Michelle M. Biddulph

The appellant appealed his convictions for child luring and possession of child pornography.

He argued that the search of his home computers violated his section 8 Charter rights, that his section 11(b) rights were breached due to delay, and that the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable steps test and assessing the mens rea for the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the search, no unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework, and that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and possessed the requisite mens rea.

The Receiver sought costs of a contempt motion against the respondent on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent had been found in civil contempt for breaching an appointment order and sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment.

The court awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, finding the respondent's conduct egregious and highly disrespectful to the court and its appointed officer.

The quantum was fixed at $563,485, with a minor reduction for time spent on irrelevant facts.

The Receiver brought a contempt motion against the respondent for breaching an appointment order by interfering with the Receiver's exclusive authority and supporting a criminal complaint against the Receiver's representatives in Panama.

Having previously found the respondent in civil contempt, the court determined the appropriate penalty.

Finding that the respondent's conduct was a blatant and deliberate breach that undermined the court's authority, and that a fine would be insufficient for deterrence, the court ordered the respondent to be imprisoned for 30 days.

The applicant, H.K., sought release pending appeal of his 10-month imprisonment sentence.

The court found that the appeal, particularly concerning the sentence, met the "not frivolous" test.

It was noted that denying release would likely render the sentence appeal moot, as the applicant would serve the custodial portion of his sentence before the appeal could be heard.

The court granted the application for release pending appeal and imposed a publication ban.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his daughter, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to review the complainant's personal journals, failing to consider her motive to lie, and assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision that reviewing the highly private journals was not necessary in the interests of justice, given the availability of other evidence to support the appellant's motive theory.

The Court also found the trial judge properly considered the motive theory and made reasonable credibility findings supported by the evidence.

In a Commercial List receivership arising from judgment enforcement, the receiver moved for contempt after the respondent swore a declaration used to support a criminal complaint in Panama challenging the receiver's replacement of directors of a Panamanian subsidiary.

The court held it had jurisdiction because the alleged misconduct had a real and substantial link to Ontario, including the Ontario receivership order, the Ontario corporation in receivership, and the enforcement of an Ontario judgment.

Applying the civil contempt framework, the court found the appointment order was clear and unequivocal, the respondent knew of it, and he intentionally breached it by purporting to act for the debtor and by supporting foreign proceedings against the receiver without leave.

The court declined to find criminal contempt because the notice of motion did not provide sufficient particulars.

The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and break and enter after consuming alcohol and psilocybin mushrooms and committing violent acts while in a state of extreme intoxication akin to automatism.

The Crown invoked s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code to bar the defence of self-induced extreme intoxication.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that s. 33.1 violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting conviction without proof of mens rea or voluntariness, and that these violations could not be saved under s. 1 because the provision is not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweigh its salutary benefits.

Section 33.1 was declared unconstitutional and of no force or effect, and the trial acquittal was restored.

The appellant, Xiu Jin Teng, appealed her conviction for first-degree murder and her sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was the trial judge's dismissal of her Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel, which the trial judge found was not bona fide but an attempt to delay the trial.

Other grounds included Charter breaches (s. 11(b) right to trial within reasonable time, s. 10(a) and (b) detention rights), jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, and the unreasonableness of the first-degree murder conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, upholding the trial judge's findings that the Rowbotham application was an abuse of process and that the trial was fair.

It also found no Charter breaches, no error in jury instructions, and that the conviction was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was allowed on a narrow point, varying a communication prohibition order to allow for family law-related communications.

The appellant, Jordan Brown, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault by wounding and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on "wounding" and intent to endanger life.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence despite a conceded error by the trial judge regarding the consideration of treatment prospects at the designation stage, finding no reasonable possibility that the outcome would have differed.

The appellant, a dental hygienist, appealed the mandatory revocation of his registration for professional misconduct (sexual abuse of a patient, his eventual spouse).

The appeal challenged the Court of Appeal's prior decisions in Leering and Mussani, arguing that the "zero-tolerance" policy and mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code infringed sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that sexual abuse is established by the concurrence of a health professional-patient relationship and a sexual relationship, and that mandatory revocation does not violate Charter rights, as economic interests are not protected by sections 7 or 12, and the penalty is not cruel or unusual.

The court also clarified the narrow scope of the spousal exception.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him for extradition to the United States on child sexual abuse charges.

The applicant argued the surrender was unreasonable due to a significant disparity in potential sentences (a 30-year mandatory minimum in the US versus a 90-day to 3-year range in Canada, where the Canadian mandatory minimum for the equivalent offence had been struck down as cruel and unusual punishment) and the potential for indefinite civil commitment in the US.

The Minister had obtained assurances from the US Department of Justice that the applicant would not face civil commitment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, affirming the Minister's decision as reasonable.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to the Minister in extradition matters, emphasizing that sentence disparity alone, absent extreme circumstances, does not "shock the conscience" of Canadians under section 7 of the Charter, especially when assurances mitigate other risks.

The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed two appeals concerning the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) jurisdiction to conduct disposition review hearings by videoconference without the accused's consent during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant, found not criminally responsible (NCR), objected to a virtual hearing.

The ORB proceeded without consent and subsequently ordered her detention.

The Superior Court quashed the ORB's jurisdictional ruling via certiorari.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal of the certiorari order, affirming that the ORB lacked statutory authority under the Criminal Code to compel virtual attendance without consent.

It also allowed the applicant's appeal of the detention order, finding it void due to the ORB's violation of procedural rules (Rule 43.03(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules) by proceeding while a certiorari application was pending.

The court emphasized that the Criminal Code implies a right to physical presence unless consent is given for virtual attendance, and that the pandemic does not justify exceeding statutory jurisdiction.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The proceedings spanned over 19 years, involving three trials, an appeal, and a dangerous offender application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling after deducting significant periods of defence delay—including the accused absconding and repeatedly changing counsel—and exceptional circumstances such as a mistrial.

The court also found the post-verdict delay reasonable, as it was justified by the complexity of the dangerous offender application, further defence delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

During a dangerous offender hearing, the Crown sought to abandon reliance on a court-ordered psychiatrist whose evidence was challenged in cross-examination, and instead tender the evidence of a new psychiatrist.

The defence brought an abuse of process motion under s. 7 of the Charter, arguing the Crown was seeking an improper litigation advantage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Crown was attempting to provide the court with as much information as possible to assess the offender's risk, rather than acting for an oblique motive.

Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft pleaded guilty to 60 charges under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, including 58 counts of unlawfully importing vehicles that did not conform to prescribed vehicle emissions standards and two counts of providing misleading information.

The company admitted to installing defeat devices in approximately 128,000 diesel vehicles imported into Canada between 2008 and 2015, which allowed the vehicles to pass emissions testing while emitting substantially higher nitrogen oxide levels during normal driving conditions.

The court imposed a fine of $196,500,000, the largest environmental fine in Canadian history at that time, reflecting the severity of the deliberate deception, the environmental and health risks created, and the need for deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant, a dental hygienist, appealed the revocation of his license by the Discipline Committee after he provided dental hygiene treatment to his wife.

The Committee found this constituted professional misconduct under the Health Professions Procedural Code, which mandates license revocation for sexual abuse of a patient, defined to include sexual relations.

The appellant argued the mandatory revocation and public registry notation violated his and his wife's rights under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no section 7 violation as there is no constitutional right to practice a profession, and no section 12 violation as the mandatory revocation and registry notation did not constitute cruel and unusual treatment.

The court noted the harshness of the result but held it was bound by the legislation as the government had not yet passed a proposed spousal exemption regulation for dental hygienists.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and sexual interference.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sexually assaulted a 15-year-old complainant at a property he owned, holding a knife to her throat and forcing her to perform fellatio.

The appellant's defence relied on a medical condition affecting his genitals and a theory of innocent secondary transfer of semen.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, treatment of DNA evidence, or application of the collateral fact rule.

A long-term offender was charged with breaching the residency condition of his long-term supervision order, which required him to reside at a community correctional centre.

The appellant sought to collaterally attack the validity of that residency condition at trial, arguing it exceeded the Parole Board's statutory authority under s. 134.1(2) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The majority held, applying the Maybrun framework, that Parliament did not intend to permit such a collateral attack because effective review mechanisms — including writing to the Parole Board and applying for habeas corpus — were available to the appellant.

The concurring minority would have permitted the collateral attack given the constitutional dimensions and severity of the potential penalty, but agreed the s. 7 claim failed on its merits because the residency condition was not arbitrary.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, arguing counsel failed to provide disclosure, failed to prepare him to testify, failed to obtain medical and phone records, and failed to confront the complainant with DNA evidence and inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance and that there was no miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's credibility findings were based on the appellant's implausible evidence and were supported by the record.

The appellant A.R. appealed his conviction on six counts of sexual assault, two counts of uttering threats, and two counts of assault arising from allegations of domestic violence against his ex-wife between 2011 and 2013.

He received a global sentence of four years.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and alleged differential scrutiny of witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and gave adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence on each count.

The sentence appeal was not addressed as it was contingent on the conviction appeal being allowed.