Louise Tansey

Following a five-week trial, the offenders were convicted of fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document arising from a fraudulent mandatory entry-level training scheme for commercial truck drivers.

Between January 2019 and May 2021, the offenders operated unregistered truck driver schools, charged students $4,000-$5,000 for substandard training that did not meet MELT standards, and paid accomplices to fraudulently upload false MELT completion records to the MTO database.

Approximately 45-47 students per offender were defrauded.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; the offenders sought a conditional sentence of 12-18 months.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with strict conditions including house arrest for the full duration, 200 hours of community service, and a forfeiture order against one offender for three commercial trucks valued at approximately $100,000.

The court dismissed an application by Alain Bellefeuille for a temporary publication ban regarding information related to a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

Bellefeuille, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, argued that publication of the SIU report could prejudice his right to a fair trial.

The court found the risk to trial fairness was speculative and could be mitigated by jury selection and instructions.

The open court principle and freedom of expression outweighed any potential benefit of a publication ban.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, B.S.L., on charges including sexual assault and uttering threats.

The appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred by failing to act as a gatekeeper against inadmissible evidence of other sexual activity under s. 276 of the Criminal Code; and second, that the trial judge relied on speculation and conjecture to make adverse credibility findings about the complainant, particularly regarding an audio recording.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility findings, and that the defence's questioning about the recording's date did not constitute s. 276 evidence.

The accused, Rodney Nichols, charged with murder, sought a further extension of his fitness assessment beyond the statutory 60-day limit under the Criminal Code.

The defence argued for a liberal interpretation of the provisions to ensure a full answer and defence, citing the complexity of the psychiatric issues and the need for specialized testing.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The court, adopting the reasoning from R. v. Reimer, held that it had jurisdiction to grant a new assessment order even after the 60-day period, interpreting the statutory time limits as directory rather than mandatory to prevent injustice and achieve the objectives of the mental disorder scheme.

The court granted a new 30-day fitness assessment order.

The Crown applied to have Danyiel Walker declared a dangerous offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence or, alternatively, a determinate sentence of 20 years with a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Walker had pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences against children and child pornography charges, and had a history of similar youth offences and a prior Children's Aid Society intervention.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, victim impact statements, and uncharged conduct.

The court found Walker to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour, persistent aggressive behaviour, and a failure to control sexual impulses, and concluded his conduct was intractable.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that lesser measures would adequately protect the public, citing concerns about the effectiveness of treatment and the limitations of community supervision, particularly regarding internet access.

The Crown brought a motion for certiorari and mandamus in a dangerous offender application, challenging the sentencing judge's decision to rule Victim Impact Statements (VIS) inadmissible without reviewing them.

The VIS related to uncharged conduct that had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider the VIS before ruling on their admissibility.

The court directed the sentencing judge to hear the VIS in a voir dire, emphasizing the broad range of information required in dangerous offender hearings and the procedural fairness owed to all parties, including victims.

Danyiel Walker pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences, and the Crown sought to have him declared a dangerous offender.

This decision concerns a Gardiner hearing to determine the admissibility and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of certain uncharged conduct as facts in aggravation for sentencing.

The Crown sought to adduce five statements from a 14-year-old victim, MP: three video-taped police statements and two written statements from counselling sessions.

The court found that the three police statements were admissible under s. 723(5) of the Criminal Code, satisfying the necessity and threshold reliability tests due to video recording, cross-examination of facilitators, and lack of motive to lie.

However, the two counselling statements were deemed inadmissible due to lack of video recording and being transcribed from memory.

Regarding the ultimate reliability of the uncharged conduct, the court found that allegations concerning a second child, CL, were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to ambiguity in MP's testimony.

However, several specific allegations concerning MP himself were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including exposure of genitals, showing child pornography, inserting penis into MP's mouth, and threats.

These proven facts will be admitted for the analysis of the offender's future risk in the dangerous offender application.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a second court-ordered psychiatric assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to support a defence of not criminally responsible.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a second assessment was not necessary because a comprehensive assessment had already been conducted by a forensic psychiatrist, and there was no evidence of new information that would shed further light on the accused's mental state at the time of the offence.

The three offenders were convicted of kidnapping, unlawful confinement, break and enter, and sexual assault after breaking into the victim's apartment, confining her, and sexually assaulting her with hair removal cream.

The principal offender, who orchestrated the attack out of revenge and distributed intimate images of the victim online, was sentenced to 7 years in prison.

The two co-offenders, who acted as aiders and did not participate in distributing the images, were each sentenced to 4 years in prison.

All offenders received credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an incident in a supply room at the complainant's workplace.

Both the complainant and the accused testified, presenting conflicting versions of events.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework to assess credibility.

The court found both witnesses to be unreliable and noted significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the sequence of events and her subsequent behaviour.

Given the frailties in the evidence, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and over 80 contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire to address a Charter application alleging denial of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) due to failure to facilitate interpretation.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights, determining that special circumstances did not exist on an objective basis despite the accused's limited English proficiency.

The court convicted on both counts, finding the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on driving conduct, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness, and proved the over 80 offence based on breath sample analysis.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused challenged the mandatory victim surcharge under Criminal Code section 737 as violating equality rights under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the surcharge had a disproportionate impact on persons with mental disabilities.

The Crown sought to justify the violation under section 1 of the Charter by arguing the surcharge served pressing and substantial objectives of raising funds for victim services and holding offenders accountable.

The court rejected the Crown's section 1 justification, finding the legislation was not minimally impairing and that the deleterious effects on disabled persons outweighed the salutary effects.

The Crown sought to admit hearsay statements of a deported witness, Omar Ahmed, and his prior transcript testimony in a re-trial for first-degree murder.

The Respondent objected on grounds of necessity and reliability.

The court found that while necessity was met due to Ahmed's deportation, threshold reliability was not established due to his criminal background, inconsistencies in prior testimony, and the Respondent's lack of full opportunity to cross-examine him in a fair trial setting.

The court also exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence to protect the Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial, given the prior conviction was overturned due to a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude 104 private communications intercepted under six wiretap authorizations, arguing violations of section 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant alleged that the affiant failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the first authorization, leading to invalidity of all subsequent authorizations.

The court reviewed the ITO for probable cause and investigative necessity, finding that despite some errors and omissions by the affiant, they were not intentional or grossly negligent and did not seriously distort the assessment of witness credibility.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had a sufficient basis to grant the authorizations, as probable cause and investigative necessity were established.

The motion to exclude the wiretap evidence was dismissed.

The Applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude call detail records obtained via search warrants, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Applicant contended that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained inaccuracies, lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence, and that police failed to file Reports to Justice as required by s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while there were minor inaccuracies in the ITOs, they were made in good faith and, once excised, sufficient grounds remained for the warrants.

The court also found that the police's failure to file Reports to Justice constituted a s. 8 Charter breach but, following established jurisprudence, determined that this technical breach did not warrant the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, especially given the serious nature of the charge.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to threatening to cause death and breach of probation.

She brought constitutional challenges to section 737 of the Criminal Code (the victim surcharge provision), arguing it violated her Charter rights under sections 7 and 15.

The court found a prima facie violation of section 15 (equality rights) on the basis that the mandatory victim surcharge has a discriminatory impact on mentally disabled persons who are disproportionately poor.

The court rejected section 7 challenges based on arbitrariness and overbreadth, finding the provision does not violate liberty or security of the person in a manner contrary to fundamental justice.

During a first-degree murder trial, the court issued written reasons for three oral evidentiary rulings.

First, evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct was admitted as its probative value in assessing the reliability of his confession outweighed its prejudicial effect.

Second, a spontaneous inculpatory utterance made by the accused to special constables while being transported was ruled voluntary and admissible.

Third, the defence was permitted to call a psychiatrist and psychologist as non-expert witnesses to testify about the accused's demeanour and pre-confession statements, but they were restricted from providing a diagnosis or testifying about post-confession statements.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge (SAC) imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the SAC constitutes a punishment rather than an ancillary order.

Applying the test for cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, the court determined that imposing a $700 surcharge on an impoverished, mentally ill, and substance-dependent offender with a monthly income of approximately $136 would be grossly disproportionate and incompatible with human dignity.

The court declared section 737(1) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect under section 52 of the Charter.

A 26-year-old Inuit street person with severe alcohol and drug addiction was convicted of nine offences including assault, mischief, and breaching court orders.

He faced a mandatory victim surcharge of $900 ($100 per offence) under section 737 of the Criminal Code.

Living on social assistance with a monthly income of $250, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the victim surcharge provision, arguing it violated section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that the victim surcharge constitutes punishment and that imposing it on an indigent offender in these circumstances would be grossly disproportionate, both as applied to the accused and in reasonable hypothetical cases.

The court declared section 737 of no force or effect.