Marc R. Labrosse

The applicant, Marguerite Landry, was substantially successful on a motion for interim costs and sought costs for the motion.

As a self-represented litigant, she claimed fees for time spent and disbursements.

The court found that she did not meet the requirements for a self-represented litigant to receive costs for time and effort, as she did not demonstrate an opportunity cost or that she performed work ordinarily done by a lawyer.

The court limited her recovery to reasonable disbursements, fixing costs at $500.

Following a decision on a motion to change and a motion for withdrawal in child protection proceedings, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Applicant Mother sought substantial indemnity costs against the Respondent Father, while the Father sought costs against both the Mother and the Children's Aid Society.

The court denied costs in the child protection proceedings, noting that costs in such matters require more than mere success.

However, the court awarded costs to the Applicant Mother for the motion to change in the divorce proceedings, as she was the substantially successful party.

The court fixed costs at an elevated partial indemnity rate of $28,319.46, sanctioning the Respondent Father for his unreasonable behaviour in filing voluminous and unnecessary materials.

The applicants sought to vary a sealing order under s. 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to obtain access to the Information to Obtain search warrants executed at two residences.

They argued that, as non‑accused persons affected by the search, they had a presumptive right to access the materials in order to assess potential Charter s. 8 violations.

The Crown opposed, arguing that a non‑accused must first present some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully before a court will review sealed materials.

The court adopted the approach from Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General) and R. v. Schmidt, requiring a preliminary evidentiary basis before varying a sealing order.

Because the applicants filed no evidence suggesting unlawful authorization of the warrants, the application was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary retroactive and ongoing child support, section 7 tutoring expenses, life and health insurance designations, and a non-depletion order.

The court found insufficient evidence to determine retroactive support and referred it to trial.

The respondent father's claim for undue hardship based on marriage debts was dismissed for lack of evidence showing his standard of living was lower than the applicant's.

The court ordered ongoing child support of $970 per month and partially granted the tutoring expenses.

The court also ordered the respondent to designate the applicant as the beneficiary of his life insurance in trust for the children and to maintain her on his health benefits.

The request for a non-depletion order was dismissed.

The applicant mother and respondent father separated after nine years of marriage.

The mother sought sole custody of their nine-year-old child, supervised access for the father, and child support.

The father sought shared custody.

The court found that the father had unresolved mental health issues, exhibited aggressive behaviour towards third parties, and was entirely unable to communicate effectively with the mother.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the court awarded sole custody to the mother and ordered that the father's access be supervised, subject to a review in six months.

The court also maintained a restraining order against the father and ordered him to pay child support and arrears.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the applicant’s claim for renewed spousal support in a Motion to Change, following a separation agreement containing a final release of spousal support.

Applying the two‑stage analysis from Miglin v. Miglin, the court examined whether the agreement should be set aside due to deficiencies in negotiation, disclosure, or subsequent unforeseen circumstances.

The court found the agreement was negotiated over several years with extensive disclosure and legal representation, and there was no evidence of duress or procedural unfairness.

At the second stage, the applicant failed to demonstrate a significant change in circumstances not contemplated by the agreement.

Summary judgment was granted and the spousal support claim dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment alleging constructive dismissal after the employer replaced her during a medical leave and offered a significantly reduced position at lower pay.

The court held that the employer had already fundamentally altered the employment relationship by hiring a permanent replacement and offering only a demoted role, constituting constructive dismissal.

Summary judgment was granted on liability and reasonable notice was fixed at 15 months, including salary, benefits, and bonus entitlement.

However, genuine issues requiring trial remained regarding aggravated damages and alleged discrimination contrary to the Human Rights Code.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for wrongful dismissal subject to mitigation, while the remaining claims could proceed to further adjudication.

A lawyer sought leave to appeal a costs endorsement ordering him to personally pay a portion of the applicant’s costs under Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party argued the costs judge failed to apply the proper two‑part test for personal costs orders against counsel, failed to provide adequate reasons, and denied procedural fairness by not allowing independent submissions from counsel facing potential personal liability.

The court reviewed the stringent requirements governing costs awards against lawyers, including the need for extreme caution and prior notice to the lawyer.

It concluded there were arguable grounds that the costs judge erred in exercising discretion and in failing to permit the lawyer to respond personally.

Leave to appeal the costs endorsement was therefore granted.

Child protection motion under the Child and Family Services Act seeking a temporary care and custody order.

The court considered evidence of chronic school absences, unsanitary living conditions including mold, concerns about supervision, sexualized behaviour by one child, and a positive hair follicle drug test for amphetamines/methamphetamines by the father.

The court found the father had not demonstrated the ability to protect the children from ongoing harm and instability.

It concluded that supervision would be insufficient to protect the children.

A temporary order placing the children in the care and custody of the child protection agency for six months was granted.

The applicant brought a motion to change a separation agreement following the termination of his employment, seeking termination of his spousal support obligation, child support from the respondent for a dependent adult child with disabilities, and an order requiring the respondent to pay him spousal support.

The court found no material change in circumstances warranting variation of the agreement.

The adult child’s needs were being met through disability benefits and child support could not be justified merely to fund a future trust.

The applicant’s income was imputed at $50,000 based on his admission that he could obtain employment at that level, and the agreement’s income‑adjustment provisions continued to govern spousal support.

The claims for child support and spousal support from the respondent were denied.

Separated parents brought a motion regarding their child’s schooling and interpretation of an income provision in their separation agreement.

The father sought enrollment of the child in a private homogeneous French education program, while the mother requested that the child remain in daycare temporarily pending a full trial on long‑term schooling.

Applying the best interests of the child under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court held that the evidentiary record on a motion was insufficient to determine the long‑term schooling issue and ordered the child to remain in daycare for the upcoming academic year.

The court further interpreted the separation agreement as requiring income determinations strictly based on Line 150 of each party’s tax return, rejecting deductions for union dues and exclusion of non‑recurring income.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a separation agreement and prior order that terminated child support when the parties’ children reached age 21.

The court considered whether the contractual provision was enforceable where the children remained full‑time post‑secondary students.

The court held that the clause terminating support at age 21 was unreasonable and unenforceable under s. 56(1.1) of the Family Law Act because it conflicted with the objectives of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court further concluded that a motion to vary under s. 17 of the Divorce Act does not require that the children be “children of the marriage” at the date of filing.

Retroactive variation was granted and the motion adjourned to determine the appropriate quantum of support for adult children under s. 3(2) of the Guidelines.

The parties reached an agreement on all issues except the choice of school for their four-year-old child and the resulting parenting schedule.

The applicant mother sought to have the child attend a public school near her residence, while the respondent father sought a Catholic school near his residence.

Relying on the recommendations of the Office of the Children's Lawyer, the court found it was in the child's best interests to attend the school near the mother's residence to minimize travel and transitions, and to allow the child to attend the same school as her half-sister.

The court ordered that the child reside primarily with the mother during the school week, with the father having access three out of four weekends.

Following a contested family law motion involving interim custody and related relief, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving party had been found substantially successful on the motion and sought full indemnity costs exceeding $17,000, arguing the responding party acted unreasonably by rejecting the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the wishes of the teenage children.

The court held that although the moving party was substantially successful, the responding party’s opposition was not unreasonable given conflicting affidavit evidence and legitimate issues requiring adjudication.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules, the court reduced the claimed amount and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs were fixed at $7,121.83 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable from the proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer brought a motion to quash an appeal from a child protection decision granting Crown wardship, or alternatively for summary judgment dismissing the appeal.

The appellant parent challenged the motion judge’s findings of fact and alleged inaccuracies in the Society’s evidence but identified no specific errors of law.

The court held that while the appeal was not manifestly devoid of merit such that it should be quashed, the evidentiary record overwhelmingly supported the motion judge’s findings and no palpable and overriding error was identified.

Applying the summary judgment standard for appeals under the Family Law Rules, the court concluded it was plain and obvious that the appeal could not succeed.

Summary judgment dismissing the appeal was granted.

On a motion to change a prior custody and child support order, the father sought sole custody, termination of his child support obligations, retroactive reimbursement, and child support from the mother after the child began residing exclusively with him.

The mother opposed the motion and sought confirmation of the original order, return of the child to her school, and appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child’s decision to live with the father but held it was premature to vary custody without independent investigation.

The OCL was appointed to represent the child’s interests, the child’s principal residence was temporarily confirmed with the father, and structured access with the mother was ordered.

The mother was ordered to pay guideline child support while the child resides with the father, with retroactive issues reserved for trial.

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondents were not entitled to treat the retirement of his transition support loan as a taxable benefit and issue a T4.

The applicant argued that the loan documents, specifically a Q&A document, implied the loan would be retired without financial consequence to him.

The court found no ambiguity in the loan documents and held that they did not restrict the manner in which the respondents could retire the loan.

The application was dismissed, as the court could not rewrite the contract to impose an obligation to retire the loan tax-free.

A non‑party brought a motion seeking to set aside or vary an order for directions in estate proceedings concerning the administration of a deceased’s estate.

The moving party asserted standing as an affected person and alternatively through a power of attorney granted by an existing party.

The court held that a power of attorney does not permit the attorney to advocate in court on behalf of the grantor without counsel and that a potential future successor to an estate beneficiary does not qualify as an “affected person” under Rule 37.14(1).

The court further concluded that the moving party had no financial interest in the estate and possessed none of the documents referenced in the order for directions.

The motion was dismissed for lack of standing and the responding party’s cross‑motion to strike the motion was granted, with costs awarded against the moving party.

The father brought a motion alleging the mother was in contempt of several prior custody and access orders relating to their child.

The court focused on whether the mother had breached a specific access order requiring the child to spend time with the father.

Evidence showed the mother had conveyed to the child that he could decide whether to attend visits and had taken no meaningful steps to enforce the order.

The court found that these actions effectively discouraged compliance and constituted contempt of the existing access order.

Sanctions were deferred while the court implemented a structured, gradual access regime and counselling measures to rebuild the father–child relationship.

A mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody, a restraining order, disclosure, and mental health assessment relating to the father’s mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and paranoid delusions.

The father sought joint custody and access.

The court found further information about the father’s treatment was required but declined to compel full medical record disclosure or a formal custody-access assessment at that stage.

The court granted the mother temporary custody and ordered that the father’s access be supervised until his mental health treatment stabilized and further information was provided.

A restraining order was issued restricting the father’s contact with the mother except regarding access.