Michelle M. Biddulph

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him for extradition to the United States on child sexual abuse charges.

The applicant argued the surrender was unreasonable due to a significant disparity in potential sentences (a 30-year mandatory minimum in the US versus a 90-day to 3-year range in Canada, where the Canadian mandatory minimum for the equivalent offence had been struck down as cruel and unusual punishment) and the potential for indefinite civil commitment in the US.

The Minister had obtained assurances from the US Department of Justice that the applicant would not face civil commitment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, affirming the Minister's decision as reasonable.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to the Minister in extradition matters, emphasizing that sentence disparity alone, absent extreme circumstances, does not "shock the conscience" of Canadians under section 7 of the Charter, especially when assurances mitigate other risks.

The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed two appeals concerning the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) jurisdiction to conduct disposition review hearings by videoconference without the accused's consent during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant, found not criminally responsible (NCR), objected to a virtual hearing.

The ORB proceeded without consent and subsequently ordered her detention.

The Superior Court quashed the ORB's jurisdictional ruling via certiorari.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal of the certiorari order, affirming that the ORB lacked statutory authority under the Criminal Code to compel virtual attendance without consent.

It also allowed the applicant's appeal of the detention order, finding it void due to the ORB's violation of procedural rules (Rule 43.03(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules) by proceeding while a certiorari application was pending.

The court emphasized that the Criminal Code implies a right to physical presence unless consent is given for virtual attendance, and that the pandemic does not justify exceeding statutory jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and sexual interference.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sexually assaulted a 15-year-old complainant at a property he owned, holding a knife to her throat and forcing her to perform fellatio.

The appellant's defence relied on a medical condition affecting his genitals and a theory of innocent secondary transfer of semen.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, treatment of DNA evidence, or application of the collateral fact rule.

A long-term offender was charged with breaching the residency condition of his long-term supervision order, which required him to reside at a community correctional centre.

The appellant sought to collaterally attack the validity of that residency condition at trial, arguing it exceeded the Parole Board's statutory authority under s. 134.1(2) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The majority held, applying the Maybrun framework, that Parliament did not intend to permit such a collateral attack because effective review mechanisms — including writing to the Parole Board and applying for habeas corpus — were available to the appellant.

The concurring minority would have permitted the collateral attack given the constitutional dimensions and severity of the potential penalty, but agreed the s. 7 claim failed on its merits because the residency condition was not arbitrary.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, arguing counsel failed to provide disclosure, failed to prepare him to testify, failed to obtain medical and phone records, and failed to confront the complainant with DNA evidence and inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance and that there was no miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's credibility findings were based on the appellant's implausible evidence and were supported by the record.

The appellant A.R. appealed his conviction on six counts of sexual assault, two counts of uttering threats, and two counts of assault arising from allegations of domestic violence against his ex-wife between 2011 and 2013.

He received a global sentence of four years.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and alleged differential scrutiny of witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and gave adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence on each count.

The sentence appeal was not addressed as it was contingent on the conviction appeal being allowed.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellant's action.

The respondents were entirely successful on appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

West Face Capital Inc. sought $250,000 in costs while Brandon Moyse sought $149,905.18.

The appellant argued for reduced costs amounts.

The Court of Appeal awarded West Face $200,000 and Moyse $100,000, both inclusive of disbursements and HST, considering the respondents' complete success, the nature of the appeal involving a large record and detailed factual re-litigation, and costs thrown away due to an unnecessary adjournment.

Appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellant's action for misuse of confidential information and spoliation.

The appellant alleged that the respondent West Face Capital Inc. improperly obtained and used confidential information about the appellant's bid to acquire WIND Mobile Inc., allegedly obtained from a former employee who moved to West Face.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding that the appellant failed to prove that confidential information was provided to West Face or that any such information was used in West Face's successful competing bid.

The trial judge also found that the appellant's choice to terminate negotiations due to a break fee demand, rather than West Face's competing bid, caused the failure of the appellant's acquisition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment and dismissed the appeal, as well as the application for leave to appeal the costs orders.

Following a successful defence in a wrongful dismissal trial, the defendant sought costs of approximately $750,000.

The plaintiff argued for $500,000.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, noting that while the electronic trial was efficient, both sides engaged in overkill and over-representation.

The court reduced the defendant's claimed fees slightly and awarded costs of $725,651.30 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, a former Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of Royal Group, Inc., sued for wrongful dismissal, claiming approximately $6.6 million in damages.

The defendant employer argued cause for dismissal based on the plaintiff's involvement in two instances of serious misconduct: the "Vaughan West land flip" and the misappropriation of a "Premdor warrant." Both involved the plaintiff's participation in schemes where senior officers, including himself, made secret profits at the corporation's expense and failed to disclose these conflicts of interest to the independent board of directors.

The court found that the plaintiff, as a fiduciary and senior employee, breached his duties of loyalty, honesty, candour, and fidelity by facilitating the usurpation of corporate opportunities, taking corporate funds without proper authority, and actively participating in deceptive practices, including back-dating documents for tax purposes.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, concluding that his conduct constituted just cause for summary dismissal, emphasizing the strictness of fiduciary duties in public corporations.