Megan E. Shortreed

The applicants, minority co-owners of two commercial properties, sought relief from alleged oppressive conduct, breach of trust, and breach of fiduciary duty by the majority co-owners and property managers following a cash call.

The court found that the respondents' failure to provide timely and meaningful access to financial records unfairly disregarded and prejudiced the applicants' interests under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

However, the court dismissed claims regarding management fees, financing, and conflicts of interest, and found no breach of trust or fiduciary duty.

The court ordered specific terms for future financial disclosure and governance but declined to order a forced buy-out of the applicants' interests.

Costs for the disclosure motion were awarded to the applicants on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Liquidator of Maple Bank GmbH's Canadian business sought an interim distribution of surplus funds to the German Insolvency Administrator (GIA) during winding-up proceedings.

The motion was unopposed.

The court approved the interim distribution, finding it appropriate given that adequate reserves were established to cover all proven and potential claims, ensuring no prejudice to Canadian creditors.

The court emphasized a broad, flexible interpretation of insolvency legislation and the policy of assisting foreign insolvency proceedings.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The court heard two motions: the defendants sought further production of documents, and the plaintiffs sought an order for the defendants to attend examinations for discovery.

The court granted some of the defendants' production requests, ordering the plaintiffs to produce unredacted financial statements and to request files from their auditors (PWC) and an accounting firm (HLB).

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for discovery attendance, finding that the defendants had acted reasonably in not attending previously scheduled examinations due to the plaintiffs' incomplete production.

The court emphasized the relevance and proportionality rules for production, stating that if a document contains relevant information, it must be disclosed in its entirety without redaction.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.

In a joint cross-border insolvency trial concerning the allocation of approximately $7.3 billion in lockbox funds from the sale of global business lines and residual intellectual property, the court interpreted the Master R&D Agreement as an operating transfer-pricing document that granted limited licence rights but did not govern post-insolvency allocation.

The court rejected both the position that one Canadian debtor owned all sale proceeds by virtue of legal title and the position that the EMEA debtors jointly owned all intellectual property by operation of law.

Applying unjust enrichment principles and the broad remedial jurisdiction available in CCAA proceedings, the court held that a just result required a pro rata allocation among debtor estates based on allowed claims.

The court further directed that duplicate claims be counted only once for allocation purposes, that intercompany claims be included, and that interim distribution proposals be brought forward.

The appellant entered into a contract with the respondent for the storage of vaccines in a temperature-controlled warehouse.

The contract required the appellant to maintain all-risk property insurance.

After the cooling system malfunctioned and destroyed the vaccines, the appellant's insurer brought a subrogated action against the respondent and other contractors involved in the warehouse's operations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the insurance covenant barred the claim against the respondent (except for a $100,000 negligence carve-out) and that the other contractors were third-party beneficiaries of this protection.

Following dismissal of a complex multi‑party action on summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of the entire action in addition to agreed costs of the summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff argued that costs submissions should be limited to the motion and that delay in bringing the motion inflated the defendants’ legal fees.

The court held that where summary judgment disposes of the entire action, the court may fix costs of the entire proceeding, treating the motion similarly to a trial judgment.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the defendants’ claimed partial‑indemnity costs by 25% to align with what would have been the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations in a large and technically complex case.

The plaintiff pharmaceutical company stored vaccines with a logistics provider under a master services agreement requiring the plaintiff to obtain all‑risk property insurance covering the stored goods and naming the warehouse operator as an additional insured.

After a refrigeration malfunction allegedly rendered the vaccines unsellable, the plaintiff commenced a subrogated action against the warehouse operator and various contractors responsible for the cooling and monitoring system.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the covenant to insure constituted an allocation of risk whereby the plaintiff assumed the risk of loss to the goods and thereby barred tort claims against the warehouse operator for that loss.

The court further held that the covenant extended to contractors and related parties with an identity of interest in the performance of the contract.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action and all cross‑claims.

The moving party, Dr. Sazant, sought an extension of time to bring a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to challenge an order of a single judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the delay prejudiced the respondents.

The court emphasized that resort to s. 21(5) should not become routine and that the justice of the case did not require granting the extension.

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board and the claimant, R.M., brought a motion to quash an appeal filed by the appellant, Dr. Sazant.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Board that extended the time for R.M. to file a compensation claim for alleged sexual assaults.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, finding that section 23 of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act only permits appeals from final decisions, not interlocutory orders.

The Court further held that even if the proceeding were converted to a judicial review application, it would be stayed as premature to avoid fragmenting the administrative process.

The appellant, a chiropractor, brought an application to set aside an Assistant Registrar's order that dismissed his appeal of a $128,000 costs award for delay.

The court applied the three-part test for setting aside a dismissal for delay, finding that the appellant had a bona fide continuing intention to appeal and that the delay was inconsequential.

The respondent conceded the merits of the appeal.

The application was granted, and the dismissal order was set aside subject to conditions including the payment of previous costs orders and the perfection of the appeal.

The appellant pharmacist appealed a penalty imposed by the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists, which prohibited him from having a proprietary interest in a pharmacy or working at a family member's pharmacy for three years.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to 19 counts of misconduct related to fraudulent billing and falsifying records.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding the penalty was justified for public protection given the sustained level of dishonesty and ongoing attempts to conceal it.

The applicant nurse sought judicial review of the College of Nurses' acquisition of her occupational health and safety records from her former employer without her consent.

The employer had terminated the applicant for cause and reported incidents of professional misconduct to the College.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the records constituted personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, the Act expressly permitted their disclosure to the College for regulatory purposes.

Furthermore, the College's investigator had broad statutory authority under the Health Professions Procedural Code to request and examine the records.

The appellant appealed an order of a Master dismissing its motion to amend a case management timetable and granting the respondent's cross-motion to dismiss the action for breach of court orders and timetables.

The court considered the appropriate standard of review for a Master's final discretionary decision, noting conflicting jurisprudence between a rehearing standard and a 'clearly wrong' standard.

The court concluded it was unnecessary to finally determine the standard, as the appeal would be dismissed under either standard.

The Master was not clearly wrong, and the court would have exercised its discretion in the same way.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his certificate of registration for sexual abuse.

During the hearing, the College called an expert witness who was subsequently appointed to the Discipline Committee before the panel released its reasons.

The Divisional Court found that a reasonably informed bystander would conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the panel members had to weigh the expert's evidence while she was their colleague on the Committee.

The decision of the panel was quashed as void ab initio.

The appellants, minority shareholders in a family investment company, appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy under s. 248(2) of the Business Corporations Act.

They alleged that the company's directors engaged in oppressive conduct by paying improper management fees to a director's holding company and by making an undocumented loan to the company president.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the management agreement was a reasonable business arrangement and that the loan, while poorly documented, was made in the best interests of the company and did not unfairly prejudice the appellants.

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.

The appellant dentist appealed an order striking his statement of claim against counsel retained by the professional regulator in disciplinary proceedings.

The Court of Appeal majority held that novelty was not a basis to strike a malicious prosecution claim at the pleading stage and that the pleaded civil conspiracy claim should also stand.

Although the pleadings were poorly drafted, the majority concluded the matter should proceed to trial, leaving the trial judge to assess the various claims on the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and the motion to strike was dismissed with costs to the appellant here and below.

The appellant father, earning over $945,000 annually, appealed a child support order requiring him to pay the Table amount of $10,034 per month for his two children.

He argued that the Table amount was inappropriate under s. 4 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and that the word 'inappropriate' allowed for downward variation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'inappropriate' means 'unsuitable', granting courts discretion to increase or decrease Table amounts for high-income earners.

However, the Court found a presumption in favour of the Table amounts and concluded the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused her discretion in awarding the Table amount in this case.