Michelle Psutka

Two appellants, addicted to fentanyl, set fire to a rowhouse using Molotov cocktails at the direction of their fentanyl dealer, killing three occupants and seriously injuring a fourth.

Both pleaded guilty to three counts of manslaughter and one count of arson causing bodily harm and received sentences of 16 and 17 years respectively, plus $250,000 restitution orders each.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's treatment of mitigating factors including addiction and mental health, and held the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

However, the court quashed the restitution orders, finding the sentencing judge failed to weigh the appellants' ability to pay and imposed them as a mechanical afterthought.

Fresh evidence of post-sentencing cooperation with authorities was not admitted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death arising from a fatal ATV accident.

The appellant was towing the deceased's disabled ATV using a short fabric sling when his vehicle drifted left, causing the tow strap to become caught and the deceased's ATV to flip, resulting in her death.

The trial judge found the appellant was impaired by alcohol, engaged in an inherently dangerous towing operation without proper concentration, and that his conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in the trial judge's treatment of expert and lay evidence regarding the tow setup, and that causation was properly established for both offences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

The court found that the evidence did not support leaving the charge to the jury on the basis of wilful blindness, as there was no basis for a reasonable jury to find that the respondent knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that the victim had died.

The court also held there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder, as the evidence established the victim died and there was no live issue as to causation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed N.S.'s appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider his mixed out-of-court statements and erred in finding that Crown witnesses corroborated each other.

The Court found no reversible error, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and did not misuse the concept of corroboration.

The decision clarifies the use of mixed out-of-court statements and the proper approach to corroborative evidence in sexual offence trials.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Samer Al-Akhali’s conviction appeal for sexual assault but allowed his sentence appeal, reducing his penitentiary sentence from five years to three.

The court found that the trial judge properly rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, and that the trial was procedurally fair.

However, the trial judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the principles of rehabilitation and restraint applicable to youthful first-time offenders.

The appellate court emphasized that, while denunciation and deterrence are important in serious sexual assault cases, rehabilitation and restraint must be prioritized for young, first-time offenders, and the sentence must be proportionate and individualized.

The United States sought to extradite the applicant for child luring offences.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the extradition proceedings, arguing abuse of process.

The court found that the provincial Crown breached the applicant's section 7 and 8 Charter rights during a prior domestic prosecution by failing to disclose ongoing interactions with US authorities and by sharing his computer hard drive without limitations.

This misconduct prejudiced the applicant, who pleaded guilty domestically without knowing his full jeopardy.

The court concluded this was one of the clearest of cases where a stay of proceedings was necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant was convicted of drug and firearm offences.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the search warrant used to obtain evidence was improperly issued.

Specifically, he contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading and that tips from confidential informants (CIs) and an anonymous caller were not sufficiently compelling, credible, or corroborated to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for reviewing search warrants and the `Debot` criteria for assessing CI reliability.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant, even if certain information in the ITO were excised.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, alleging trial judge errors in the jury charge regarding the W.(D.) instruction on consent and the consideration of absence of injury.

The Court of Appeal found no misdirection, affirming that the trial judge's consent instruction, read holistically, was not misleading, and that the absence of injury was not a contradiction given the complainant's testimony and lacked a common sense inference of injury from pain alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him to the United States for trial on charges of sexual exploitation of children and interstate communication-extortion.

The applicant argued the surrender was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, and violated his Charter rights under sections 7 and 6, and that the Minister unreasonably declined to seek assurances regarding potential civil commitment in the U.S. The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding it reasonable and entitled to substantial deference.

The Court concluded that the potential sentence disparity and civil commitment process in the U.S. did not render the surrender unjust, oppressive, or a violation of Charter rights, and that the Minister's decision to not seek assurances was also reasonable.

The appellant, David Charizanis, appealed a 12-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the sentence was fit and appropriate, having considered all operative principles, including restraint, and appropriate weight to mitigating factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Laura Coristine, appealed her convictions for six counts of assault against her ex-husband, Jim Quinn.

She argued that the trial judge misapprehended her evidence and erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend some minor aspects of the appellant's evidence, these errors did not amount to a miscarriage of justice given the overall assessment of credibility.

The court also found no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, including his consideration of the complainant's motive to lie, the "unusual" nature of some allegations, and the proper use of notes as an aide mémoire.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, leave to appeal sentence, and a release order pending appeal.

The primary issue was the court's jurisdiction to grant a release order under s. 679 of the Criminal Code, as the applicant had already been released under an invalid Superior Court order.

The court initially refused the release order, holding that the applicant was not in "custody" for the purposes of s. 679 while released under the invalid order.

The court granted the release order only after the applicant surrendered into physical custody, clarifying that an invalid release order remains binding until negated by due process or surrender.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of a loaded firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and making a false statement.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's proposed sentence without notifying counsel or providing clear reasons, by treating the loaded nature of the firearm as a separate aggravating factor (when it was an essential element of the offence), and by failing to consider the guilty plea as a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, the original sentence was vacated, and a global sentence of four years' custody (as initially proposed by the Crown) was imposed, less pre-sentence custody credit.

The applicant, Kyle Jones, sought a stay of extradition proceedings based on abuse of process, arguing for perpetual piecemeal prosecution, and alternatively, requested disclosure to build a record for the Minister of Justice.

The court dismissed both applications, finding no air of reality to the abuse of process claim and that the disclosure request was not relevant to the committal hearing and would unduly prolong the expeditious extradition process.

The court emphasized that concerns about prosecutorial discretion and the appropriate forum for prosecution are primarily matters for the Minister of Justice at the surrender stage.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a business partner and sentenced to 18 months incarceration and restitution.

He appealed his conviction, arguing a s. 11(b) Charter violation (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and an error in the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 11(b) violation, concluding that the trial judge incorrectly applied the presumptive ceiling for delay.

The court dismissed the Crown's request to impose a remedy other than a stay of proceedings, reaffirming that a stay is the appropriate and only available remedy for a s. 11(b) breach.

The conviction for fraud was stayed.

The appellant's other grounds of appeal, including the W.(D.) analysis and the sentence appeal, were dismissed.

The applicant, Kyle Jones, sought disclosure of a hard drive and communications between Canadian and American authorities to support an abuse of process motion to stay extradition proceedings.

He alleged intentional delay by authorities to maximize incarceration and potential perpetual piecemeal prosecution.

The court dismissed the disclosure application, finding that the allegations were not capable of supporting a stay of proceedings and lacked an air of reality, being based on speculation rather than concrete proof.

The court emphasized the distinct roles of the judiciary and executive in extradition and that issues of delay and forum are primarily for the Minister of Justice.

The appellant, J.K., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his two-year prison sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of evidence regarding a lodged tampon and the dismissal of a Charter application for pre-conviction delay.

The sentence appeal contested the finding of no unreasonable post-conviction delay and sought a sentence reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence on the tampon issue, finding it inadmissible under Palmer criteria.

It upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the s. 11(b) application, justifying the nine-month pre-conviction delay (due to an outstanding bench warrant) under the transitional exceptional circumstance and the 13-month post-conviction delay (related to a Gladue report) by deducting six months for administrative error as a discrete exceptional event and justifying the remainder under transitional exceptional circumstances.

The two-year sentence was found fit, with the trial judge having appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the appellant's personal circumstances and the impact of bail conditions.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed on four grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge materially misapprehended two aspects of the appellant's testimony, which significantly impacted the judge's credibility findings.

The court found that these misapprehensions were sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.

The other grounds of appeal, concerning a Section 11(b) Charter violation, restrictions on cross-examination of prior sexual activity under Section 276 of the Criminal Code, and the Crown's re-election to proceed by summary conviction, were dismissed.

A new trial was ordered.

S.H. appealed convictions for sexual assault and attempting to overcome resistance by choking.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's jury instruction on cross-count evidence, treatment of a prior consistent statement, denial of a Criminal Code s. 276 application, and alleged improper Crown closing arguments.

The Court of Appeal found reversible error in the jury instruction on cross-count evidence, which the Crown conceded was erroneous and not harmless.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.