Michael Dineen

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for killing his uncle.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the Crown had misrepresented the mens rea required for murder by suggesting the jury could convict if the appellant "ought to have known" his actions would cause death.

Although the trial judge provided correct instructions on the law, his inadequate response to the jury's question about "ought to know" and his erroneous definition of recklessness created a real danger that the jury did not properly understand that subjective foresight of death was required.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a four-year penitentiary sentence imposed after conviction on counts of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old cousin when the appellant was 20 years old.

The single act of sexual contact resulted in pregnancy.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in stating the appropriate sentencing range and failed to apply principles governing custodial sentences for youthful first offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing range was appropriate given the intimate nature of the contact, the relationship between the parties, and the significant consequences to the complainant.

The court set aside only the victim surcharge.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The appellant and complainant were guests at the same hostel and shared a co-ed room.

The complainant alleged the appellant sexually assaulted her; the appellant claimed the sexual contact was consensual.

The trial judge convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conduct and reasons for judgment gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and an appearance of unfairness, warranting a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of oxycodone, production of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a search warrant execution at a rural residence.

The Crown's case relied heavily on data extracted from a Samsung cell phone found at the residence, which the Crown alleged belonged to the appellant's son.

The appeal raised three main issues: whether the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case by recalling the officer-in-charge; whether the trial judge erred in applying section 31.3(b) of the Canada Evidence Act to admit the cell phone data; and whether the trial judge erred in admitting the officer's opinion evidence regarding the text messages.

The majority dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in relying on section 31.3(b), the evidence was properly admissible under section 31.3(a) and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice arose.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding three cumulative errors that deprived the appellant of fundamental procedural protections.

The Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for an accused convicted of sexual interference.

The Crown had relied on the complainant's pregnancy as corroborating evidence of the assault, while the application judge had dismissed the accused's s. 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on other possible causes of the pregnancy.

The majority held that both the application judge and the trial judge erred, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) on the basis that the cross-examination that actually occurred allowed the defence to adequately test the Crown's evidence.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, holding that the restriction on cross-examination deprived the accused of an entire process of questioning and that the errors were neither minor nor harmless.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for unlawful confinement and assault.

The trial judge had found an honest but mistaken belief in consent, leading to the acquittal.

The appeal court found that the trial judge misapplied the honest but mistaken belief defence by focusing on events after the alleged offence and misapprehending critical evidence.

Additionally, the trial judge's reasons for the acquittal were deemed inadequate, failing to explain the verdict based on the complainant's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered before a different jurist.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and threatening death following a trial by judge alone and sentenced to two years in custody, less time served.

On appeal, the court found that a breach of solicitor-client privilege occurred during trial when the trial judge questioned defence counsel about why certain matters were not put to the complainant during cross-examination.

Defence counsel, in breach of privilege, confirmed that the appellant's testimony differed from what counsel expected.

The trial judge then used this privileged information in his reasons for judgment to draw an adverse inference against the appellant's credibility.

Although the trial judge stated the inference was not determinative, the Court of Appeal found that the use of privileged information created an appearance of unfairness constituting a miscarriage of justice, regardless of whether it was essential to the conviction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that he should receive a 25-day reduction to account for approximately two months during which he could have been earning remission toward parole eligibility had his sentencing proceeded as originally scheduled in July 2018 rather than September 2018.

The delay was caused by the Crown's personal unavailability.

The Crown opposed the reduction, citing section 719(3) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits awarding credit for time served for a different offence.

The Court of Appeal distinguished prior case law and found that the appellant was not seeking to double-count time or apply time served on one offence to another, but rather seeking relief from an unusual unfairness caused by Crown scheduling difficulties.

The court exercised its discretion to remedy this unfairness and granted the reduction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for receiving a financial benefit from sexual services contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

Duty counsel argued that the trial judge erred in applying the presumption under subsection (3) when other findings suggested uncertainty about whether the complainant gave all earnings to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the presumption and noting that the trial judge's findings regarding control for a second charge did not undermine the presumption's application.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's finding that there was no breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter despite significant delay.

The trial judge had calculated net delay at 50 months, exceeding the Jordan cap by 20 months, but found exceptional circumstances justified the excess delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding exceptional circumstances and the Crown's reasonable management of the complex prosecution.

On the sentence appeal, while the Court of Appeal identified a factual error regarding the timing of professional credentials, it found the error immaterial to the ultimate sentence and upheld the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for obtaining credit by false pretences and inducing a person to act on a false document.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's finding that the mortgage broker could have been naive was inconsistent with a finding of fraudulent conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge's determination that the appellant actively participated in drafting false rental agreements and submitted them knowing they were false was sufficient to ground the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding exclusive possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia seized from a bedroom rented by the appellant.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's finding of exclusive possession was undermined by the landlord's evidence that another tenant (referred to as the "tall skinny guy") may have entered the room.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's inference of knowledge and control based on temporal exclusive possession was reasonable given the evidence, including the appellant's rental of the room, the nature of items found, police surveillance observations, and the lack of evidence that the other tenant was present near the time of seizure.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as dependent on a successful conviction appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

The defence argued the complainant fabricated the complaint due to pressure from his father.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instruction that "the timing of the disclosure signifies nothing," arguing it was improper in the context of the case.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction was ill-advised but not misleading when considered in context with the full charge and counsel's closing addresses.

The court clarified the instruction referred to delay between incidents and disclosure, not the circumstances of disclosure.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the victim fine surcharge was set aside with Crown consent.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 12 years imposed for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and breaches of court orders.

The appellant had sexually assaulted his teenaged step-granddaughter on an ongoing basis for one and a half years, including various forms of sexual abuse.

The appellant had a prior conviction for sexual interference with the same victim when she was 10 years old and had also been convicted of sexually abusing the victim's mother in the 1990s.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the sentencing judge was functus officio when imposing a non-communication order approximately one month after the original sentencing, finding it was a permissible administrative correction.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice on the grounds that a mathematical error was made in calculating pre-sentence custody credit.

The sentencing judge intended to apply a 1.5:1 credit ratio but the calculation resulted in 13 months of credit instead of the correct 13.3 months.

The Crown conceded the mathematical error but argued against correction based on judicial discretion and the minimal nature of the discrepancy.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence by 15 days to correct the mathematical error.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in connection with a home invasion robbery in which the victim was shot and killed.

The Crown's case relied heavily on hearsay statements made by two associates of the appellant to police, in which they implicated him in planning and executing the robbery.

The trial judge admitted these statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay statements and in dismissing a Charter application based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's admission of the hearsay statements did not meet the more restrictive test established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Bradshaw.

The court also clarified the proper approach to calculating delay under the Jordan framework when extraordinary remedies are pursued.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for firearm-related offences and possession of marijuana.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's ruling that he was not detained during a police-citizen interaction on a Toronto Community Housing Corporation property, and that evidence obtained should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no detention occurred and that the interaction was a lawful community policing exercise.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to correct a pre-sentence custody calculation error.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the appellant raised matters to which defence counsel did not object at trial and which did not affect the fairness of the trial.

However, leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge made calculation errors in sentencing.

The appellate court varied the sentence to time served.

The appellant appealed his sentence for unauthorized use of credit card data, challenging the imposition of house arrest and curfew terms as conditions of probation.

The appellant argued these conditions were unreasonable and not authorized under section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code as they were punitive rather than rehabilitative.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the traditional rehabilitative purpose of probation but noted the sentence resulted from a joint submission accepted by the sentencing judge.

The court declined to strike the conditions as illegal given the unique circumstances and the limited record before it, though it noted the sentencing judge should have articulated the basis for accepting the impugned terms.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.