ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: FS-25-47983
DATE: 2026 02 11
B E T W E E N:
Hoor Abdulkarim Ahmad AL-SAIDI
Aaron Franks/ Brent Mendiola, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
Mayad Abdullah Esmail AL-SAIDI
Rana Charif, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD: December 17, 2025
ENDORSEMENT
JUSTICE MCSWEENEY
[ 1 ] This is the Applicant wife Ms. Al-Saidi’s motion for interim child and spousal support, and interim costs pursuant to the new r. 24(25) of the Family Law Rules.
[ 2 ] The substantive interim orders sought are:
a) An order imputing the Respondent's income for support purposes in the amount of $415,968 per year pursuant to s. 19(1) (c) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR 97-175, as amended (the " Guidelines ");
b) An order that, commencing July 1, 2025 and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Respondent pay interim monthly child support for Jena Al-Saidi born on May 1, 2016 ("child") in the amount of $3,348 per month until further court order or signed agreement;
c) An order that the Respondent shall pay all of the child's s. 7 expenses until further court order or signed agreement;
d) An order that, commencing July 1, 2025 and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Respondent pay interim net after-tax spousal support to the Applicant in the amount of $6,135 per month until further court order or signed agreement;
e) An order pursuant to r. 24(25) of the Rules that the Respondent pay to the Applicant the lump sum of $150,000 on account of interim costs and/or disbursements within 30 days, and without prejudice to the Applicant's ability to return a further motion, if necessary, to seek an order for a further interim cost and/or disbursements.
[ 3 ] This motion is hotly contested by the Respondent, Mr. Al-Saidi, on both procedural and substantive bases. He argues that the court in Yemen has jurisdiction and that the child should be returned there. He also argues that this motion is premature, is not urgent, and should await determination of his jurisdiction motion.
[ 4 ] The Respondent’s challenge to the Ontario Superior Court as the correct forum for adjudicating separation obligations and property division is to be determined at a jurisdiction motion to be scheduled for that purpose.
[ 5 ] The record indicates that over a six-month period in 2025, Mills J. had approximately nine attendances with the parties, and that other judges were engaged with them as well. The positionality and acrimony appear to have been amplified by counsels’ abrasive relationship.
[ 6 ] Going forward I recommend continuing case management to streamline this application and ensure efficient and consistent resource allocation.
Respondent’s Objection – Motion not urgent:
[ 7 ] Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Al-Saidi, argued strenuously against the court hearing the motion as it is not “urgent.” He also argued against doing so as a “regular motion” on the basis that the restricted time and page limits applicable to regular (under 59 minute) motions in the Central West Region prejudiced his ability to file more detailed responding material.
[ 8 ] On these threshold issues, I note simply that the scheduling of the motion followed multiple attendances and an Early Case Conference (ECC). Its scheduling as a matter of “urgency”, in Central West Region, means a date was found within 3 weeks of the ECC. I am satisfied on a review of the materials filed on this motion and the endorsements to date that it was appropriately scheduled.
[ 9 ] With respect to the constraints of a regular motion on a busy list in which this motion was to be heard in under 59 minutes: this forum is appropriate for interim motions as a matter of court resource allocation – it would not have served either of these parties to address the interim relief sought in a more protracted matter, such as waiting months for a dedicated “long motion date”.
[ 10 ] I therefore proceeded to hear the motion as scheduled.
Background Facts Established:
[ 11 ] I find the following facts established for the purpose of these interim motions:
a) The parties have one child, a daughter, born in 2016. She currently resides with her mother in Ontario and attends school here. The child was born in Ontario and lived here all her life, with the exception of a period of approximately eight months, in 2024-25, which she spent in Yemen.
b) The Applicant, an HR professional, lost her job with United Way in April 2024. The Applicant and child went abroad after that, initially to Egypt for vacation, then to visit family in Yemen. Once she was there, the Applicant says that the Respondent wanted her to stay, so she did initially. Then he tried to stop her from leaving that country when she wanted to return home to Canada. Ultimately, she fled back to Canada after eight months in Yemen. She left with the child against the Respondent’s wishes and contrary to legal restrictions imposed by the Yemen courts.
c) It is the Respondent’s position that the Applicant belongs in Yemen, where she and the Respondent were born and still have some family. Also, he argue she knows the culture, and that the child should now live there. Although he does not concede the Applicant’s position that they lived and raised their daughter in Canada prior to separation, his own affidavit makes several references to their home and life together and standard of living as a family in Canada.
d) The parties separated in Yemen in March or April 2025.
e) In or around April 23, 2025, the Respondent obtained a unilateral religious divorce from the Applicant, and promptly remarried.
f) The Applicant and child returned to Canada in April 2025.
g) It is disputed whether the child became “habitually resident” in Yemen prior to her return to Canada.
h) Mother looked for work on her return to Canada, and obtained some partial employment in December 2025.
i) There is ongoing litigation in Yemen. The parties disagree as to whether it is the appropriate forum to determine the parties’ property and parenting separation rights and obligations.
j) Mr. Al-Saidi currently works and resides in the USA.
[ 12 ] Issues to determine on this interim motion
a) Respondent’s income for interim support purposes;
b) Child support – table and s. 7;
c) Whether child support is currently being paid;
d) Applicant’s income for interim spousal support purposes;
e) Whether an interim spousal claim is precluded by Yemeni religious divorce;
f) Entitlement/quantum of interim spousal support;
g) Whether an interim cost and/or disbursements order should be made.
Respondent’s Income for Interim Support Purposes:
[ 13 ] The Respondent did not make financial disclosure of his income, which is his obligation to do.
[ 14 ] The Applicant’s affidavit attached the Respondent’s 2024 US Income Tax Return, which showed a gross income of $211,675 in 2024 in USD.
[ 15 ] I accept the Applicant’s conversion rate of 1.4 CAD for every USD. I do not accept the Applicant’s proposed gross-up calculation as its methodology is not supported by caselaw or other authority.
[ 16 ] In the absence of better or any financial disclosure from the Respondent, I find his income for the purpose of interim child and spousal support to be $296,345 CAD.
Interim Child Support Ordered:
[ 17 ] The Respondent asks the court to find that he is already paying reasonable child support in good faith. He points to a court order he obtained unilaterally from a judge in a Yemen court, requiring him to pay into the Yemen court, in Yemen currency, every month, funds for the support of the child. Respondent deposes that the amount paid into Yemen court, which he says equates to approximately $450 CAD, could rent a luxury three-bedroom apartment in Yemen and is therefore sufficient child support.
[ 18 ] Counsel for the Respondent offered no authority for the proposition that a parent living in the USA satisfies all or part of his child support obligation to the residential parent in Canada by paying funds into a foreign court. The Respondent concedes that to obtain the money, the Applicant would have to make arrangements with the court to obtain the funds, provide banking information, convert the currency, etc.
[ 19 ] In the circumstances I do not consider the Respondent to have paid child support for the purposes of this application, as the child is living in Canada and the funds allegedly paid abroad are not paid to the custodial parent. Comparisons to cost of living in Yemen are not of assistance to the court on this motion, since the Applicant and child are living in Canada.
[ 20 ] Monthly table support for one child on $296,345 federal child support guidelines is $2,439.
[ 21 ] The Applicant seeks interim child support from separation. Her application was issued in June 2025. She moved promptly thereafter to seek interim support. I direct interim monthly child support to commence July 1, 2025.
[ 22 ] Monthly interim child support shall be paid by Respondent father to the Applicant mother in the Guidelines amount of $2,439, commencing July 1, 2025 and thereafter on the first day of each month, until further court order or signed agreement.
Section 7 expenses:
[ 23 ] I decline to make an order for interim s. 7 expenses at this time as the record is insufficient to determine either the parties’ regular lifestyle expenditures prior to separation, or which expenditures should reasonably be covered by the monthly table support ordered.
[ 24 ] The Applicant is encouraged to maintain all records of child related expenditures for potential reallocation as part of any final resolution.
Applicant’s Income for Interim Spousal Support Purposes:
[ 25 ] Applicant’s financial statement filed.
[ 26 ] She lost her job in 2024, and on return to Canada with she was looking for employment. In December 2025, she obtained employment, earning $11,098 per year. I find her annual income for support purposes at this time is therefore $11,098.
[ 27 ] The Applicant appropriately amended her income evidence to include her recent employment.
Effect of Religious Divorce on Interim Spousal Support Claim:
[ 28 ] Respondent contends that at time of separation or shortly thereafter, the Applicant told him she wanted a divorce. Shortly thereafter, he obtained a unilateral religious divorce or “talaq”.
[ 29 ] Because the religious divorce, or “talaq” was granted in Yemen, Respondent argues that the Applicant is not entitled to claim spousal support in Canada or, any relief to which she would be entitled at separation if the divorce had not been granted.
[ 30 ] I am not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument and authorities that the Yemen religious divorce either can be, or should be, recognized by this court as a bar to the Applicant’s claim for interim spousal support, for the following reasons.
a) First, the parties do not meet either of the threshold criteria under the Divorce Act to be eligible to divorce at this time, despite their clear mutual desire not to reconcile, as: they have not been separated, even at this date, for a year; nor have they yet made reasonable provision for the child of the marriage;
b) Second, neither party’s evidence supports a finding that either spouse was habitually resident in Yemen for a year when the talaq was granted, as required by s. 22 of the Divorce Act ;
c) Third, recognition of a religious divorce obtained unilaterally by the husband for his benefit and used as an argument to bar relief claimed by a wife, who herself had no standing to object to it, has been recognized as contrary to public policy and principles of natural justice: see, for example, Audet J. in Al Sabki v Al Jajeh , 2019 ONSC 6394 , at paras. 51-55 .
Legal Framework for Interim Spousal Support:
[ 31 ] The Divorce Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2 nd Supp.), s. 15.2(2) , is the authority under which an interim order for spousal support may be awarded.
[ 32 ] Although the foundational requirements for an order for spousal support are substantially the same whether interim or final support is sought, both practical and evidentiary considerations distinguish the interim analysis as follows:
a. Interim spousal support orders are made in order to provide income for dependent spouses from the time the proceedings are instituted until trial;
b. A prima facie case for entitlement must be shown. However, at the interim stage, it is not necessary for the court to conduct a complete inquiry into all aspects and details to determine what extent either party suffered economic advantage or disadvantage as a result of the relationship. That is to be left to the trial judge.
c. Once a prima facie entitlement is established, an interim support order is made to maintain the accustomed lifestyle, if possible, pending final disposition on the merits.
d. Interim support is based on the parties’ means and needs. In the interim support analysis, the applicant’s needs and the responding party’s ability to pay assume greater significance.
see Sherr J. in Samis v. Samis , 2011 ONCJ 273 , at paras. 43-44 ; Fisher v. Fisher , 2008 ONCA 11 , 88 O.R. (3d) 241 , at para. 76
[ 33 ] Interim without prejudice support is often referred to as “rough justice”, as it is support ordered on an interim basis pending final disposition on the merits and variation based on the fuller record that will be available at trial.
Prima facie case established:
[ 34 ] The following facts established on the mother’s evidence support her prima facie entitlement to spousal support on both compensatory and needs bases: length of marriage, being 16 years; wife being primary caregiver to child of marriage, including sole caregiver when husband was working abroad; wife’s income was consistently substantially lower than her husbands.
[ 35 ] The following facts support needs-based entitlement at this time: the wife lost her job in 2024 and has been living off her savings since then. Although she has secured part-time employment, I find on the evidence that she is not self-supporting at this time without further intrusion into her life savings. I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the Applicant must demonstrate a level of abject poverty or complete depletion of resources prior to seeking interim spousal support relief where a prima facie case has been established.
[ 36 ] I note further factors favouring the order sought include that Applicant mother has been the sole care giver of child since separation. I also note her evidence of current need from her evidence that she has had to replace some of the family’s possessions in Canada, including furnishings and winter clothing, as they remain inaccessible to her, as they are in storage within the Respondent’s sole control.
[ 37 ] Having found prima facie entitlement and current need, and using the incomes for each party found above, a SSAG spousal support calculation “with child” formula yields a range of $6,278 at the low end to $7,842 on the high end.
[ 38 ] Factors favoring the higher end of the SSAG range for spousal support on an interim basis include the Applicant’s strong compensatory claim based on her support for the Respondent’s career during the marriage; her role as primary caregiver to the child; and the length of the marriage.
[ 39 ] Current need factors favouring higher end of range since separation include her job loss in 2024; only recently obtained partial self-employment; and her role as sole caregiver to the child in Canada at this time.
[ 40 ] Based on the above, an interim spousal support award toward the high end is indicated. Further, I must consider the Respondent’s refusal to comply with his financial disclosure obligations, which cannot prejudice her claim for interim relief.
Spousal support ordered.
[ 41 ] Interim spousal support in the amount of $7,500 per month shall be paid by Respondent to Applicant commencing July 1, 2025, and on the first of each month thereafter, until further court order or signed agreement.
FRO enforcement order
[ 42 ] Both interim child and spousal support shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).
[ 43 ] Support deduction order to issue.
[ 44 ] NOTE regarding payment of child and spousal support: Respondent is directed to pay the interim child and spousal support ordered to the Applicant until FRO commences its enforcement of support. Support shall be paid in CAD, and shall be paid either to the Applicant directly, or through her counsel. Applicant shall provide an executed direction to the Respondent regarding support payments by February 20, 2026 to Respondent’s counsel, copy to Mr. Al-Saidi.
Interim costs per r. 24(25):
[ 45 ] Applicant seeks an order for interim costs in the amount of $150,000. The essence of her argument, supported by her affidavit evidence, is that the Respondent has conducted litigation in Yemen and Canada in a manner that has caused her to expend $100,000 in savings and will continue to deplete her resources. His strategy means that she will not be able to properly resist his aggressive tactics and his goal of having this court order the child sent to Yemen.
[ 46 ] The applicant’s affidavit evidence, her motion record, and the endorsements of the court in this application to date, as summarized in the Applicant’s factum at paras. 16-26, support a finding of an uneven playing field and aggressive tactics by Respondent as described.
[ 47 ] The 2025 amendments to the Rules added subsection 25 to r. 24. Subsection 25 provides that “[t]he court may make an order that a party pay an amount of money to another party to cover part or all of the expenses of carrying on the case, including legal fees”: O. Reg. 10/25, s. 4; O. Reg. 172/25, s. 10(5).
[ 48 ] The record supports findings that, as contended by the Applicant, the Respondent does not live in Canada, is opposing her in both Yemen and Canadian courts simultaneously, is seeking an order compelling their child to go and live in Yemen, has significantly more income than she does, and has made no financial disclosure as required in this application.
[ 49 ] It is also common ground that the Respondent filed expert evidence requiring expenditure, and production of the same from the Applicant. Further, in multiple attendances including before this court on this motion, the Respondent argued that the child’s entitlement to support was not an “urgent” consideration as, inter alia , the mother had been living off her savings to feed, clothe and house their child.
[ 50 ] In considering the interim costs sought, I conclude that fairness and necessity favour the granting of an order for interim costs. Without such interim costs, the Applicant will be unable to marshal the needed expert and other evidence and argument to support her position opposing the Respondent’s efforts to take the child to Yemen. The stakes where a child’s best interests are in issue are the highest; in this case the jurisdictional issues and expert evidence required add additional complexity.
[ 51 ] I have considered the amount requested of $150,000. I have no difficulty on the evidence filed by the Applicant, and on review of the court’s record to date in this high-conflict matter, in agreeing with the Applicant that her fees and disbursements at the current “burn” rate, will or will shortly exceed $150,000.
[ 52 ] However I must also consider, as a matter of fairness, that I am simultaneously making significant child and spousal support orders, with arrears payable back to separation. In these circumstances, fairness favours an interim costs order in the amount of $100,000. Further interim costs may be sought by motion, with leave of the court.
[ 53 ] Interim costs shall be paid no later than March 12, 2026, funds payable to the Applicant’s counsel in trust. Interim costs shall be subject to reapportionment as ordered or agreed between the parties.
[ 54 ] Further, given that interim costs are ordered as a matter of access to justice, or “leveling the playing field”, that purpose will not be achieved unless the Respondent complies with the orders made. He has played games, in the court’s view, including with child support funds paid to Yemen, putting money out of reach for the Respondent.
[ 55 ] In ordering interim costs to be paid, I consider that the evidence shows that the Respondent resides outside the jurisdiction. It is further appropriate, in my view, to direct that unless otherwise ordered, the Respondent’s jurisdiction motion shall not proceed until support arrears and interim costs ordered herein are paid by the Respondent.
[ 56 ] I make this direction in this case as Respondent and his assets appear to be out of the country, and his materials emphasize his non-attornment to the Superior Court of Justice. Although not framed as such, the Applicant’s motion for interim costs is based on findings which are similar or the same as parts of the test for security for costs. The concept is the same: a party abroad with resources may not litigate with impunity in a jurisdiction where the record indicate that the party may be unwilling or unable to satisfy either an adverse judgment or cost award.
[ 57 ] Interim costs and/or disbursements of $100,000 ordered payable by March 12, 2026 by Respondent to Applicant.
Conclusion :
[ 58 ] I make the following interim orders:
a) Monthly child support shall be paid by Respondent to the Applicant in the amount of $2,439, based on Respondent’s income of $296,345, from July 1, 2025;
b) Monthly spousal support shall be paid by Respondent to the Applicant in the amount of $7,500 per month, from July 1, 2025;
c) Support ordered above shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office; SDO to issue accordingly.
d) Until FRO commences direct enforcement of support, Respondent shall pay support directly to Applicant or through her counsel, as she may direct by executed direction re: funds provided by February 26, 2026 to Respondent and his counsel.
e) Rule 24(25) interim costs shall be paid by Respondent to the Applicant in the amount of $100,000, this amount payable by March 31, 2025.
f) The jurisdiction motion is stayed pending the Respondent’s payment of (i) all support arrears; and (ii) and the $100,000 r. 24(25) interim costs order.
Costs of this Motion :
[ 59 ] Both parties sought costs if successful. Both uploaded cost outlines at the motion. Applicant’s full recovery costs are $55,247.40; Respondent counsel’s costs, per her outline, are $25,819.87. Disbursements are a minimal part (a few hundred dollars) in both cost outlines.
[ 60 ] The Applicant was successful in arguing the motion on an urgent basis, and in the result was substantially successful in obtaining the orders she sought. She is presumptively entitled to costs. I accept that costs of the motion, as referenced in both counsel’s cost outlines, include costs of the ECC attendance and subsequent steps to schedule as an urgent motion including attendances in which the urgency was disputed.
Effect of any offers to settle:
[ 61 ] Following hearing of the motion, parties provided the Registrar with offers to settle, which I reviewed after deciding the motion.
[ 62 ] Both parties made offers to settle.
[ 63 ] Respondent’s offers: Respondent Mr. Al-Saidi’s offers of December 1, 2025 and December 16, 2025 both included offers to increase child support by $1,000 per month beyond the amount (equivalent to $450 CAD) which he states that he currently pays into court in Yemen each month in Yemen currency. His first offer to settle made support conditional on the Applicant returning the child to Yemen for a full school year and abandoning her Canadian application.
[ 64 ] The Respondent’s first offer was in form and timing an offer under the Rules which could trigger cost consequences in the event that the Respondent “beat” his offer on the motion. He did not.
[ 65 ] His later offer was made after the start of the motion day on December 17, 2025, as parties awaited court hearing time. It had fewer conditions. Although not an offer to which the mandatory consequences in the Rules can apply, I note that he did not exceed or meet that offer either.
[ 66 ] Applicant’s offers: Applicant made an offer dated November 13, 2025 to settle the motion, providing Respondent also provided the listed outstanding basic financial disclosure.
[ 67 ] Applicant’s November 13, 2025 offer was in the format of a r. 18 offer. However I cannot find that that the result was equal and better on the categories sought, as no disclosure was sought or ordered, nor were s. 7 expenses ordered. She was successful in obtaining spousal support higher than her offer, but lower child support. The Applicant would have settled for $75,000 interim r. 24(25) costs, and did better in the result with respect to that relief category.
[ 68 ] In the result I find the Applicant’s offers and conduct were more resolution-oriented, I consider them as a non-binding but relevant factor in considering her efforts to avoid the necessity of the motion.
[ 69 ] I have reviewed the Applicant’s costs outline. Her counsel’s total hours spent on the motion and preceding steps were over 90 - 15.4 hours for Mr Franks (senior counsel) and 75.5 hours for Mr. Mendiola (junior counsel). This total is significantly in excess of Respondent counsel’s 62 hours for the same motion. In that regard I note that as the Respondent husband did not comply with his disclosure obligations nor financial statement, fewer costs were incurred in the preparation of his materials. That discrepancy is therefore not a basis for any reduction in the Applicant’s entitlement as a matter of comparison, as both were required to comply with disclosure obligations at and prior to the motion, but only the Applicant did so.
[ 70 ] I have considered what costs the Respondent would have expected to pay, if unsuccessful, and in that regard think the number of hours of his counsel plus 40 percent of the hours again, is a reasonable approximation of what counsel time would have been required to marshal and incorporate his missing financial disclosure for the motion. I also consider that the Respondent’s baseless resistance to timely hearing of this motion for interim support, which on my review of the numerous endorsements to date, prolonged the time and required steps, and therefore the costs incurred by the Applicant to obtain the interim relief I have ordered.
[ 71 ] I have considered the purpose of costs as set out in the Rules , the factors identified by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in its guiding jurisprudence, and the importance of, on the one hand, deterring conduct that prolongs disputes unnecessarily, and on the other hand, recognizing and rewarding efforts to settle without adjudication.
[ 72 ] I conclude that a fair and just award for costs of this motion, in all the circumstances is fixed in favour of the Applicant in the amount of $30,000, inclusive of fees taxes and disbursements. This amount shall be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant no later than March 12, 2026.
[ 73 ] I have amended the draft temporary order filed by the Applicant to contain the orders made herein.
[ 74 ] Amended draft order signed this day and to issue.
[ 75 ] NOTE: I am not chambered in Milton, and am not seized of any aspect of the parties’ litigation in the Superior Court of Justice.
[ 76 ] Queries regarding case management shall be directed to Justice Mills, or in her absence to LAJ Coats or her designate.
Justice McSweeney
Released: February 11, 2026

