M.D. McArthur

Dr. Grochowski, an emergency room physician, sued Adam Young for defamation over online comments published by The Sarnia Observer.

Young's comments alleged Grochowski prescribed highly addictive medication without close inspection.

The court found the statements defamatory, rejecting Young's defenses of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication.

The court awarded Dr. Grochowski $12,500 in general damages plus prejudgment interest, and $2,000 in costs for a pleading amendment.

The defendant sought a bail review after being denied bail by a Justice of the Peace.

He was charged with robbery, disguise with intent, dangerous driving, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and failing to comply with release conditions.

The defendant proposed a new release plan including his mother as surety for a higher amount, residing at her home, GPS monitoring, and drug counselling.

The court found that the new evidence, including GPS monitoring, constituted a material relevant change in circumstances, triggering a review.

However, the court ultimately found that the defendant failed to discharge the reverse onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, given his serious criminal record, long-standing drug addiction, past breaches, and the escalating nature of his criminal activity.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to comply with a breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge had directed a verdict of acquittal on the refusal charge at the close of the Crown's case and acquitted on the impaired driving charge after the respondent testified.

The appeal challenged the directed verdict, arguing an error in law, and the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons for acquittal on impaired driving, alleging palpable and overriding error.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence for the impaired driving charge, and that the trial judge was correct in granting the directed verdict for the refusal charge due to insufficient evidence to identify the demanding officer and the timing of the refusal.

Alternatively, if there was an error in the directed verdict, it did not impact the overall verdict and did not justify a retrial.

The defendant, Juan Camilo Garcia Barbosa, was charged with aggravated assault and confinement following a physical altercation with the complainant.

The incident involved an argument over a cell phone, resulting in the complainant sustaining a mild spinal fracture.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility and reliability, noting significant inconsistencies in her testimony, including the omission of a choking allegation made to police and medical staff, and her post-incident contact with the defendant.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt due to these reliability concerns.

The defendants brought a motion seeking leave to amend their Statement of Defence and to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The plaintiff opposed both requests.

The court granted leave for the defendants to amend their Statement of Defence, finding the proposed amendments legally tenable and noting the early stage of proceedings precluded prejudice.

However, the court dismissed the request to remove plaintiff's counsel, deeming it premature and based on unwarranted speculation, emphasizing the litigant's right to counsel of choice and the high threshold for disqualification.

The plaintiff, Enterprise Rent-A-Car Canada Company, sought summary judgment against the defendant, George Bryan, for damages to a rented vehicle.

The vehicle was stolen and subsequently involved in an accident.

The defendant argued that a damage waiver in the rental agreement applied and that the plaintiff's claimed damages were excessive and some credit card payments unauthorized.

The court found that the defendant failed to fulfill contractual obligations, specifically by not returning the original ignition key and not ensuring the vehicle ignition was off at the time of theft, thereby invalidating the damage waiver.

The court also determined that the damages claimed were not excessive and the credit card charges were authorized.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for outstanding payments for solar panel installation work and dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim.

The defendants counterclaimed for damages due to alleged negligence and breach of contract by the plaintiffs.

The court granted partial summary judgment in favour of two individual plaintiffs (Ian Poss and Scott Oliver) for their claims, dismissing the counterclaims against them, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding their work.

However, summary judgment was denied for the corporate plaintiffs due to substantial factual conflicts and credibility issues requiring a full trial.

The court also declined to pierce the corporate veil of the defendant corporations.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the vehicle manufacturer and dealer.

In a second action, the plaintiffs sued their insurer for failing to preserve the vehicle.

The insurer issued a third-party claim against the plaintiffs' lawyers, alleging they were negligent in failing to preserve the evidence.

The third-party lawyers moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, holding that any negligence by the lawyers fell within the scope of their agency and would be attributable to the plaintiffs, making the third-party claim unnecessary.

The Huron-Perth Children’s Aid Society appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that returned a 10-year-old child (JJ) to the respondent grandparents.

JJ had been in extended society care with the grandparents for approximately 4.5 years before being temporarily placed with other foster parents.

The grandparents had brought a status review motion.

The Society argued the lower court judge misapplied Section 115(10) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act by failing to maintain the status quo and by placing the child in an unlicensed resource home contrary to Section 247.

The respondents contended no error occurred and the order should stand based on the child's best interests.

Counsel for the child, appointed by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, supported the child's return to the respondents.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in law regarding the judge's discretion to change care and custody based on the child's best interests, even if the home was unlicensed, and that the judge properly considered the status quo.

The plaintiff and the deceased entered into a jewelry business partnership and obtained life insurance policies on each other.

After the deceased passed away, the plaintiff sought summary judgment for the $250,000 insurance proceeds and a $42,000 promissory note.

The defendants counterclaimed, arguing the insurance proceeds were meant to fund a buy-sell agreement for the deceased's shares or were held in a constructive trust.

The court granted partial summary judgment, finding no evidence of a buy-sell agreement or constructive trust, and declared the plaintiff entitled to the insurance proceeds.

The claim regarding the promissory note was sent to trial due to conflicting evidence.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident action brought a motion under Rule 30.10 seeking production of a Crown Brief from the non-party Attorney General of Ontario.

The Attorney General objected on the basis that the motion was premature, as statements of defence had not yet been filed.

The court agreed, holding that relevance cannot be established in a vacuum before pleadings are closed.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew it once pleadings are closed.

The defendants brought a Charter application under section 11(b) alleging that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached.

The delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 20.5 months.

The Crown acknowledged the delay was presumptively unreasonable and sought to justify it based on case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The court found neither complexity nor transitional circumstances applied.

The case involved straightforward factual issues regarding consent and age verification, with only three principal Crown witnesses and a five-day trial schedule.

The court granted the application and stayed all charges against the defendants.

The appellant appealed a conviction for speeding at 114 km/h in an 80 km/h zone on Highway 89.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal based on "Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument" (OPCA) theories, including claims that the Highway Traffic Act applies only to commercial vehicles, that he was operating a private conveyance, that the traffic stop violated his human rights and UN principles, and that his driver's licence and ticket were void due to being signed without prejudice.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the appellant's arguments lacked legal merit and were based on erroneous legal interpretations.

The defendant was charged with multiple offences including possession of stolen property, failing to comply with recognizance, breach of probation, using a stolen credit card, and simple possession of morphine.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the defendant's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated during a police stop and search.

The Crown conceded a section 8 breach.

The court found additional violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b), and excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire.

The defendant brought applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was arrested for public intoxication but never formally arrested for impaired driving, despite reasonable grounds existing after the defendant's statements to police.

The investigating officer failed to provide the defendant with rights to counsel when the nature of the investigation changed to a more serious criminal offence.

The breathalyzer technician proceeded on the basis of an arrest for a provincial offence and left the caution section blank on the alcohol influence report.

The court found violations of sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2).

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on a blended voir dire basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on the investigating officer's failure to have an approved screening device readily available when making the demand for a breath sample, resulting in an 8-minute delay.

The court found that a realistic opportunity existed for the accused to consult counsel before the test was administered and that the officer failed to take reasonable steps to facilitate the accused's right to counsel.

The court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.