Michael Robert Fawcett

The appellant sought leave to appeal a global sentence of 23.5 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation for four counts of breach of probation.

The appellant had 12 prior convictions for breaching no-contact orders relating to his former spouse and son.

The sentencing judge found the appellant incorrigible and focused on specific deterrence and protection of the victims.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and that a significant jump in sentence length was justified to protect the victims and deter the appellant.

The appellant, J.C.J., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and incest, and his five-year sentence for incest (concurrent three years for sexual assault).

The conviction appeal was based on ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding a failed s. 11(b) application and inadequate preparation for testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice.

The sentence appeal argued errors in applying s. 155(2) as a guide, failing to properly weigh mitigating factors, considering defence conduct as aggravating, and imposing an s. 161 order for an over-18 complainant.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, except for setting aside the s. 161 order, which the Crown conceded was inapplicable.

The appellant, Darryl Anthony Yong, appealed his conviction for administering a noxious substance, invitation to sexual touching, and trafficking cocaine, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, deferring to the trial judge's findings on credibility and the application of mens rea.

The appeal from sentence was granted to the extent of varying the terms of the s. 161 order, specifically regarding contact with the victim and positions of trust, but was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of uttering a threat to a police officer and one count of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as a sentence term of probation that included banishment from the City of London.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred by finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim and by applying a "totally objective" test.

The Court of Appeal found that, reading the trial judge's reasons as a whole, she had considered the appellant's subjective circumstances (history with police, psychological fear) and correctly determined there was no air of reality to the self-defence under s. 34(1) or s. 34(3) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal, specifically regarding the banishment term, was also dismissed as it was part of a joint submission.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed for offences involving her own very young daughter.

The appellant sought to reduce the global sentence to one year by making the sentences concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the global sentence, finding the two-year sentence entirely deserving of the appellant's conduct.

The court confirmed that a weapons prohibition was mandatory and could not be changed.

However, the court modified the prohibition order based on fresh evidence regarding the appellant's employment prospects after sentence, reducing the age restriction from sixteen to fifteen years in specified paragraphs.

An appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum clarifying that the appellant was to be freed on November 4, 2019, and that the sentences imposed were concurrent and therefore complete as ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The parties had agreed to a joint submission intended to result in a penitentiary sentence to allow the appellant access to treatment programs.

However, the parties miscalculated, resulting in a sentence that was practically too long.

The appellant argued for 150 days while the Crown acknowledged that four to six months would have been appropriate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of 150 days for the original 307-day sentence.

The appellant appealed a conviction and sentence entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned after the appellant failed to attend the hearing despite being advised that the Crown would seek dismissal for non-attendance.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of fraud, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant claimed his lawyer failed to properly prepare him for trial, made improper admissions, failed to present relevant evidence, and colluded with the Crown.

The Court of Appeal rejected all allegations, finding that defence counsel's performance met the standard of reasonably competent counsel.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his fine and compensation orders based on impecuniosity, but the Court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from a conviction on four counts of threatening his professor and family members.

The trial judge provided thorough reasons with careful credibility findings.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal and rejected the applicant's motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no proper basis for leave, no legal errors by the lower court, and that the issues did not transcend the facts of the case or raise matters of significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 46 months imposed for three robberies of vulnerable businesses, arguing the sentence was too harsh and that the sentencing judge had double-counted by treating offence elements as aggravating factors and had given insufficient weight to the guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit, finding that the sentencing judge was correct in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, the use of weapons and threats, and the appellant's criminal history.

The respondent was convicted of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a loaded firearm.

Following conviction, the respondent brought a motion to stay proceedings claiming a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to post-verdict delay.

The trial judge granted the stay, applying the Jordan presumptive ceiling to the entire period from charge to sentencing.

The Crown appealed, arguing that post-verdict delay should be assessed separately and without presumptive ceilings.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, establishing that while Jordan principles apply to post-verdict delay, a separate five-month presumptive ceiling applies to post-verdict proceedings, distinct from the pre-verdict ceilings.

The court found that the post-verdict delay, after deducting time attributable to an exceptional circumstance (a Part XXIV dangerous offender application), fell below the five-month ceiling and therefore did not constitute a breach of section 11(b).

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempting to obstruct justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction arose from allegations that while in custody, the appellant wrote letters to another inmate requesting false evidence concerning prior convictions.

The trial judge convicted the appellant despite the loss of the original letters prior to the re-trial.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge shifted the burden of proof when assessing the evidence of the key witness; (2) the trial judge failed to properly apply Vetrovec principles regarding the credibility of an unsavoury witness; and (3) the trial judge erred in dismissing the stay application based on the prejudice caused by the loss of the original letters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed from his conviction on two counts of failure to comply with a recognizance and three counts of break and enter a dwelling house and commit theft, as well as from his sentence of time served (585 days pre-sentence custody credited at 878 days).

The appellant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on multiple grounds, including claims that he did not understand the proceedings, was not provided with disclosure, and that his counsel negotiated a resolution without his instructions.

The Court of Appeal found all allegations lacked credibility based on the record of the plea inquiry, written instructions from the appellant to counsel, and the appellant's express waiver of a translator.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed from the refusal of a Superior Court judge to grant mandamus with certiorari in aid in relation to a decision of a justice of the peace refusing to issue process on a private prosecution.

The appellant sought an adjournment at the hearing on grounds of efficiency and personal circumstances, which was refused.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the justice of the peace had not committed any jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, or other error permitting Superior Court review.

The appellant appealed a vexatious litigant order issued by the Superior Court that enjoined him from instituting or continuing proceedings in any Superior Court in Ontario for the review of lower court proceedings or Crown action with respect to any private criminal information, except with leave of a Judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

The order also included the Ontario Court of Appeal within its scope.

The appellant sought an adjournment and raised two main issues: that the lower court erred in declaring him a vexatious litigant, and that the court erred in denying his applications for certiorari and mandamus regarding three private prosecutions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the vexatious litigant designation but struck the portion of the order that enjoined the appellant from initiating proceedings before the Court of Appeal without leave, finding that the application judge may have overstepped her jurisdiction in that regard.

The appellant appealed her conviction on three counts, seeking to set aside her guilty plea.

The trial judge conducted no plea inquiry and did not read in the facts.

The police synopsis was filed as an exhibit with defence counsel indicating the appellant had reviewed it.

At sentencing, a pre-sentence report revealed the appellant disputed her guilt and suffered from a mental disorder.

Although the sentencing judge obtained verbal acknowledgments from the appellant regarding the facts and acceptance of responsibility, the judge expressed reservations about the genuineness of the appellant's acceptance of responsibility.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was not unequivocal due to the absence of a proper plea inquiry, the mental health issues at play, and the ambiguity regarding what the appellant was accepting responsibility for.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant abandoned his appeal of a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on February 22, 2019.

The appellant was out of custody and did not appear at the hearing.

The Crown confirmed the appellant's intention to abandon the appeal.

As a result, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that he should receive a 25-day reduction to account for approximately two months during which he could have been earning remission toward parole eligibility had his sentencing proceeded as originally scheduled in July 2018 rather than September 2018.

The delay was caused by the Crown's personal unavailability.

The Crown opposed the reduction, citing section 719(3) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits awarding credit for time served for a different offence.

The Court of Appeal distinguished prior case law and found that the appellant was not seeking to double-count time or apply time served on one offence to another, but rather seeking relief from an unusual unfairness caused by Crown scheduling difficulties.

The court exercised its discretion to remedy this unfairness and granted the reduction.

The appellant sought an adjournment to retain counsel but the proposed counsel advised that he had not been retained and did not expect to be.

Duty counsel advised the court that he was abandoning the appeal.

The court found no basis for a further adjournment and dismissed the appeal as abandoned.