Martin Sabat

The appellant, Paul J. Lochner, appealed his conviction for assault and the conditional discharge and 18 months probation sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty after a trial marked by significant disruptions from the appellant and his family.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in credibility findings and by failing to provide adequate reasons.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the record, and that the appellant could not complain about inadequate reasons given his and his family's disruptive behavior that forced the trial judge to cut short his ruling.

The court also rejected the appellant's motion for recusal and adjournment.

The appellant, Arafat Bakshi, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and misapplied the principles from R. v. W.D. The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided detailed and careful reasons, correctly instructed herself on the reasonable doubt standard, and properly applied the W.D. principles by assessing the complainant's credibility and finding the appellant's evidence implausible.

The court emphasized the deference owed to trial judges in credibility assessments.

The accused applied for a bail review after being denied bail on nine firearm-related charges.

The accused argued there was a material change in circumstances based on a firearm property report indicating blank bullets were used, and a new proposed plan of supervision involving his common law spouse as a surety.

The court found that the report did not materially change the Crown's case and that the new supervision plan was deficient.

The court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the accused would re-offend and that his detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on Mr. Waisanen for impaired driving.

Mr. Waisanen had initially received a conditional discharge and no driving prohibition, despite a conviction for impaired driving, due to a trial judge's finding of a Charter breach (arbitrary detention).

A previous appeal had overturned the stay of proceedings and clarified that the police conduct, while a Charter breach, was not egregious enough to warrant such a significant sentencing reduction.

This court found the conditional discharge and lack of driving prohibition to be an unfit sentence, emphasizing the paramount sentencing objectives of general and specific deterrence, especially given the high blood alcohol readings.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a fine and a mandatory driving prohibition.

The accused was convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death after his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The accident was not his fault, but he left the scene for 20-25 seconds, during which time the pedestrian was run over by a truck and killed.

The court stayed the manslaughter conviction under the Kienapple principle.

Considering the highly unusual mitigating circumstances and collateral immigration consequences, the court sentenced the accused to six months less a day imprisonment, followed by 18 months of probation.

The accused struck a 90-year-old pedestrian in a crosswalk while making a right turn on a red light.

The victim died from her injuries two days later.

The accused fled the scene after briefly stopping and observing the victim's severe injuries.

The court found that the accused's failure to stop before striking the pedestrian, despite having a clear view and sufficient time to react, constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and breach of probation after leaving a series of unwanted, obsessive voicemails for the complainant at her workplace in 2012.

The accused and the complainant had no contact for 12 years following a previous criminal harassment charge and peace bond in 2001.

The court found that the accused's conduct constituted repeated communication that caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety.

The court also found the accused possessed the requisite mens rea of recklessness, as he subjectively appreciated the risk his conduct posed but persisted anyway.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The accused applied to sever a five-count indictment involving sexual assault, criminal harassment, breach of probation, and two child pornography possession charges.

Applying the balancing framework from R. v. Last, the court considered prejudice to the accused, factual nexus between counts, strategic decisions about testifying, and trial efficiency.

The court found that the historical sexual assault allegation, involving a different complainant and events more than a decade earlier, lacked a legal or factual nexus to the other charges and risked significant moral prejudice if tried together.

The remaining four charges arising from events in 2012 were also severed into two separate trials to preserve the accused’s ability to testify selectively.

The court ordered three separate trials, with the sexual assault charge to be heard by a different judge.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography arising from photographs and a three‑volume journal containing images and written commentary seized during search warrants.

The accused conceded possession but argued that some materials were not child pornography and that the journal fell within the judicially created private-use exception recognized in R. v. Sharpe.

The court held that several images clearly met the definition of child pornography under s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code and that significant portions of the journal advocated or counselled sexual activity with persons under eighteen.

The Sharpe private-use exception did not apply because the journal incorporated pornographic images sourced from outside materials rather than being created solely by the accused.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Ms. Kathleen Hao, a conditionally accredited Tagalog interpreter, was qualified to provide interpretation assistance for the defendant's trial on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown sought to qualify Ms. Hao for simultaneous interpretation, alternatively for consecutive interpretation.

The defence opposed qualification on both grounds, arguing that her conditional accreditation status and occasional use of English words rendered her unqualified.

The court found Ms. Hao not qualified for simultaneous interpretation but qualified for consecutive interpretation, based on her passing score in consecutive interpretation on the MAG test, combined with her background, training, and courtroom experience.