemplated medical “treatment options” that have been explained to the patient. See: R. v. Litchfield (1993), 86 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 107-8 (S.C.C.); R. v. G.H., 2018 ONCA 349 at para 5; R. v. Cloutier (2011), 2011 ONCA 484, 272 C.C.C. (3d) 291 at paras 95-7 (Ont. CA).
[8] Given the above circumstances, there was abundant evidence in this case from which Ritchie J. could reasonably conclude that Lannard touched Ms. V.F. in an objectively sexual manner, that she had not consented to this kind of sexual touching, and that it was not part of any medical “treatment options” that had been explained to her. The touching of her vagina was the most obvious example of this kind of improper touching.
[9] When faced with this difficulty, Mr. Berger advanced a narrower argument concerning the “unreasonable verdict” ground of appeal. He submitted that Ritchie J.’s finding that Ms. V.F. was a credible and reliable witness was unreasonable. In particular, he submitted that Ritchie J.’s acceptance of Ms. V.F.’s evidence concerning the touching of her vagina was unreasonable, given what Mr. Berger described as glaring inconsistencies in Ms. V.F.’s account. He submitted that her account evolved in a number of ways, as follows: that merely “trying” or “attempting” to touch her vagina became an actual touch; that a “split second” touching of her vagina became a minute long touch; and that looking at the “ceiling” at the time of the vaginal touch became actually seeing the touching of her vagina.
[10] I have carefully reviewed Ms. V.F.’s detailed and repeated evidence on this point and I do not accept counsel’s submission that there were glaring inconsistencies. Ms. V.F. explained what she meant by “trying” or “attempting” to touch her vagina, namely, touching “on the outside… the labia… I’m not talking about… the actual inside the vagina”. Furthermore, she never gave a definitive estimate as to how long this particular touching lasted. Her best estimate was that it was longer than seconds but shorter than a minute. In this regard, counsel’s suggestion to her concerning “a split second” touching was embedded in a double-barreled question. As a result, this suggestion was never clearly adopted. Finally, Ms. V.F.’s evidence about the direction of her gaze was that she was lying on her back with her eyes “facing the ceiling” at the time of the frontal massage and the vaginal touching. She explained that when she felt an “intimate” and “emotional” area like her vagina being touched, she “pulled away” and that “I saw and I felt”. In cross-examination, she repeated, “I was able to feel it and I was able to see it”. In re-examination, she was asked “where were your eyes looking when he touched your vaginal area”? She replied, “The massage… The doctor’s hands, what he was massaging, the movements.” This does not strike me as an inconsistency, to feel a very invasive form of touching and then to actually look at it.
[11] Ritchie J. gave careful and detailed Reasons for Judgement, explaining why he found Ms. V.F. to be a credible and reliable witness (at pp 6-9). As part of his analysis, Ritchie J. directly addressed the defence submission that Ms. V.F.’s accounts of touching her vagina were inconsistent. He concluded that any consistencies had either been explained or they had not been made out. His conclusions on this factual point relating to credibility are entitled to considerable deference. In any event, and as explained above, I agree with them based on a reading of the trial transcript. See: R. v. D.T. (2014), 2014 ONCA 44, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 526 at paras 76-80 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. C.R. (2010), 2010 ONCA 176, 260 O.A.C. 52 at paras 34-5 (C.A.); R. v. Francois (1994), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 298 (S.C.C.).
[12] For all these reasons, the first ground of appeal concerning “unreasonable verdict” cannot succeed.
[13] The second ground of appeal against conviction alleges a number of ways in which the trial judge “misapprehended evidence”. It is settled law that a “misapprehension of the evidence may refer to a failure to consider evidence relevant to a material issue, a mistake as to the substance of the evidence, or a failure to give proper effect to evidence”, provided that “those errors play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction.” See: R. v. Morrissey (1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 218 and 221 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lohrer (2004), 193 C.C.C. (3d) 25 (S.C.C.).
[14] The Appellant submits that Ritchie J. misapprehended evidence concerning the legitimacy of the various treatments, concerning the ongoing treatment discussions about Ms. V.F.’s various ailments, concerning the final wall exercise, and concerning the touching of her vagina. The first two of these four alleged “misapprehensions of evidence” are inter-related. In summary on these two points, the Appellant submits that Ritchie J. fixated on the fact that Ms. V.F.’s initial request for treatment related only to back pain, that he ignored evidence of Ms. V.F.’s ongoing discussions with Lannard about a number of other ailments (that were unrelated to her back), and that he concluded that treatments of other parts of Ms. V.F.’s body (aside from her back) were illegitimate.
[15] In my view, this is not a fair reading of Ritchie J.’s Reasons for Judgement. First of all, it is not accurate to say that Ritchie J. fixated on Ms. V.F.’s need for back treatment and ignored discussions that she had with Lannard about other ailments and about the need to treat other parts of her body. During his recitation of the facts, early on in his Reasons, there were at least five separate occasions where Ritchie J. adverted to discussions between Lannard and Ms. V.F. during the course of the various treatments (at pp. 3-5). These discussions included references to Ms. V.F.’s complaint about constipation and to the explanation Lannard gave her for massaging a tendon in the groin. More importantly, in a later analytical section of his Reasons, Ritchie J. expressly addressed the issue of whether Ms. V.F. had raised “other medical issues”, aside from her back pain, and whether treatments of these other parts of her body were “legitimate” (at pp. 10-11). He stated the following:
The defence submitted that “V.F. went to see Mark with a variety of issues that spanned from her shoulder, to her spine, to her mid to lower back to her hip to her leg to her stomach, and included general postural, stress and constipation issues” (page 2 of the defence’s written submission). There was no evidence of that, in my view. Ms. V.F. came to Dr. Lannard because of her sore back. Other medical issues were mentioned in the medical questionnaire Ms. V.F. completed and mentioned during the course of the conversation on the second visit. That did not give Dr. Lannard an unspoken mandate to address all of Ms. V.F.’s medical issues, and in fact it would be speculative to suggest that he embarked upon such a mission. Further, I am not in a position to say whether 90% of the treatment Dr. Lannard provided was legitimate or only 10% was legitimate, but it makes no difference in either event. The simple question is whether sexual assaults occurred during the course of providing the treatment. Even assuming that all of the treatments provided were legitimate, it is my conclusion that sexual assaults still occurred. I refer in particular to the defendant removing Ms. V.F.’s panties, putting his finger in her vagina, towelling down her naked chest and body, and engaging her in an erotic wall exercise.
[16] As I read this important passage in his Reasons for Judgement, Ritchie J. found as a fact that Ms. V.F.’s initial reason for seeing Lannard was solely “because of her sore back.” However, he acknowledged that “other medical issues”, aside from back pain, had been “mentioned” by Ms. V.F., both in the initial medical questionnaire that she filled out and in the ongoing discussions that occurred during treatment. Although the questionnaire and the ongoing discussions did not give Lannard “an unspoken mandate to address all of Ms. V.F.’s medical issues”, Ritchie J. was willing to assume in favour of the defence that “all of the treatments provided were legitimate.” Nevertheless, Ritchie J. concluded that four specific sexual assaults were committed “during the course of providing the [legitimate] treatment,” namely, removing Ms. V.F.’s panties and exposing her vagina, touching her vagina, towelling down her naked chest and body after the massage treatment was finished, and putting his leg between her legs while putting his face against her face, pressing her shoulders against the wall, and whispering in her ear as she was doing a back exercise.
[17] None of the above findings are unreasonable and they do not support the alleged “misapprehensions of evidence”. Far from ignoring the discussions about ailments other than back pain, Ritchie J. acknowledged these discussions. And far from challenging the legitimacy of treating areas of the body other than the back, Ritchie J. assumed that “all of the treatments provided were legitimate”. Later in his Reasons, on three separate occasions, Ritchie J. repeated his finding concerning four specific sexual assaults that were extraneous to the legitimate treatments (at pp.12, 13 and 16-17):
Further, there is no valid justification for such things as the removal of her underpants, touching her vagina, towelling down her naked body, and the erotic wall exercise. It was Dr. Lannard who benefitted from that conduct, not his patient.
The defence also submitted that Ms. V.F.’s mind was poisoned by suspicion and that normal, innocent aspects of her treatment were perceived by her as sinister and improper. I do not agree. Quite simply, there was nothing normal and innocent about removing Ms. V.F.’s panties, touching her vagina, towelling her naked body, and engaging her in an erotic wall exercise. Ms. V.F. did not see things through a distorted eye. She saw things clearly.
The defence submitted that it was not proven that any touching of a sexual nature took place and also that mens rea was not proven. Again, I do not agree. A distinction can be made between legitimate medical treatments and touching of a sexual nature, even though they may be taking place more or less at the same time. For example, the groin massage may be legitimate, but removing her panties “so they won’t get soiled” would not be. I say this in the context of many improper actions taken by Dr. Lannard, such as the finger in the vagina and towelling down Ms. V.F.. As I have mentioned, the whole course of Dr. Lannard’s conduct must be considered together in its totality.
[18] In conclusion concerning the first two alleged “misapprehensions of evidence,” they are simply not made out. On a fair reading of Ritchie J.’s Reasons for Judgement as a whole, he acknowledged the discussions about ailments other than back pain and he assumed the legitimacy of treating parts of Ms. V.F.’s body other than her back. He then went on to find that Lannard committed four acts that were not part of any legitimate treatment, and that were objectively sexual, even though they occurred at roughly the same time as legitimate treatments. These findings were entirely reasonable. There was no need to remove Ms. V.F.’s panties and expose her vagina, in order to massage a tendon in her groin area. There was no need to touch her vagina. There was no need related to any treatment to towel down her naked body, after the massage treatment was complete. And there was no need for Lannard to participate in the wall exercise in an intimate and erotic manner, as opposed to simply watching her and instructing her while Ms. V.F. performed the exercise.
[19] The third and fourth alleged “misapprehensions of evidence” concern the wall exercise and the touching of the vaginal area. They only require brief analysis. The Appellant submits that Ritchie J.’s characterization of the wall exercise as “erotic” was not supported by the evidence. I disagree. Ms. V.F. described a number of acts committed by Lannard while she did the exercise - putting “his legs between my legs”, pressing her “shoulders against the wall” with his hands, putting “his face against mine”, and “looking down and whispering in my ear”. The totality of these acts, in the context of Lannard’s prior sexual touching of Ms. V.F., justified Ritchie J.’s use of the term “erotic”. The Appellant further submits that Ritchie J. failed to appreciate various alleged inconsistencies in Ms. V.F.’s account concerning the touching of her vaginal area. This submission simply repeats the same argument, already addressed above, that was advanced in the context of “unreasonable verdict”. I repeat the analysis set out above, rejecting the submission concerning these alleged inconsistencies.
[20] For all these reasons, the second ground of appeal is not made out. There were no “misapprehensions of evidence”.
[21] The third and last ground of appeal relating to conviction concerns the Crown’s re-examination of Ms. V.F.. The Appellant submits that two errors were committed at this stage of the trial. First, Ritchie J. allowed the Crown to re-examine Ms. V.F. on the issue of whether she consented to an erotic massage. Second, he allowed the Crown to use an anatomical diagram of the vaginal area in order to illustrate exactly where Ms. V.F. said that Lannard had touched her. It was submitted that these two errors rendered the trial unfair.
[22] In my view, there is no merit to this third ground of appeal. The first alleged error, concerning the Crown’s question about consent “to have an erotic or sexual massage” (at p. 174), misconceives the trial record. The Crown had originally framed the question in a way that connected it to the patient history form, where there was a question about “sex problems” (at p. 168). The defence objected to this connection between consent to an erotic massage and the “sex problems” question on the form, arguing (at p. 169) that it raised s. 276 Criminal Code issues related to Ms. V.F.’s past sexual history (which the defence had avoided in cross-examination). However, Mr. Berger (who was trial counsel) made it clear that he had no objection to the Crown re-examining on the simple issue of consent to a sexual massage. As he put it (at pp. 172-3):
“… she [the Crown] is entitled to ask whether there was consent for an erotic or sexual massage, but it’s not, it’s not proper to connect it in any way to the questionnaire she filled out… Dr. Lannard has no issue with the question of whether she gave consent or not to a sexual or erotic massage, but beyond that or any connection, there’s a major problem with that”.
At this point, the Crown resiled from her initial position and stated that she agreed with Mr. Berger (at p. 173):
“All right. Well, I’m fine to just ask that question”.
Ritchie J. then ruled in Mr. Berger’s favour, sustaining his narrow objection to the original way in which the Crown had framed the question (at p. 173):
“Well, I agree with Mr. Berger. I think that is the way to go”.
It can be seen that the first alleged error during re-examination involves the Crown asking a question that the Appellant had expressly agreed to.
[23] The second alleged error, involving the anatomical diagram of the vaginal area, was the subject of a defence objection at trial (at pp. 185-6). Mr. Berger submitted that the diagram could have been introduced during examination-in-chief and that it was improper to introduce it during re-examination because it would “bolster credibility”, as he put it. The Crown submitted that there had been extensive cross-examination “about the actual location” of this touching, and whether Lannard actually touched or only attempted “to touch the vagina”, and that the “anatomical labels of that region” would help make it “clear what she’s referring to”. Ritchie J. agreed with the Crown’s position. He held that cross-examination had “clouded things and made things unclear” and that the proposed re-examination “is proper clarification”. Mr. Berger repeated the same arguments on appeal that he made at trial.
[24] In my view, the re-examination was proper. There had been extensive cross-examination as to what Ms. V.F. meant when she stated that Lannard had “attempted” to touch her vagina. It was only in cross-examination that she explained that he had touched “the labia on the vagina”, and not “the canal, the actual inside of the vagina”. In these circumstances, the anatomical diagram usefully clarified evidence that had come out for the first time in cross-examination, by showing the exact parts of the vaginal area that Ms. V.F. was referring to. As Martin J.A. put it, speaking for the Court in R. v. Moore (1984), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 541 at 568 (Ont. C.A.):
The right to re-examine exists only where there has been cross-examination, and must be confined to matters arising in cross-examination. New facts cannot be introduced in re-examination. The judge may, however, in his discretion grant leave to introduce new matters in re-examination and the opposite party may then cross-examine on the new facts. In re-examination leading questions may not be asked: see Phipson on Evidence, 13th ed. (1982), pp. 823-4; 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed. (1940), p. 567.
Also see: R. v. Duncan et al, 2016 ONSC 1126 at paras 32-36.
[25] Out of an abundance of caution, Ritchie J. invited defence counsel to cross-examine on matters that the defence had objected to in re-examination. Martin J.A. explained, in the above passage in R. v. Moore, supra, that this is the proper course to follow where “new matters” are allowed in re-examination as an exercise of “discretion”. Mr. Berger declined Ritchie J.’s invitation to cross-examine further on the anatomical diagram. He maintained his objection but stated, “we don’t think we need to ask any further questions” (at pp. 202-3). Accordingly, even if the anatomical diagram somehow introduced a “new matter” in re-examination, Richie J. followed the procedure set out in Moore.
[26] For all the above reasons, the third ground of appeal is not made out. There was no improper re-examination of Ms. V.F..
[27] For the reasons set out above, the appeal from conviction is dismissed.
(ii) The sentence appeal
[28] I do not intend to address the sentence appeal in any great detail as it was not fully argued. I asked Mr. Golwalla, at the beginning of the Crown’s sentence appeal, whether he was seeking to re-incarcerate Lannard at this point. Given that Lannard completed the three month custodial sentence over nine months ago and had then resumed his life, and given the additional hardship involved in re-incarceration, Mr. Golwalla fairly conceded that the Crown would not seek to re-incarcerate Lannard. The Crown’s concern was simply that the sentence imposed by Ritchie J. was outside the appropriate range and the Crown did not want it to stand unchallenged.
[29] The Crown had sought an 18 month sentence at trial. Ritchie J. conceded that the three month sentence he imposed was “lenient”. He acknowledged two aggravating circumstances, namely, the significant breach of trust by a “medical practitioner” and the “traumatic impact” that the assaults had on Ms. V.F.. The repetition of the assaults was also an aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the mitigating circumstances were that Lannard was a first offender, he had strong family support, and he had performed some 20 hours of community service while awaiting sentence. In somewhat similar cases, involving breach of trust sexual assaults by health care professionals, Campbell J. held that 14 months jail was the appropriate sentence in R. v. Aguas, 2015 ONSC 5732, and Schreck J. imposed a six month jail sentence in R. v. Khan, 2016 ONCJ 282. In R. v. Butt, 2012 ONSC 4326, a case that did not involve breach of trust by a health care professional, I held that six to twelve months jail was the appropriate range of sentence for sexual assaults “in the mid-range of gravity”, citing the leading appellate authorities in Ontario.
[30] I am satisfied that the sentence imposed by Ritchie J. was below the appropriate range of sentence. However, the Crown is not pressing its cross-appeal, for the reasons explained above. Accordingly, I need not decide whether imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range amounts to reversible error in the circumstances of this particular case. See: R. v. Lacasse (2015), 2015 SCC 64, 333 C.C.C. (3d) 450 at paras. 56-72 (S.C.C.).
[31] For all these reasons, the sentence appeal is dismissed.
D. CONCLUSION
[32] For the reasons set out above, Lannard’s appeal against conviction and the Crown’s cross-appeal against sentence are both dismissed.
M.A. Code J.
Released: December 7, 2018