M.D. McArthur

The applicant sought to prove the deceased's 2020 Will and inter vivos transfers, while the respondent filed a Notice of Objection alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence regarding both the 2016 and 2020 Wills, as well as the transfers.

The court reviewed the evidence, applying the minimal evidentiary threshold test for suspicious circumstances.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet this threshold for any of her grounds, and the applicant successfully addressed any potential concerns.

The respondent's Notice of Objection was struck.

The applicants, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, sought to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a rural property, alleging violations of their s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights.

The court found moderate and minor breaches of s. 10(a) and (b) due to a delay in transporting one applicant to the police detachment to contact counsel and a failure to promptly inform both applicants of additional charges.

However, the court found no breach of the duty to hold off eliciting evidence.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the breaches were not deliberate or systemic, had a minor impact on the applicants' Charter-protected interests, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle collision action scheduled for trial in February 2022.

Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the Omicron variant, and the suspension of civil jury trials in London, the court found that waiting for a jury trial would cause unacceptable delay and prejudice.

Applying the principles from Louis v. Poitras, the court provisionally struck the jury notice and ordered the matter to proceed as a judge-alone trial.

The appellant was convicted of three driving offences after fleeing from police.

The sole issue at trial was identity, which relied heavily on the recognition evidence of a police officer who had prior interactions with the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the extent of the officer's familiarity with the appellant's deceased brother.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while a misapprehension occurred, it was not material and did not play an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process, as the officer's familiarity was well-established through other significant interactions.

The offender pled guilty to possessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle without authorization.

The court considered the impact of systemic anti-black racism and the offender's experiences as a biracial youth, applying the principles from R. v. Morris.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for gun crimes, the court imposed a sentence of 3 years and 6 months, reduced to 25 months after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The plaintiff underwent a reverse ileostomy surgery.

In the recovery room, a nurse erroneously administered a large dose of Heparin instead of Voluven.

The plaintiff subsequently suffered massive internal bleeding, compartment syndrome, and required further surgeries.

The trial was bifurcated to determine liability.

The court evaluated expert testimony and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Heparin caused the bleeding, as the evidence suggested the bleeding originated from blood vessels that spasmed during surgery and relaxed post-operatively.

The defendants brought a motion seeking production of a future care cost report and an income loss report from the plaintiff's 2007 motor vehicle accident benefits file.

The plaintiff had sued for injuries sustained in a 2011 slip and fall.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested reports were predicated on medical assumptions and had no relevance since the prior medical reports had already been disclosed to the defendants' experts.

The accused was tried on three historical sexual assault counts and one count of assault with a weapon arising from alleged incidents involving the complainant.

The court held that credibility and reliability were central, applied the W.(D.) framework, and found the accused's evidence could not be rejected.

The court also found material inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant's evidence, considered the surrounding family access dispute as relevant context, and concluded the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for the deficiency owing on an investment loan after the defendant defaulted.

The defendant alleged fraud by his investment advisor, claimed the advisor was an agent of the plaintiff, and raised the defence of non est factum, arguing he did not receive proper independent legal advice.

The court found no evidence of an agency relationship between the plaintiff and the advisor, noted the defendant signed an independent legal advice certificate, and rejected the non est factum defence.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for the deficiency and dismissed the defendant's counterclaim.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced an action against the Crown, his former union (AMAPCEO), and the union's legal counsel, alleging conspiracy and misfeasance in public office related to his 2014 termination and subsequent grievance proceedings.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action against all defendants.

The court found the claims against the Crown were barred by res judicata from a prior dismissed action and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The claims against the union defendants were similarly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The claims against the union's lawyers were dismissed as statute-barred and because the lawyers owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

Sentencing for multiple child pornography offences, including making, possessing, making available, online communication to facilitate a child pornography offence, and breach of bail by possessing internet-capable devices.

The court applied proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, and totality principles, with substantial reliance on recent appellate guidance emphasizing the gravity of sexual offences against children and the role of technology in perpetuating abuse.

Aggravating features included a very large collection, the youth of the children depicted, surreptitious creation of images, real-time participatory conduct, and reoffending while on bail.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, absence of prior record, remorse, and some rehabilitative prospects.

A global sentence of 4.5 years' incarceration was imposed with enhanced pre-sentence credit, probation, registry and prohibition orders, and forfeiture.

The defendant, charged with assault, sexual assault, and voyeurism, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the date of charge to the anticipated end of trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

After deducting delay solely attributable to the defence and discrete events, the net delay still exceeded the ceiling.

The court found the delay unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Alberta while a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant, an Alberta resident.

The plaintiff commenced an action in Ontario.

The defendant brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction.

The court applied the Van Breda framework and found no presumptive connecting factors to Ontario, as the tort occurred in Alberta and the defendant resided there.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by filing a statement of defence, noting the defendant consistently challenged jurisdiction.

The action was stayed.

The applicant sought interim primary residence of the four children following separation and a unilateral move.

The respondent also sought primary care or shared custody.

The court, applying the best interests of the child test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, ordered interim shared custody on an alternate week basis.

The decision emphasized the need for stability and consistency, and discouraged parental conflict and "affidavit-wars" noting that both parents had demonstrated the ability to care for the children.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer was appointed.

The applicant father brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' 11-year-old child from the respondent mother in Ontario to himself in British Columbia.

The father had moved to B.C. in 2017, which constituted a material change in circumstances.

The child expressed a consistent and genuine desire to live with her father during the school year and her mother during the summer.

A Voice of the Child report confirmed the child's wishes were independent and not the result of coaching.

The court found both parents capable and loving, but gave significant weight to the child's clear and realistic wishes given her age and maturity.

The motion was granted, and the child's primary residence was changed to the father.

The moving party sought to prove the 2017 Will of her late father, which left the estate entirely to her and disinherited her two brothers.

The respondent brothers challenged the Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, failure to know and appreciate the contents, and undue influence by the moving party.

The court found that the drafting solicitor's evidence substantially answered the concerns regarding capacity and knowledge.

However, the court found a minimal evidentiary basis existed regarding undue influence due to the potential for domination in the parent-child relationship and conflicting evidence.

The court ordered the production of solicitor and financial records and adjourned the motion for directions.

The defendants applied under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of charges due to unreasonable delay, as the time from charge to the anticipated end of trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found no defence-caused delay and no discrete events that would justify the delay.

Furthermore, the case was not deemed particularly complex to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay.

Despite acknowledging significant judicial resource limitations, the court concluded that the 30.5-month delay was unreasonable and granted the application, staying the charges against both defendants.

The Crown sought to admit expert forensic accounting evidence from Jeffrey J. Good to establish that approximately $49,500 in seized currency was proceeds of drug trafficking.

The defendants were jointly charged with possession of various prohibited substances for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court applied the two-step admissibility test for expert evidence from *Mohan* and *White Burgess*.

While the expert was qualified, the court found the evidence lacked logical relevance to directly link the seized funds to drug trafficking over the seven-year period analyzed.

Concerns were also raised regarding the unexplained expansion of the expert's mandate from one defendant to both, and the arbitrary selection of the seven-year period.

The court concluded that the potential prejudicial effects of the evidence, including inviting speculation and devolving the case into a remote inquiry, outweighed its slight probative value.

Consequently, the expert evidence was deemed inadmissible.

The moving party father brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the parties' 20-month-old child from Calgary to London, Ontario, and interim custody.

The responding party mother had moved to Calgary with the child following an incident that led to criminal charges against the father and bail conditions prohibiting contact.

The court found that a status quo had been established with the mother in Calgary over the past six months.

Applying the best interests of the child test and considering the reluctance to upset the status quo on an interim basis, the court dismissed the father's motion and ordered that the child remain in the interim care and custody of the mother in Calgary.

The defendant, The Personal Insurance Company, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence psychiatric examination.

The plaintiff opposed, citing concerns about the trial date being compromised under Rule 53.03.

The court found that a psychiatric assessment was necessary due to a recent material change in the plaintiff's circumstances (inability to work).

While acknowledging the plaintiff's diligent conduct, the court ordered the plaintiff to attend the examination and the defendant to serve the report by a specific date.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff $3,500 in costs, despite being successful on the motion, due to the defendant's delay in seeking the examination.