Michelle Psutka

The appellant appealed convictions for possession and making available child pornography, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The proceedings spanned approximately 50 months and involved disclosure disputes concerning forensic images of hard drives, bifurcation of the trial to accommodate an expert witness, and numerous defence applications.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the net delay exceeded the 18‑month Jordan ceiling and that the trial judge erred in characterizing the case as particularly complex.

However, because the charges were laid before the release of Jordan, the court applied the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis and concluded that the Crown had justified the delay in light of the parties’ reliance on the pre‑Jordan Morin framework, the modest excess over the Morin guidelines, the defence’s limited diligence in advancing the case, and minimal prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was dismissed and the convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of a loaded firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and making a false statement.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's proposed sentence without notifying counsel or providing clear reasons, by treating the loaded nature of the firearm as a separate aggravating factor (when it was an essential element of the offence), and by failing to consider the guilty plea as a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, the original sentence was vacated, and a global sentence of four years' custody (as initially proposed by the Crown) was imposed, less pre-sentence custody credit.

The applicant, Kyle Jones, sought a stay of extradition proceedings based on abuse of process, arguing for perpetual piecemeal prosecution, and alternatively, requested disclosure to build a record for the Minister of Justice.

The court dismissed both applications, finding no air of reality to the abuse of process claim and that the disclosure request was not relevant to the committal hearing and would unduly prolong the expeditious extradition process.

The court emphasized that concerns about prosecutorial discretion and the appropriate forum for prosecution are primarily matters for the Minister of Justice at the surrender stage.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a business partner and sentenced to 18 months incarceration and restitution.

He appealed his conviction, arguing a s. 11(b) Charter violation (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and an error in the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 11(b) violation, concluding that the trial judge incorrectly applied the presumptive ceiling for delay.

The court dismissed the Crown's request to impose a remedy other than a stay of proceedings, reaffirming that a stay is the appropriate and only available remedy for a s. 11(b) breach.

The conviction for fraud was stayed.

The appellant's other grounds of appeal, including the W.(D.) analysis and the sentence appeal, were dismissed.

The applicant, Kyle Jones, sought disclosure of a hard drive and communications between Canadian and American authorities to support an abuse of process motion to stay extradition proceedings.

He alleged intentional delay by authorities to maximize incarceration and potential perpetual piecemeal prosecution.

The court dismissed the disclosure application, finding that the allegations were not capable of supporting a stay of proceedings and lacked an air of reality, being based on speculation rather than concrete proof.

The court emphasized the distinct roles of the judiciary and executive in extradition and that issues of delay and forum are primarily for the Minister of Justice.

The appellant, J.K., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his two-year prison sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of evidence regarding a lodged tampon and the dismissal of a Charter application for pre-conviction delay.

The sentence appeal contested the finding of no unreasonable post-conviction delay and sought a sentence reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence on the tampon issue, finding it inadmissible under Palmer criteria.

It upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the s. 11(b) application, justifying the nine-month pre-conviction delay (due to an outstanding bench warrant) under the transitional exceptional circumstance and the 13-month post-conviction delay (related to a Gladue report) by deducting six months for administrative error as a discrete exceptional event and justifying the remainder under transitional exceptional circumstances.

The two-year sentence was found fit, with the trial judge having appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the appellant's personal circumstances and the impact of bail conditions.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed on four grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge materially misapprehended two aspects of the appellant's testimony, which significantly impacted the judge's credibility findings.

The court found that these misapprehensions were sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.

The other grounds of appeal, concerning a Section 11(b) Charter violation, restrictions on cross-examination of prior sexual activity under Section 276 of the Criminal Code, and the Crown's re-election to proceed by summary conviction, were dismissed.

A new trial was ordered.

S.H. appealed convictions for sexual assault and attempting to overcome resistance by choking.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's jury instruction on cross-count evidence, treatment of a prior consistent statement, denial of a Criminal Code s. 276 application, and alleged improper Crown closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal found reversible error in the jury instruction on cross-count evidence, which the Crown conceded was erroneous and not harmless.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicants, two firefighters charged with fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months and one week.

After deducting three months of conceded defence delay, the net delay was 32 months and one week, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown argued that additional periods, including a two-month delay for a judicial pre-trial, a two-month adjournment of the preliminary inquiry, and a seven-week judicial reserve period, should be deducted as defence delay or exceptional circumstances.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that the delays were not caused by the defence and that the Crown failed to take proactive steps to mitigate them.

The court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury on planning and deliberation were flawed.

The appellant conceded guilt for second degree murder but contended there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation based on evidence of the appellant's contact with a witness approximately one week before the murder to facilitate fraudulent use of the victim's debit cards, combined with evidence of the nature and circumstances of the killing.