Lucy K. McSweeney

In a criminal prosecution for importing a controlled substance, the court ruled on the voluntariness of pre-arrest statements made by the accused to border services officers at Pearson airport.

The defence challenged voluntariness on the basis that the accused was questioned without caution and that no audio or video recording captured the statements.

Applying the contemporary confessions rule and the threshold reliability requirement for the evidentiary record, the court held the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary.

The court found no threats, inducements, oppression, operating-mind concerns, or trickery, and admitted the statements at trial.

On an interim family law motion, the moving party sought child support, spousal support, and interim costs under r. 24(25) of the Family Law Rules while jurisdiction was disputed in parallel Yemen proceedings.

The court imputed interim income to the responding party based on available U.S. tax evidence and ordered retroactive monthly child support and interim spousal support from July 1, 2025, but declined to order interim s. 7 expenses on the existing record.

The court rejected the argument that a unilateral Yemen talaq barred interim spousal support, citing Divorce Act threshold requirements and public policy concerns.

The court granted substantial interim costs to level the litigation playing field and stayed the jurisdiction motion until support arrears and interim costs were paid.

Costs of the motion were also awarded to the moving party.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld a Hearing Division finding of professional misconduct for failing to cooperate with a Law Society investigation.

The appellant argued he was denied procedural fairness when his request for an adjournment was refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Division applied the correct standard of review and made no error in concluding that the Hearing Division's refusal to grant an adjournment did not breach procedural fairness.

The court also upheld the findings of professional misconduct and the penalty of an indefinite suspension.

The respondent law firm moved to set aside a Registrar's order for the assessment of its accounts, arguing the clients failed to request the assessment within the 30-day period under section 3 of the Solicitor's Act.

The court found that the clients did not receive the accounts until November 2024, making their request timely.

The motion was dismissed, and the assessment was ordered to proceed, limited to the specific accounts and not the retainer agreement.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision denying her an extension of time to request a review of an order finding her jointly liable for rent arrears.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness because she received no notice of the original LTB hearing and only learned of the order months later when served with a civil claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the LTB's failure to address the central issue of procedural fairness in its reasons constituted an error of law.

The matter was remitted to the LTB to determine whether the appellant was accorded natural justice.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Capital Markets Tribunal finding he breached a 15-year trading ban by participating in stock secured financings.

The Tribunal found that the lenders' sales of pledged securities constituted trades, and the appellant's actions, including sourcing financing and analyzing the value of the pledged equities for compensation tied to the sales' profits, were acts in furtherance of those trades.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal made no palpable and overriding error in its contextual analysis of the appellant's conduct.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision that denied his claim for income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to poor interpretation services at the hearing and because the same tribunal member conducted the reconsideration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, as the tribunal adequately addressed the interpreter concerns and established jurisprudence permits the same adjudicator to conduct a reconsideration.

The court also found the tribunal's factual findings regarding the appellant's ability to work were reasonable.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decisions of the lower court judge dated March 7 and April 8, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

The moving parties were ordered to pay all-inclusive costs of $5,000 to each of the two responding parties.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decisions of Brownstone J. dated February 18 and March 17, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order removing him as director and CEO of a privately held technology company under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding his conduct oppressive, assessing the respondents' reasonable expectations, and ordering his removal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion.

The court upheld the removal of the appellant as a proportionate remedy to address the corporate dysfunction he caused.

The applicant, a community organization, sought judicial review of an Ontario Land Tribunal decision dismissing their request to reconsider a zoning by-law amendment.

The amendment permitted a housing development for people leaving homelessness on a property already containing seniors' housing.

The applicant argued the development should be restricted to seniors leaving homelessness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and consistent with the Provincial Planning Statement, as restricting zoning by age would violate equality rights.

The Court also found no procedural unfairness despite inappropriate submissions by the respondent's counsel, though it denied costs to the successful respondent as a result.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision declaring her a vexatious litigant after she filed over 160 applications.

The applicant argued the HRTO hearing was procedurally unfair and the decision was unreasonable, seeking to adduce a surreptitious recording of the hearing as new evidence.

The Divisional Court admitted the recording but dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO provided a fair hearing and reasonably concluded the applicant's conduct was vexatious.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order directing the Children's Aid Society to conduct an assessment under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, noting that while the parties agreed the order was a mistake, such an error should be corrected on a motion in the court below under Rule 25(19)(b) of the Family Law Rules.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a costs endorsement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court dated June 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and reserved the costs of the motion to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellants sought to appeal a decision declining to award costs against a law firm under s. 86(1)(b)(i) of the Construction Act.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was required under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act because the appeal was solely regarding discretionary costs, and the costs order did not constitute a 'judgment' under s. 71 of the Construction Act.

Finding that the test for leave was not met, the court denied leave and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order regarding parenting time.

The court considered the children's strong and consistent views, their maturity, and the father's failure to take responsibility for past family violence.

The court granted the mother's request, ordering that contact with the father be at the children's sole discretion and initiative, and dismissed the father's requests for joint decision-making, compelled psychological assessments, and police enforcement of contact.

The applicant, Glycobiosciences Inc., sought leave for its non-lawyer principal, Kevin Drizen, to represent it in a separate action against the respondents.

The court dismissed the application, finding it procedurally improper as such relief must be sought by interlocutory motion within the existing action, not a new application.

The court also deemed the application an abuse of process, particularly given a recent Court of Appeal ruling denying Mr. Drizen similar leave.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Applicant husband sought an immediate divorce on the ground of cruelty, alleging emotional abuse, harassment, and being forced out of the matrimonial home by the Respondent wife shortly after their marriage.

The Respondent did not file an Answer.

The court reviewed the unopposed application, requiring further evidence to support the cruelty claim.

Based on the Applicant's affidavit and police occurrence reports, the court found that the Respondent's behaviour caused the Applicant significant psychological distress and rendered continued cohabitation intolerable, establishing a breakdown of the marriage due to cruelty under section 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Divorce Act.

The court granted the divorce immediately, noting that the respondent's intent was not at issue, only the subjective harm caused.

The Appellant father appealed the relocation and decision-making portions of a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice, which had granted primary residence and sole decision-making for the child to the Respondent mother and allowed her to relocate to Poland.

The father argued the trial judge erred in finding the mother could be deported, failing to consider all evidence, and not properly applying the child's best interests.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law, including the finding that the mother's precarious immigration status and her plan for the child in Poland were relevant to the child's best interests.