Leonard Ricchetti

During a trial for sexual interference, the Crown and Defence brought several pre-trial and mid-trial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The court ruled that the accused's statements to police on November 18 and October 26 were voluntary and did not violate his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

However, a statement made on October 28 was excluded because the accused was heavily intoxicated, rendering it involuntary.

The court also ordered redactions to the complainant's police interview to prevent impermissible oath-helping, and made mid-trial rulings allowing some prior consistent statements by the complainant to rebut allegations of recent fabrication.

In a construction lien proceeding involving multiple unconsolidated actions, counsel for one lien claimant sought salvage costs from the trust monies available to all lien claimants.

The court dismissed the claim for salvage costs, finding it lacked jurisdiction to award such costs against non-consenting lien claimants where the actions were not consolidated and the counsel was not appointed carriage counsel.

The court also determined the validity and quantum of the lien claimant's claim, finding it valid for $82,278.69 despite some missing purchaser files and lack of strict compliance with written authorization requirements for extras.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding his rental unit exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under section 5(i).

When the tenancy began, the appellant shared a kitchen and bathroom with the respondent landlord's daughter, whom he later married.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board reasonably determined the exemption applied based on the facts at the time the tenancy agreement was entered into, and the appellant could not unilaterally change the legal nature of the relationship.

The appellant university appealed an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike the respondent student's claim for breach of contract.

The student alleged the university breached a contract by failing to return graded assignments with comments and explain a grade received in 2006-2007.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the claim lacked necessary particulars to establish the university went beyond its academic discretion.

Furthermore, the court held it was plain and obvious the claim was statute-barred, as the alleged breach occurred well over two years before the claim was commenced in 2015, and repeated internal complaints did not extend the limitation period.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Electrical Safety Authority Review Panel suspending their Master Electrician and Electrical Contractor licences for 90 days.

The Review Panel found the appellants breached several rules of the Electrical Safety Code, including failing to obtain inspection permits, failing to obtain authorization to reconnect power, installing incorrect equipment, and charging grossly excessive fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Review Panel's interpretation of the Code was reasonable, the appellants had sufficient notice of the allegations against them, and the remaining issues were questions of fact over which the court had no jurisdiction.

The appellant, an indirect stakeholder, appealed an order approving a plan of arrangement that reorganized the respondent corporation into a limited partnership.

The appellant sought standing to vary the plan to grant it dissenting rights, arguing its economic interests were prejudiced.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the BCE framework, only security holders whose legal rights are affected have standing to challenge a plan of arrangement.

As an indirect shareholder, the appellant had no legal right to interfere in the respondent's business affairs or circumvent the approval of the direct shareholder.

During a lengthy matrimonial trial, the applicant alleged that the respondent's former counsel, SimpsonWigle LLP, breached a Mareva injunction by receiving payments from frozen offshore companies.

The parties agreed to defer the contempt hearing against the law firm until after the trial judgment.

At the commencement of the contempt hearing, the law firm brought a motion to dismiss, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the Mareva order was no longer live and operative.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no requirement in law that an order must be live and operative when a contempt motion is brought or a finding is made, particularly where the purpose is to address a deliberate breach rather than to coerce compliance.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica.

During a customs inspection, a positive ion scan led to further questioning and a personal search.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements as voluntary, while the defence sought to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and not the result of oppression.

However, the court held that the accused was detained when the CBSA officer began focused questioning after a second positive ion scan without providing Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the accused's statements regarding a side trip to Panama made during this period of detention, but admitted subsequent statements made after rights were provided.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample at trial.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The accused argued the verdicts were inconsistent and the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the synergistic effects of Ativan and alcohol.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by finding the accused lacked the mens rea for impaired driving due to the unanticipated effects of combining alcohol and prescription medication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no inconsistency in the verdicts, no material misapprehension of evidence, and holding that the presumption of voluntariness for impaired driving can be rebutted where impairment results from the unforeseeable combined effect of alcohol and drugs.

The applicant brought an ex parte motion to enforce a family law judgment, seeking to pierce the corporate veil of an offshore company, issue garnishments, and obtain a vesting order for the respondent's shares.

The court granted leave to proceed ex parte due to the respondent's history of contempt and asset depletion.

However, the court adjourned the requests to pierce the corporate veil and issue garnishments to allow notice to affected third parties.

The court dismissed the request for a vesting order, finding it was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction under the Family Law Act, Family Law Rules, or Rules of Civil Procedure to grant new substantive relief after the final judgment had been entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample into an Approved Screening Device.

He argued his refusal was equivocal because he believed he was not the driver and wanted to speak to counsel first, and that the demand was not made forthwith.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the refusal was unequivocal, the demand was made forthwith, and no Charter breach occurred since the offence was complete before the right to counsel was engaged.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after CBSA officers found the drug in food cans in his luggage.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements to CBSA and RCMP officers as voluntary, while the accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged arbitrary detention, an unreasonable strip search, and sleep deprivation.

The court found the statements voluntary, noting that while keeping the accused awake was minor misconduct, it did not induce the statements.

The court also dismissed the Charter application, finding no detention during routine customs questioning and no unreasonableness in the brief strip search.

A mid-trial ruling also admitted a Certificate of Analyst.

The Moving Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss tort claims by Correct Building Corporation (CBC) arising from an aborted development project.

CBC, a related corporate entity to Correct Group Inc. (CGI), was not a party to the preliminary agreement with the City of Barrie but anticipated being awarded the construction contract.

The court applied the *Cooper v. Hobart* test for duty of care, finding no reasonable foreseeability of harm or sufficient proximity between CBC and the Moving Defendants.

The court also cited policy reasons against extending a duty of care to potential subcontractors.

The motion was granted, and CBC's claims against the Moving Defendants were dismissed.

This decision addresses multiple interim motions in a family law dispute concerning child support, spousal support, section 7 expenses, retroactive support, and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court imputed incomes for both parties, ordered child and interim spousal support, dismissed the wife's claims for educational expenses, and ordered the sale of the matrimonial home.

The matter was scheduled for an expedited trial.

This decision concerns the sentencing of the respondent, Brian Earl Blatherwick, for civil contempt of court.

He was found in contempt for deliberately and flagrantly breaching two terms of a prior judgment: failing to cash in a life insurance policy and pay the value to the applicant, and transferring control of a business.

Despite having 50 days to purge his contempt, the respondent failed to do so.

The court considered mitigating and aggravating factors, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation due to the respondent's extensive history of ignoring court orders, lying, and financial non-disclosure.

The court imposed a sentence of 180 days incarceration without electronic monitoring and awarded the applicant full indemnity costs of $30,000, finding the respondent's actions to be in bad faith with intent to inflict financial harm and deceive the court.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit prior inconsistent statements made by a recanting witness to a police agent in a courthouse holding cell.

The witness had previously been granted leave to be cross-examined under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay to assess threshold reliability.

The court admitted the first part of the statements, finding sufficient procedural and substantive reliability as the witness confirmed making them and was available for cross-examination.

The second part of the statements was excluded due to poor audio quality and incomplete utterances, which undermined the jury's ability to assess their truth and accuracy.

Prior to a first-degree murder trial, the defence brought an application to permit the in-custody accused to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The Crown opposed the application, citing institutional incident reports demonstrating the accused's history of violence and non-compliance while in custody.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the incident reports established a significant risk to courtroom security.

The court also noted that security concerns were heightened due to anticipated hostility between the accused and certain Crown witnesses.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude audio files found on his Blackberry cell phone.

The files contained rap lyrics referencing a firearm of the same calibre as the murder weapon.

The accused argued that the seizure of the phone, the search warrant, and the delayed report to a justice violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found no Charter breach in the initial seizure or the type of warrant used.

Although the Crown conceded a breach regarding the delayed report to a justice, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and found the probative value of the rap lyrics outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The applications were dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act for leave to cross-examine a reluctant witness, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, on prior inconsistent statements made to an undercover informant, Mr. Darren Watts, during a first-degree murder trial.

The witness had recanted his prior statements during examination-in-chief, claiming he was "high" and couldn't recall.

The defence opposed, arguing no material inconsistency and challenging the circumstances of the statements.

The court found material inconsistencies and granted leave, determining that the interests of justice favoured allowing cross-examination, as the statements were relevant to the identity of the shooter, the credibility of another witness, and the motive for the shooting, and their reliability was not fundamentally undermined by the witness's claims of impairment or the informant's conduct.

The court ruled on whether to provide a Vetrovec caution to the jury for three witnesses (Mr. Borden, Mr. Moy-Lingomba, and Mr. Watts) in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected to cautions for Mr. Borden and Mr. Moy-Lingomba, arguing that such cautions are for the Defence's benefit and should be omitted if the Defence requests.

The Crown conceded that a caution was not needed for Mr. Watts.

The court determined that a trial judge's duty to ensure trial fairness and assist the jury supersedes a tactical decision by the Defence when a Vetrovec caution is necessary or mandatory.

Given Mr. Borden's overwhelming credibility issues and the centrality of his evidence to the Crown's case, a Vetrovec caution was deemed mandatory.

For Mr. Moy-Lingomba, who also had overwhelming credibility issues and whose evidence was critical to both the Crown (motive) and Defence (third-party suspect), a "mixed Vetrovec" caution was deemed mandatory to assist the jury in assessing inculpatory and exculpatory statements.