Michael Dineen

Mohamud Dirie appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting ante mortem hearsay statements and that the jury charge was unbalanced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the pre-trial evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of the deceased's statements about fear and prior incidents, or in the trial judge's decision not to allow viva voce cross-examination of a witness on the voir dire.

The court also found the jury charge was fair and balanced, despite the trial judge's permissible expressions of opinion on the evidence.

The appellant, Tyrell Stewart, appealed convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm with ammunition and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's possession of a handgun and ammunition found during a search warrant execution at a basement apartment.

The trial judge inferred knowledge and control based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant having keys to the premises and a "lived-in quality" of his possessions there.

The appeal raised arguments concerning misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, unreasonableness of the verdict, and lack of formal arraignment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions reasonable and that any procedural irregularities did not cause prejudice.

The appellant, Peter Sagos, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and extortion, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The charges arose from harassing and threatening emails sent to his former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for his ineffective assistance claims, largely due to the absence of an affidavit from himself or trial counsel.

The court affirmed that trial counsel is a compellable witness in such motions and that the defence strategy pursued at trial was reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant, found Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) for a fatal stabbing, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to continue a detention order, arguing that a conditional discharge was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable.

The court noted the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment, tendency to minimize negative stressors, and the very short period he had been in the community after many years of confinement.

The ORB's decision to maintain the detention order was deemed a reasonable outcome to test the appellant in the community and ensure public safety.

The appellant, Ahmad Durani, appealed his convictions for criminal negligence causing death while street racing and failing to remain, and his global sentence of 5 years' imprisonment.

The convictions stemmed from a street race that resulted in a fatal collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the actus reus and mens rea of criminal negligence and in applying the presumption for failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in evidence and that the appellant's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the norm.

The court also found the trial judge correctly rejected the appellant's statements as "evidence to the contrary" for the failing to remain charge.

The appellant, Boris Panovski, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in the jury charge, specifically regarding the application of the W.(D.) rule to exculpatory eyewitness testimony, the overall inadequacy and imbalance of the charge, and the admission of certain non-recognition evidence.

The court determined that these errors were not curable by the proviso.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of sexual assault and one count of assault against his wife.

The appeal argued errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant, rejection of the appellant's evidence, and use of cross-count similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on credibility and the admissibility of similar act evidence to show a pattern of abusive conduct.

The appellant, Norman Howes, appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, despite a minor inconsequential error in characterizing evidence.

The court affirmed the fairness of the trial and proper application of the burden of proof.

However, the sentence was varied by setting aside a s. 161(1)(a.1) order, which the Crown conceded was improperly made in light of R. v. K.R.J.

The appellant appealed a disposition from the Ontario Review Board that imposed a detention order with community living privileges, arguing the Board failed to adequately consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was supported by the treating psychiatrist's opinion, which cited the appellant's poor insight and ambivalence to medication.

The court also addressed a moot issue regarding temporary liberty restriction due to early COVID-19 protocols, noting the Board's reasons properly advised the Hospital to consider individual clinical opinions in future.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding the complainant had no motive to fabricate and using this to assess her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between a "proven absence of motive to fabricate" and an "absence of evidence of motive to fabricate." The court held that while a proven absence of motive is a high bar, the absence of evidence of motive can be considered as one factor among many in assessing credibility, provided it is not given undue weight or used to reverse the burden of proof.

The trial judge's approach was found to be consistent with established legal principles.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial after a juror brought internet articles into the jury room.

She also argued her s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by post-conviction delay and her right to make full answer and defence was compromised by lost airport surveillance video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inquiry into the jury issue was sufficient, the post-conviction delay was justified by a Gardiner hearing which constituted an exceptional circumstance, and the jury instructions regarding the lost video were fair.

The appellant, Carl Quinton, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, which was largely based on a confession obtained through a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

The trial judge failed to hold a voir dire to determine the confession's admissibility under R. v. Hart, accepting defence counsel's mistaken concession that Hart did not apply.

The Court of Appeal found that the operation clearly fell under Hart, and the purported waiver of the voir dire was invalid because counsel was not fully informed and the agreement offered no benefit to the defence.

The Court highlighted significant abuse of process concerns, given the police exploitation of the appellant's vulnerabilities (alcoholism, mental health issues, physical stroke, social isolation, and financial destitution).

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, with the Court emphasizing the need for rigorous judicial scrutiny of police conduct in Mr. Big operations.

The appellant was convicted of possessing MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated due to unlawful continued detention and search.

The trial judge found the initial detention and pat-down lawful, but the search of the appellant's knapsack unlawful, admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's continued detention was lawful, emphasizing the totality of circumstances and the reasonable suspicion held by police in a dangerous situation.

Consequently, the appeal against conviction was dismissed, though a mandatory victim fine surcharge was quashed.

The appellant was convicted at trial of drug offences including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of oxycodone, production of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that although the trial judge erred in relying on the wrong legislative provision to admit cell phone data and may have erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case and in admitting an accused's statement without a voluntariness voir dire, the curative proviso applied because the Crown's case was overwhelming.

The Supreme Court majority agreed, finding the pre-reopening evidence was overwhelming and the curative proviso was properly applied.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that allowing the Crown to split its case led to an unfair trial that could not be cured.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's finding that there were reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant for wilful obstruction of a peace officer, arguing that his refusal to answer police questions should not have been considered and that video evidence did not support active resistance during a pat-down search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's conduct (stiffening and pulling away) was part of a larger context, and her findings of active resistance and reasonable officer actions for safety were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a sexual encounter with the complainant.

The trial judge had found the appellant not guilty of sexual assault but guilty of assault causing bodily harm based on bruising to the complainant's thighs.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by stating it was 'clear' the complainant did not consent to an earlier slap on the walk home, when her actual testimony indicated a lack of memory.

The summary conviction appeal court agreed, finding the misapprehension was on a matter of substance and played a central role in the trial judge's reasoning process regarding non-consent to the force that caused the bruising.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard appeals from convictions and sentences related to a series of tractor-trailer thefts and robberies.

Appellants challenged the validity of cell tower production orders, the admission of evidence obtained from Charter-breaching production orders under s. 24(2), and the use of similar act evidence.

One appellant also challenged possession convictions.

The Court dismissed all conviction appeals, finding the initial production orders valid, the s. 24(2) analysis sound (due to reduced privacy expectation in public location data), and the similar act evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, finding the trial judge erred by analogizing the robberies to home invasions, which led to unduly high base sentences.

The Court reduced the total sentences for the three appealing accused.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale fraud obtained through the Government of Canada’s Small Business Financing Program.

The conviction appeals challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of three s. 11(b) Charter motions for unreasonable delay, arguing that the judge erred by not addressing the merits due to non-compliance with deadlines.

The sentence appeals contested the length of imprisonment and a restitution order for one appellant, and the imposition of a custodial sentence for another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's proactive case management and the fitness of the sentences.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual abuse and one count of threatening bodily harm against his daughter.

On appeal, the appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to use evidence of the appellant's prior convictions for assault of his wife to determine whether the wife testified out of fear, and second, that the trial judge's review of the appellant's evidence was brief and unbalanced.

The Court of Appeal found no error in either ruling and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding his recklessness as to consent.

The trial judge had relied on a text message exchange to corroborate the complainant's evidence of non-consent and to establish the appellant's recklessness.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the functional approach to reasons and found the trial judge adequately explained the logical connection between the evidence and the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.