95 total
Summary conviction appeal for impaired driving dismissed as appellant had requisite mens rea regarding medication side effects.
The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he had the requisite mens rea.
The appellant had consumed a significantly increased dosage of prescription medication before driving, despite experiencing recent memory loss and knowing the drug could cause drowsiness.
The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction, applying the test from R. v. King to find the appellant could reasonably have foreseen the impairment or was reckless.
The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the appeal judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.
Choking conviction set aside as it was part of the assault rather than to facilitate it.
The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence against his wife.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, finding it amply supported by the evidence.
However, the court set aside the choking conviction, concluding that the choking was part of the assault itself and not done with the specific intent to enable or facilitate the assault.
The appeal was allowed in part, and an acquittal was entered on the choking count.
Appeal dismissed; articulable cause existed for detention and search incident to arrest was lawful.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his initial detention lacked articulable cause and that evidence obtained during a subsequent search should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that articulable cause existed.
Furthermore, the court held that the arrest preceding the search was lawful, and the evidence would not have been excluded even if the initial detention was unlawful.
New trial ordered after inadequate jury recharge on credibility and reasonable doubt.
The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from historical allegations of abuse by a child complainant, and also sought leave to appeal sentence.
The Court of Appeal held that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the jury's questions about credibility in the absence of tangible evidence and the meaning of reasonable doubt required a renewed W.(D.) instruction during recharge.
The failure to repeat that instruction created a risk that the jury had lost sight of the burden of proof and the bases on which it was required to acquit.
Although the court rejected the argument that the guilty verdicts were unreasonable, it allowed the conviction appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.
Convictions for robbery set aside due to errors in jury instructions on absence of evidence and in-dock identification.
The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and possession of stolen property arising from the robbery of a taxi driver.
At trial, the judge instructed the jury not to speculate on the absence of forensic evidence linking the appellant to the stolen items, and permitted the jury to rely on the taxi driver's in-dock identification.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that an absence of evidence can raise a reasonable doubt, and by failing to adequately warn the jury about the dangers and lack of probative value of in-dock identification.
Sentence appeal dismissed; consideration of withdrawn charge on sentencing complied with s. 725 of the Criminal Code.
The appellant appealed his sentence of one year imprisonment, 18 months probation, and a three-year driving prohibition for driving while disqualified.
He argued the sentencing judge failed to give pre-trial custody credit, improperly imposed probation for a withdrawn threatening charge, and imposed a harsh sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that pre-trial custody was credited, the sentence was fit, and the consideration of the withdrawn charge complied with the principles in Garcia v. Silva and s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Criminal Code.
Crown appeal allowed; conditional sentence for arson increased to 20 months and restitution increased to $12,000.
The Crown appealed the conditional sentence and $2500 restitution order imposed on the respondent for arson.
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons unsatisfactory and the sentence unfit for such a serious offence.
However, given the respondent's current employment situation, the court declined to convert the conditional sentence to a custodial one.
The appeal was allowed, increasing the conditional sentence to 20 months and ordering restitution of $12,000 payable in monthly instalments.
Appeal from first degree murder conviction dismissed; trial judge properly excluded evidence rather than staying proceedings for police misconduct.
The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years.
He appealed, arguing that a stay of proceedings should have been granted due to serious police misconduct, including an assault during interrogation and subsequent attempts to conceal it.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly remedied the Charter breaches by excluding the tainted evidence rather than granting a stay.
The Court also rejected arguments regarding constitutional exemptions for parole ineligibility, the admission of a jailhouse informant's testimony, and the jury instructions on first degree murder.
Sentence appeal allowed and sentence reduced where trial judge forgot pre-trial indication of lighter sentence.
The appellants appealed their sentence for aggravated assault.
During pre-trial discussions, the trial judge indicated he would impose 12 to 15 months' imprisonment on a guilty plea if the pre-sentence report was positive.
The report was positive, and the appellants pleaded guilty.
However, the trial judge sentenced them to two years less a day, having forgotten his earlier position.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding an appearance of unfairness, and reduced the sentence to 15 months plus three years' probation.
Conviction and sentence appeals for welfare fraud dismissed; trial judge's findings of undisclosed assets upheld.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for welfare fraud.
The Court of Appeal found it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the appellant had undisclosed assets and income, and that his false reporting allowed him to continue receiving welfare.
The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.
The indictment was amended on consent to charge fraud over $1,000 to conform to the Criminal Code at the relevant time.
Appeal from convictions and 8-year sentence for sexual assault of granddaughters dismissed.
The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexually assaulting his three young granddaughters.
The Crown's case rested entirely on the evidence of the three complainants.
The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury that a finding of collusion among the complainants would diminish their credibility, and by improperly addressing Crown counsel's remarks regarding the absence of medical evidence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.
The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the total sentence of 8 years' imprisonment given the egregious breach of trust, the severity of the assaults, and the appellant's prior conviction for a similar offence.
Convictions set aside and new trial ordered due to flawed credibility assessment based solely on demeanour.
The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, failing to comply with an undertaking, and threatening to damage property.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by assessing the complainant's credibility based solely on demeanour, failing to analyze significant inconsistencies in her evidence, and inappropriately considering the evidence globally across all counts.
The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Stay of proceedings for late disclosure set aside as inappropriate remedy.
The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against a young offender.
The trial judge had granted the stay due to concerns over the slow pace of Crown disclosure and the circumstances of the youth's custody.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a stay is a remedy of last resort and was not appropriate in this case, as it was not directly responsive to the violation and should not be used to discipline the Crown or police.
The stay was set aside and the matter remitted to the Youth Court.
Appeal from harassment conviction and sentence dismissed; peace bond must be observed while outstanding.
The appellant appealed his conviction for harassment and his sentence.
He argued the conviction resulted from a violation of a peace bond that should not have been issued, and that his sentence of 12 months plus three years probation was illegal because it was added to a three-year sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting the peace bond had to be observed while outstanding.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had credited pre-sentence custody and imposed a lawful sentence of 12 months plus three years probation.
Conviction and sentence appeals dismissed; fresh evidence rejected and four-month sentence upheld.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of four months' imprisonment.
He argued the verdict was unreasonable, sought to introduce fresh evidence, and contended the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.
The conviction appeal was dismissed as the verdict was reasonable.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding no error in principle given the appellant's history of abuse and previous conviction for the same offence.