Michael Robert Fawcett

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and sexual assault of a police officer, as well as his sentence of time served.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to address the appellant's apparent intoxication in the context of the specific intent offence of break and enter.

Both counsel agreed to substitute a conviction for forcible entry contrary to s. 72(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant's conviction for sexual assault was upheld as the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The victim fine surcharge was set aside on consent.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence imposed for robbery, disguise with intent to commit theft, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

Two grounds were advanced: first, that the victim surcharge must be set aside (agreed to by the Crown); and second, that 54 days served in custody for unrelated offences (the Mississauga Offences) should be credited toward his sentence for the Vaughan Offences after his conviction on the Mississauga Offences was overturned on appeal.

The court granted leave to appeal and set aside the victim surcharge but dismissed the appeal on the second ground, holding that custodial time served for one offence cannot be credited toward sentencing for another offence, even where the offences are related or interconnected.

The appellant appealed a probation order imposed by the sentencing judge that prohibited him from contacting his parents.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge had changed position from what was indicated during the joint pre-trial meeting, thereby prejudicing him by denying him the opportunity to make submissions on this condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness and noting that probation had not been decided during sentencing submissions.

The court also noted that the parents could consent to contact if they wished.

The appellant appealed both her conviction for fraud under $5,000 and her sentence of three months imprisonment with restitution of $6,339.20.

The conviction appeal was not pressed and was dismissed as fully warranted by the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional discharge based on collateral immigration consequences, as she faced deportation as a foreign national convicted of an indictable offence.

The court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the three-month term was fit and at the very low end of the appropriate range for fraud involving social assistance funds, particularly given the appellant's prior similar conviction and breach of probation.

The appellant was convicted of using an imitation firearm while committing assault with a weapon and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge grounded the conviction on accessorial liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misconstrued the basis of liability, the conviction was firmly grounded in law and fact on aiding or abetting under ss. 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c).

The conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was partially successful, with the victim surcharge being set aside, but the custodial and probation portions were upheld.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted on the basis of unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The respondents, correctional officers, were charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life following the death of an inmate at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The application judge found the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that no exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in calculating defence delay, failed to recognize a discrete event, and failed to account for case complexity.

The court concluded that the resulting delay for one respondent fell just below the ceiling and for the other fell only three weeks above, justified by case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The appellant, a psychologist, was convicted by jury of two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a two-vehicle collision.

She appealed on multiple grounds, including Charter violations, credibility assessments, jury charge errors regarding straddle evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter breaches, no reversible credibility errors, and no miscarriage of justice despite some improper prosecutorial conduct.

The appellant, a 54-year-old man with schizophrenia and a history of violence and harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to order his continued detention at a forensic psychiatric facility rather than grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible in 2008 and lived in the community until December 2015, when he decompensated after stopping his antipsychotic medication.

The Board found he posed a significant threat to public safety due to his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of discontinuing medication if discharged, and history of assaultive behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it was the least onerous and least restrictive alternative available.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the offences.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence from two adult nieces of the appellant who testified to similar inappropriate touching when they were children.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous admission of similar fact evidence due to collusion; (2) failure to properly address material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and over-reliance on demeanour; (3) impermissible inference of guilt from rejection of the appellant's testimony; and (4) unsafe and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference of a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the complainant's allegation of intercourse on multiple occasions, despite both the appellant and complainant initially denying sexual contact when discovered spooning on the appellant's bed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were infected by impermissible reliance on evidence of bad parenting, which was used to characterize the appellant as the type of person likely to commit the alleged offence.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his girlfriend's daughter and four of her friends, all primary school girls aged 10-12 at the time of disclosure.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in allowing similar fact evidence by failing to properly apply the burden of proof regarding unintentional collusion between the victims.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in not subjecting unconscious collusion to the same evidentiary burden as actual collusion, the error was harmless and did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a costs decision arising from an appeal of an order made under s. 490 of the Criminal Code.

The pawnbroker successfully obtained an order for return of a stolen diamond that had been seized by police during a criminal investigation.

The estate of the original owner appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

Both parties subsequently sought costs of the appeal.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs, as s. 683(3) of the Criminal Code expressly prohibits the allowance of costs to either the appellant or respondent on the hearing and determination of an appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and ammunition offences, challenging the trial judge's admission of evidence seized during a search of a farmhouse.

The appellant argued that the use of tear gas during the execution of the search warrant constituted an unauthorized search in breach of section 8 of the Charter, and alternatively, that the manner of execution was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the use of tear gas was not a "search" within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, as it was not conducted for the purpose of obtaining personal information but rather to safely flush out occupants.

The court also found that the search was executed in a reasonable manner given the circumstances known to police at the time.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve months plus three years probation for arson, seeking leave to appeal and challenging the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the collateral immigration consequences of the sentence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old with special needs who was unaware of his non-citizen status at sentencing, would have been deported to a refugee camp in a country where he had no connection or supports.

The court imposed a fit sentence of six months less a day, which the appellant had already served.

A pawnbroker brought an application under s. 490(7) and (9)(c) of the Criminal Code seeking return of a diamond seized by police during a criminal investigation.

The diamond had been stolen from the deceased and pawned to the pawnbroker, from whom police seized it.

The application judge granted the order without notice to the estate of the deceased, who had an ownership interest in the diamond.

The estate appealed, arguing it was entitled to participate in the application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that although the pawnbroker met the statutory notice requirements by notifying the Attorney General, the application was made on an ex parte basis and the pawnbroker failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, including the estate's competing claim to the diamond.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm on two grounds: (1) whether his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and (2) whether the trial judge's finding that the gun used in the robbery was a firearm was unreasonable.

The appeal was heard after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in R. v. Jordan, which fundamentally changed the approach to s. 11(b) claims by establishing a presumptive 30-month ceiling for trial completion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The sole issue was whether the complainant consented to the sexual touching, as the appellant admitted to the touching itself.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the jury charge was unfair and unbalanced, as the trial judge spent significantly more time summarizing the Crown's theory than the defence's theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the charge appeared facially imbalanced, when considered holistically with counsel's closing submissions, the jury was adequately instructed on the factual issues, applicable law, and positions of both parties.

The court emphasized that a functional approach to reviewing jury charges requires consideration of the entire trial context, not the charge in isolation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and related offences arising from a jewellery store robbery, as well as his sentence of 12 years imprisonment.

The appellant advanced three grounds of appeal on conviction: that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence was equally consistent with him being a fence rather than a perpetrator; that the trial judge failed to provide a Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness; and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three grounds, finding that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported only one rational inference that the appellant was one of the two masked perpetrators, that the trial judge had properly considered the witness's credibility issues without requiring a formal caution in a judge-alone trial, and that the trial judge's factual findings were sound.

The court also found the 12-year sentence was fit.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and dangerous driving.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained following a police take-down.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal on the basis that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's exceptional physical condition and the disproportionate impact of incarceration on him.

The sentence was varied to make the dangerous driving sentence concurrent rather than consecutive to the firearm sentence.