Morris Cooper

The applicant brought a motion to compel compliance with outstanding orders, for contempt, and to strike the respondent's Answer and Claim following chronic non-compliance with financial disclosure obligations.

The court found that the respondent had failed to purge his previous contempt and imposed a $300,000 penalty.

Due to the respondent's ongoing failure to comply with court orders and the Family Law Rules, the court struck his Answer and Claim, limiting his future participation in the proceedings, and awarded full indemnity costs to the applicant.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside the conditional certification of their proposed class action against Canada regarding the placement of Aboriginal children in non-Aboriginal foster care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the case management judge erred by conditionally certifying the action when the statement of claim did not disclose a viable cause of action.

The Court also agreed that the certification motion should be heard by a different judge to avoid the original judge sitting in review of his own decision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, quashing the Divisional Court's costs award because it failed to consider the public interest and novel legal issues raised by the case.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, misuse of confidential information, wrongful dismissal, and fraudulent conveyances, the court determined the allocation and scale of costs arising from two trials and related proceedings.

The litigation involved numerous parties and mixed results, with certain defendants fully successful and others partially liable.

The court concluded that the complexity of the litigation and the magnitude of the claimed costs warranted referral of most quantification issues to an assessment officer under Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded in several instances, including where unproven allegations of fraud or serious misconduct had been advanced, while partial indemnity costs applied to others depending on conduct and settlement offers.

The court also considered the appropriateness of Bullock and Sanderson orders in allocating responsibility among defendants.

The appellants and respondents are adjoining neighbours involved in a dispute over a parking easement on the respondents' property.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order that limited their parking to a single vehicle and required them to park so as not to restrict the respondents' backyard access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly interpreted the original grant of easement and the surrounding circumstances, which indicated an intention to create a right to park only one vehicle.

The respondents' cross-appeal on costs was also dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's Answer and Claim and to find him in contempt for his ongoing failure to comply with multiple court orders regarding financial disclosure and costs.

The respondent argued he had purged his contempt to the extent possible, citing health issues, lack of funds, and reliance on third parties.

The court found the respondent had not met his obligations and had provided inadequate excuses.

However, noting some recent progress and the respondent's claim that his health issues had resolved, the court adjourned the motion to strike and the contempt motion, giving the respondent one final opportunity to comply with a strict timetable for disclosure and payment of costs.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding spray foam insulation services.

The appellant argued that its defence of equitable set-off required the entire matter to proceed to trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's factual distinction between the types of services provided, noting that the attic insulation and related set-off claims would still proceed to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff corporation sued the provincial government for $2.25 billion after the government imposed a moratorium on offshore wind farm development in Lake Ontario.

The government moved under Rule 21 to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the moratorium constituted a core policy decision grounded in public policy considerations and therefore could not ground liability in tort.

Claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, expropriation, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, misfeasance in public office, and intentional infliction of economic harm were all found to be inadequately pleaded or legally unsustainable.

The statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed without leave to amend.

The defendants moved under Rule 25.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for further particulars of allegations in a statement of claim arising from a partnership dispute involving ownership and management of an apartment building.

The defendants argued that the pleading alleged fraud and misrepresentation and therefore required detailed particularization under Rule 25.06(8).

The court reviewed the governing principles for ordering particulars, including that particulars are required only when the information is not within the knowledge of the requesting party and is necessary to permit a responsive pleading.

The court found that the statement of claim and the plaintiff’s reply to the demand for particulars sufficiently disclosed the material facts and were not bald allegations.

The motion for further particulars was dismissed.

Investors brought an action against their accountant and a lawyer alleging breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract arising from losses on second mortgage investments after mortgagor defaults.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment arguing there was no causal link between any alleged breach and the losses, particularly because the investors obtained independent legal advice and increased their investments thereafter.

The court held that equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty requires a causal connection between the breach and the loss.

The evidence demonstrated the losses resulted from the plaintiffs’ own investment decisions and not from any alleged non‑disclosure.

The court also found that a later agreement to renew the mortgage was conditional upon refinancing of a first mortgage and therefore unenforceable when that condition precedent failed.

Following a successful civil trial involving breaches of fiduciary duty and breach of trust relating to trust property, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs based on the defendants’ conduct throughout the litigation, including dishonesty, destruction or concealment of key financial records, and failure to comply with interlocutory cost orders.

The court applied the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality and considered offers to settle and litigation conduct.

Finding the defendants’ behaviour reprehensible and a clear breach of fiduciary obligations, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs.

Liability for costs was apportioned so that two defendants were jointly and severally responsible for four‑fifths of the award, with the remaining defendant responsible for one‑fifth.

The plaintiff invested in a property with the defendant Esmail, creating a trust relationship.

Esmail failed to keep proper accounts, transferred the property to his wife Yasmin to defeat creditors, and eventually sold the property without properly accounting to the plaintiff.

The solicitor acting on the sale, Jiwa, ignored the trust declaration and failed to protect the plaintiff's interests.

The court found Esmail and Yasmin liable for breach of trust and fiduciary duty, and Jiwa liable for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, awarding damages to the plaintiff.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a motion judge's decision to conditionally certify a class action on behalf of aboriginal people placed in non-aboriginal foster or adoptive homes.

The motion judge had found that the statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action but conditionally certified claims in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, effectively pre-approving an amended pleading.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by predetermining the viability of the cause of action without conducting a full analysis and denying the defendant the opportunity to argue the certification criteria.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend, and the certification motion was ordered to be heard by a different judge.

The appellant appealed an order striking its claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The core issue was whether the presence of asbestos in a property was a latent or patent defect.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the defect was patent, as the asbestos was noted in an inspector's report commissioned by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its application for specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase shares.

The trial judge found no binding contract had been formed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by focusing entirely on the subjective intent of the respondent's negotiator rather than applying the objective test for contract formation.

However, the Court declined to grant specific performance, noting that applying the objective test could still lead to a finding of no contract, and remitted the matter for a new trial.

The appellant's home was fraudulently transferred to an impostor who then mortgaged the property to the respondent.

The respondent registered the mortgage without knowledge of the fraud.

The appellant sought to set aside the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal held that the Land Titles Act operates on the theory of deferred indefeasibility.

Because the respondent acquired its interest directly from the fraudster, it was an intermediate owner and its charge was invalid against the true owner.

The appeal was allowed and the mortgage was set aside.

The appellants sought to perfect an appeal of a trial judge's order directing a corporate audit under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, despite a previous order by the Divisional Court denying an extension of time to appeal on the basis that the appeal lacked merit.

The appellants argued they perfected the appeal to pre-empt the Registrar from dismissing it for delay after the trial judge's order was finally entered.

The court quashed the purported perfection of the appeal, finding no change in circumstances to reconsider the prior finding that the appeal was devoid of merit, but granted the appellants an extension of time to appeal the previous order denying the extension.

The respondent sought costs following an appeal.

The appellant argued that the time claimed by the respondent for preparation was excessive.

The Court of Appeal agreed in part with the appellant's submissions and fixed the costs payable to the respondent at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke his appointment to an industry advisory committee.

The Minister revoked the appointment after learning the applicant was a member of the Hell's Angels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's exercise of discretion was not unreasonable and that the revocation did not violate the applicant's freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have quashed the decision, finding the revocation unreasonable given the applicant's good character, qualifications, and the fixed term of the appointment.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision finding no agreement existed for the respondent to pay a real estate commission or finder's fee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the three property 'flips' were part of one transaction for which the appellant had already earned a commission, and that the respondent had refused to sign an agreement for any further fee.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee.

An adjudicator found the dismissal unjust and ordered the employer to provide a letter of recommendation with specified factual content and to answer any reference inquiries exclusively by sending that letter.

The employer appealed, arguing the orders infringed its freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter applies to administrative adjudicators.

The Court found that both the positive order to write the letter and the negative order restricting further comments infringed s. 2(b) but were saved under s. 1 as reasonable limits designed to counteract the consequences of the unjust dismissal.