Nadia Thomas

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that had overturned his acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in concluding the trial judge improperly treated the arresting officer's notes as evidence or required them to confirm oral testimony.

The trial judge properly used the absence of an important fact in the notes regarding the origin of the odour of alcohol to assess the officer's credibility.

The trial judge's finding of reasonable doubt regarding the officer's reasonable suspicion was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to call his wife as an alibi witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that trial counsel had reasonable grounds for not calling the witness and that the appellant failed to establish prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence of two years less a day was within the appropriate range for the calculated and cold-blooded offence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court's order requiring it to pay $12,000 in costs to the respondent.

The respondent had successfully avoided a minimum jail sentence for impaired driving after the summary conviction appeal court stayed the sentence, despite finding the minimum penalty provision constitutional.

The summary conviction appeal court awarded costs against the Crown, characterizing the appeal as a test case.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the appeal was not a test case as the respondent had a vital personal interest in avoiding incarceration, and there was no Crown misconduct to justify the award.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of an accomplice's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed himself on the danger of accepting accomplice evidence and that the confirmatory evidence was overwhelming.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued a reasonable apprehension of bias because the trial judge had accepted a guilty plea from his co-accused six weeks prior to his trial, during which facts implicating the appellant were read in.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting the high threshold for reasonable apprehension of bias and that trial judges routinely disabuse their minds of prior prejudicial information.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to quash a sentence for breach of probation, as the appellant was not convicted of that charge, but the sentence for sexual assault was upheld.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The conviction appeal was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the trial judge had accepted a guilty plea from a co-accused six weeks prior to the appellant's trial, during which facts implicating the appellant were read in.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, noting that trial judges routinely disabuse their minds of potentially prejudicial information from prior proceedings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in the sentence imposed and noted the appellant had almost completed the secure custody portion.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences against seven boys, six of whom were former speech therapy patients and one of whom was his step-nephew, as well as a six-year penitentiary sentence.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge scrutinized the accused's memory more harshly than the complainants' recollections, failed to distinguish credibility from reliability, improperly admitted similar fact evidence, and should have quashed one count for vagueness of timeframe.

The court held that the similar fact evidence properly went to whether the actus reus occurred in the patient counts, that there was no air of reality to collusion or tainting, and that the indictment gave sufficient information to permit a defence.

The sentence was within the normal range for sexual offences by an adult in a position of trust who groomed children over time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his wife, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence of prior domestic abuse and failing to caution himself about collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the similar fact evidence was admissible to show the history of the relationship, motive, and to assess credibility.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the collusion issue, noting the appellant did not testify and the Crown had a strong case.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud related to the Ontario Drug Benefit Program.

They argued that the jury lacked a basis to find the plan was deprived of funds and that inadmissible hearsay evidence was admitted regarding the total detriment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the convictions and concluding that any hearsay evidence caused no prejudice since the appellants conceded the detriment exceeded $5,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility based solely on demeanour and applying a different standard to his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and was entitled to conclude the appellant's evidence was scripted, tailored, and lacked the ring of truth based on implausible explanations.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his two-year sentence.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, circumstantial evidence, the theory of the defence, and motive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate, noting that trial counsel had approved the charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the two-year sentence for robbery with a weapon on a vulnerable victim was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impersonation, fraud over $5,000, and failure to comply with a recognizance, and was sentenced to fourteen months' imprisonment and eighteen months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence of a serious medical condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's criminal record and the commission of the second offence while on bail.

The court also declined to reduce the sentence based on the fresh evidence, noting the institution's obligation to provide adequate medical treatment and the upcoming parole hearing.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence imposed on the respondent for three counts of assault with a weapon and two counts of uttering death threats against his wife and children.

The trial judge had emphasized the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation and stated he would have imposed a significant jail term had the respondent been born or raised in Canada.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in principle, holding that individuals born or raised in Canada should not be held to a higher standard of conduct than those who immigrated as adults.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted a six-month custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 23 months in jail and a restitution order of $7,781.29 for driving-related offences and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, noting the appellant's horrendous record of drinking and driving offences and lifetime driving bans.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by deleting the restitution order, as the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found several errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury, including the failure to give a limiting instruction on the complainant's prior consistent statements, using an outdated version of the Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt, and improperly limiting the defence's alternative perpetrator theory.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, with a note that the appellant had already served his sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and misapplied the W.(D.) framework by approaching the case on an 'either/or' basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly weighed all the evidence, rejected the appellant's testimony, and accepted the evidence of the two young complainants who described similar incidents without collusion.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider whether the Crown proved lack of consent and knowledge of lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the issues of consent or mistaken belief in consent, as the complainant was intoxicated and repeatedly said 'no'.

The sentence of 40 months' imprisonment, in addition to 16 months' pre-sentence custody, was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by referencing a lack of evidence of effective community supervision without following the procedure set out in R. v. Nault.

The Court of Appeal noted the sentencing judge's approach was not in accord with Nault, but dismissed the appeal because the appellant was not a good candidate for a conditional sentence given his serious criminal record.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's conclusions.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 21 months' incarceration and a five-year driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent ran a red light at high speed, struck and killed a pedestrian, dragged her 190 meters, and fled the scene.

He had a lengthy record of driving offences.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and protection of the public.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to four years and three months (after credit for pre-trial custody) along with a lifetime driving prohibition.