CITATION: Blatherwick v. Blatherwick, 2016 ONSC 6699

COURT FILE No.: 810/10 (Guelph)

DATE: 20161027

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Barbara Ann Blatherwick

Applicant

– and –

Brian Earl Blatherwick

Respondent

J. Cox, for the Applicant

D. Kilgour, for the Respondent

HEARD: September 30, 2016

ENDORSEMENT

RICCHETTI J.

BACKGROUND

[1] By Reasons for Judgment dated April 27, 2015, this court granted judgement in favour of Mrs. Blatherwick (“Judgment”).

[2] Mrs. Blatherwick brought a contempt motion as a result of Mr. Blatherwick’s alleged breach of certain terms of the Judgment.

[3] A contempt hearing was held on April 19, 2016. Mr. Blatherwick was represented by counsel and called evidence (the “Contempt Hearing”).

[4] By reasons dated May 9, 2016, Mr. Blatherwick was found to be in contempt (“Contempt Reasons”). Mr. Blatherwick was sentenced for the contempt.

THE MOTION

[5] Mrs. Blatherwick brings this motion:

a) seeking leave for this motion to be heard ex parte;

b) a declaration piercing the corporate veil of Seasons Limited – Macao Commercial Offshore ("Seasons Macao") and for garnishments to issue against the customers of Seasons Macao;

c) garnishments to issue against Discovery Bay Limited ("Discovery Bay"); and

d) an order vesting Mr. Blatherwick's shares in Seasons Macao in the name of Mrs. Blatherwick.

Analysis

Should this motion be heard ex parte?

[6] I have no hesitation concluding that this motion should be heard ex parte.

[7] In my reasons for finding Mr. Blatherwick in contempt (Contempt Reasons released on May 9, 2016), this court made the following findings of fact:

[13] One would have hoped that, after the very clear, unfavourable credibility findings against Mr. Blatherwick at trial for all of the reasons set out in the Judgment, he would have been more truthful and accurate regarding the current matters before this court. Unfortunately, that was not to be the case. Mr. Blatherwick continues to do and say whatever he believes is in his best interests, regardless of whether it is true or not, even when under oath.

[14] Let me briefly set out some of the evidence at the contempt hearing which raises further serious credibility issues regarding Mr. Blatherwick’s evidence:

a) Mr. Blatherwick and his “partners” in Seasons Halloween Business were “not happy” with the Judgment. They were particularly unhappy that they had to move their business out of the 17 Brownridge Road Property because the said property was transferred to Mrs. Blatherwick. The Seasons Halloween Business had to find and move into another building in Ontario. Mr. Blatherwick carries on his business from the new location. Despite this, the Seasons Halloween Business had record sales of approximately $48,000,000 in 2015. Approximately 40 -50% of these sales are through Seasons Macau, the company of which Mr. Blatherwick is a 50% shareholder. Yet, Mr. Blatherwick only receives a small income in Canada. Mr. Blatherwick does not know if there have been any dividends paid out from Seasons Macau. It is difficult to accept that Mr. Blatherwick would receive such a low income and have such little financial information concerning a very valuable company, Seasons Macao, of which he is the 50% shareholder. I do not accept Mr. Blatherwick's evidence regarding his income or knowledge of Seasons Macao's financial information;

b) On June 1, 2015 Mr. Blatherwick confirmed in a letter to Mrs. Blatherwick's counsel that "I have no cash now at all". On June 18, 2015 Mr. Blatherwick confirmed in writing to Mrs. Blatherwick's counsel that he had no assets valued at over $500. During approximately the same period of time, Mrs. Blatherwick was receiving no spousal support or $2,000 a month through garnishment proceedings. Yet, just like at trial, Mr. Blatherwick continued to send money and gifts to his fiancée, previous fiancée and girlfriends in the Philippines:

• Vanessa Sagmit $500 in July and August 2015;

• Izzah Reyes $1000 and a further three amounts of $500 each over the next few months;

• Desiree Domingo - a new Iphone6 (approximately $1,200). After Ms. Domingo put a photograph of the gift on her Facebook, on June 10, 2015, Mr. Blatherwick asked her to remove it because "the lawyer is still after me for money" and he “did not want the judge or the lawyer (Mr. Cox) to see that he had given her a gift";

I conclude that Mr. Blatherwick continues to be untruthful about his finances and that Mr. Blatherwick has access to more monies than he is prepared to admit, even under oath;

c) During the trial, Mr. Blatherwick denied that he had any authority (and had not had authority for some time) over the transfer monies in Discovery Bay, an offshore holding company where substantial amounts of money had moved in and out of at the instructions of Mr. Blatherwick. The details of Discovery Bay and all of its finances were never forthcoming from Mr. Blatherwick at trial. Mr. Blatherwick was asked at this hearing under oath whether he had transferred funds in Discovery Bay in January 2016. Mr. Blatherwick denied he had. Then, Mr. Blatherwick was confronted with a portion of an email dated January 18, 2016 from him to the Discovery Bay’s accountants stating: "Good Morning Anna; Please see my attached request for money transfer's to Discovery Bay. Regards. Brian Blatherwick". The rest of the email was not produced by Mr. Blatherwick. What occurred afterwards was indicative of Mr. Blatherwick's total disregard for the truth, his oath, this court's authority and the Judgment. At first, Mr. Blatherwick tried to explain that this email was an attempt to get answers to undertakings from the financial examination. However, this explanation made no sense since the financial examination took place on February 1, 2016, two weeks AFTER this email had been sent by Mr. Blatherwick. In addition, Mr. Blatherwick had not been asked any questions about Discovery Bay during the financial examination and gave no undertakings regarding Discovery Bay. Clearly, Mr. Blatherwick was lying. Eventually, when caught with these lies, Mr. Blatherwick retreated into "he needs to look for the email";

d) As set out in this court's Judgment, the Seasons Halloween Business’ sales are divided between Seasons HK and Seasons Macao. Seasons Macao has approximately 40-50% of the Seasons Halloween Business’s sales. Mr. Blatherwick owns 50% of the shares in Seasons Macao. The rest of the Seasons Halloween Business’ sales are through Seasons HK, of which Mr. Blatherwick has an indirect 1/7th interest. See the chart in the Judgment. As a result, even if one disregards Mr. Blatherwick’s indirect interest in Seasons HK, the sales through Seasons Macao are very significant, somewhere between $20,000,000 last year and Mr. Blatherwick owns 50% of Seasons Macao. The Judgment became a problem for Mr. Blatherwick because his shareholdings in Seasons Macao were registered in Macao. Upon the issuance of the Judgment, Mr. Blatherwick decided he would deal with Seasons Macao. Mr. Blatherwick was involved in several attempts (possibly successful) in 2015, after the Judgment was issued, to move customer’s sales accounts from Seasons Macao to Seasons HK. See the emails at Exhibit 2 and 3 to the contempt hearing. While Mr. Blatherwick denied that any customer accounts have been moved from Seasons Macao - I don't believe him. Mr. Blatherwick appears to be involved with his partners in restructuring the way in which Seasons Halloween Business is operated to protect Mr. Blatherwick's interests in Seasons Macao from the enforcement of the Judgment. This attitude and financial dealings by Mr. Blatherwick and his partners is consistent with the evidence at trial, where Mr. Blatherwick admitted that:

• he assisted one of his partners receive a $150,000 to avoid the partner’s spouse (they were having matrimonial difficulties at the time) from knowing about the payment;

• he had one of his partners deliver monies to his fiancée so that Mrs. Blatherwick would not know about the payment.

The financial deception by Mr. Blatherwick and his partners continues;

e) Mr. Blatherwick was examined on February 1, 2016 in a financial examination. 51 undertakings were given by Mr. Blatherwick. None were answered as of the hearing of the contempt motion. Some of the undertakings are very significant such as the financial statements of Seasons Macau, neither the 2014 or 2015 statements have been produced by Mr. Blatherwick. The lack of production of financial records by Mr. Blatherwick continues; and

f) While swearing in his affidavit for this hearing that he is no longer a director of Seasons Macao and has not been a director of Seasons Macao for about a year, when Mr. Blatherwick emptied his wallet in the witness stand, he had several business cards with his name showing that he was a director of Seasons Macao. Mr. Blatherwick claimed he needed the business cards to remember the Seasons Macao's address. But several? This just lends more evidence that Mr. Blatherwick and his partners will do and say anything to help out their partners in this “brotherhood of trust”.

[8] I am satisfied that, in this case, should Mr. Blatherwick be put on notice of this motion, Mr. Blatherwick would continue or renew his actions to make execution of the Judgment by Mrs. Blatherwick more difficult or impossible by taking actions to deplete his assets, namely, the value of the Seasons Halloween Business and, in particular, the value of Seasons Macao.

[9] Leave to bring this motion on an ex parte basis is hereby granted.

Should this court pierce the corporate veil of Seasons Macao?

[10] Granting leave to hear this motion ex parte does not end the analysis of whether this court can or should grant this remedy on an ex parte basis.

[11] In the case of Seasons Macao, the parties affected by a possible order, if made, would include:

a) Seasons Macao;

b) William Gravelle (25% shareholder in Seasons Macao); and

c) Randy Williams (25% shareholder in Seasons Macao).

[12] In my view, it would not be fair or in the interests of justice that the motion to pierce the corporate veil of Seasons Macao be granted without notice to and an opportunity for these parties to appear and respond to the relief sought as:

a) there are issues whether this court has the jurisdiction to grant such relief having issued the Judgment more than 1 1/2 years ago;

b) there may be reasons why such relief cannot or should not be granted such as being contrary to the laws of China, shareholder agreements or potentially impact creditors of Seasons Macao; and

c) If granted, this relief might permit Mrs. Blatherwick to garnish Seasons Macao's creditors (i.e. its customers) which could substantially and irrevocably impact on the business of Seasons Macao and other companies in the Seasons Halloween Business.

[13] This portion of the motion seeking to pierce the corporate veil of Seasons Macao and to issue garnishment against Seasons Macao's customers is adjourned pending service of notice to all appropriate parties.

Should Garnishments issue against Discovery Bay?

[14] Little is known about this entity. Discovery Bay receives money from the Seasons Halloween Business. Mr. Blatherwick, at least for a period of time, had the authority to disburse funds from Discovery Bay. Mr. Blatherwick received substantial amounts of money from Discovery Bay.

[15] In this court's Judgment, the following findings of fact were made regarding Discovery Bay:

[86] Discovery Bay was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on July 20, 1998. The shares are held by a trustee, Integro Trust.

[87] The exact placement and role of Discovery Bay in the Seasons Halloween Business is difficult given the lack of any documentation of the company and its dealings, financially and otherwise. No further information or documentation is known as to who are the beneficial owners of Discovery Bay. No documentation has been produced regarding Discovery Bay. No financial statements have been produced regarding Discovery Bay. No agreements, no memorandums – nothing!

[88] What is known is that Discovery Bay has at least one bank account with HSBC located in Singapore. MY Commercial, the same accountants for the Seasons Halloween Business companies, is the authorized signatory on the HSBC bank account.

[114] Mr. Blatherwick had taken the position in this proceeding that his annual entitlement from Discovery Bay was limited to either $100,000 per annum or $200,000 per annum. Mr. Blatherwick’s previous counsel reviewed the available documentation from Discovery Bay. He raised concerns in an email dated June 6, 2012 to Mr. Blatherwick that Mr. Blatherwick had received approximately $1,600,000 USD from 2006 to 2010…..

[116] It was clear to me that this letter from Mr. Leung appeared to be an after the fact re-characterization of monies Mr. Blatherwick had received from Discovery Bay. There is no document limiting Mr. Blatherwick's draw from Discovery Bay and, based on the limited documentation, he had already authorized transfers of approximately $8,900,000 USD out of the Discovery Bay bank account. Exactly how much is a mystery since the statements for all the Discovery Bay deposits and withdrawals for all years have never been produced.

[16] There is no evidence that service of this motion could not be carried out on Discovery Bay.

[17] In my view, this portion of the motion should also not be heard without Discovery Bay having an opportunity to respond to the relief sought, if it chooses to do so.

[18] I say this notwithstanding my very serious concerns that the evidence in Mr. Blatherwick's contempt proceeding showed that in January 2016, Mr. Blatherwick continued to disburse money out of Discovery Bay.

[19] This portion of the motion is adjourned pending service of notice on Discovery Bay.

Should a Vesting Order be granted regarding Mr. Blatherwick's shares in Seasons Macao?

Jurisdiction to grant vesting orders generally

[20] There is no doubt that the court has the jurisdiction to grant vesting orders where the relief is sought at trial and the vesting order forms part of the court's judgment as a mechanism to enforce an order. Section 9(1) (d) (i) and 34(1)(c) of the Family Law Act provide:

9. (1) In an application under section 7, the court may order,

(a) that one spouse pay to the other spouse the amount to which the court finds that spouse to be entitled under this Part;

(b) that security, including a charge on property, be given for the performance of an obligation imposed by the order;

(c) that, if necessary to avoid hardship, an amount referred to in clause (a) be paid in instalments during a period not exceeding ten years or that payment of all or part of the amount be delayed for a period not exceeding ten years; and

(d) that, if appropriate to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order,

(i) property be transferred to or in trust for or vested in a spouse, whether absolutely, for life or for a term of years, or

(ii) any property be partitioned or sold.

34. (1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,

(c) requiring that property be transferred to or in trust for or vested in the dependant, whether absolutely, for life or for a term of years;

(emphasis added)

[21] Clearly, in the context of an application, this court has the jurisdiction to grant a vesting order. In fact, it did so in this case as some of the terms in the Judgment vested certain properties in Mrs. Blatherwick.

[22] At trial, vesting the shares in Seasons Macao was specifically not requested as a term of the Judgment by Mrs. Blatherwick.

Jurisdiction AFTER the Judgment is issued

[23] Before a judgment is formally entered the court has a broad discretion to re-open a trial. See Schmuck v. Reynolds-Schmuck 2000 22323 (ON SC), [2000] 46 O.R. (3d) 702:

[11] At this point, a judgment has been rendered but it has not been formally entered. The case law is clear that until that time, a trial judge is not yet functus. The case law also recognizes that a trial judge has a wide discretion to permit the re-opening of a case prior to the entering of the judgment: see Castlerigg Investments Inc. v. Lam (1991) 1991 7355 (ON SC), 2 O.R. (3d) 216, 47 C.P.C. (2d) 270 (Gen. Div.). Therefore, it is open to me to exercise my discretion and re-open the case for a reconsideration of certain issues.

[24] In light of the fact the Judgment was issued and entered approximately 1 1/2 years ago, the question put to Mrs. Blatherwick’s counsel was whether this court was functus officio and could not grant the relief sought.

[25] The doctrine of functus officio was described in Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, 1989 41 (SCC), [1989], 2 S.C.R. 848 at page 860:

The general rule that a final decision of a court cannot be reopened derives from the decision of the English Court of Appeal in In re St. Nazaire Co. (1879), 12 Ch. D. 88. The basis for it was that the power to rehear was transferred by the Judicature Acts to the appellate division. The rule applied only after the formal judgment had been drawn up, issued and entered, and was subject to two exceptions:

1.where there had been a slip in drawing it up, and,

2.where there was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the court. See Paper Machinery Ltd. v. J. O. Ross Engineering Corp., 1934 1 (SCC), [1934] S.C.R. 186.

[26] The purpose of the doctrine of functus officio is that, once the final judicial determination has been made, the court is functus because:

a) parties must be able to rely on the court's final determination to carry on with their affairs post judgment;

b) the party's right to rehear or grant other relief is vested with the appellate court (subject to the exceptions to varying an order which are now set out in R. 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (an order is defined to include a judgment); and

c) there must be finality to the judicial proceeding to ensure procedural fairness and the integrity of the judicial system.

[27] Essentially, Mrs. Blatherwick's counsel submits that this court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought on the basis that:

a) the court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce its orders;

b) jurisdiction exists under the Family Law Act and the Family Law Rules; and

c) jurisdiction exists under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Inherent Jurisdiction

[28] Mrs. Blatherwick submits this court has a "residual source of powers" to do equity. Mrs. Blatherwick’s counsel relies on a number of legal authorities.

[29] In Montreal Trust Co. v. Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd. 1971 960 (MB CA), [1971] 4 W.W.R. 542, the court dealt with the jurisdiction to make orders in the context of an ongoing receivership proceeding. The issue before the court in Montreal Trust is not analogous to the present circumstances. Further, none of the examples of "inherent jurisdiction" referred to in para. 17 of Montreal Trust suggest that the court has jurisdiction to make additional orders after trial or vary its judgment after issued/entered except to express its intention correctly.

[30] In MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson, 1995 Carswell BC 1153 (S.C.C.), the court dealt with a contempt motion, a recognized independent proceeding where the court has ongoing and continuing jurisdiction to deal with in compliance of its issued orders or judgments. It does not suggest jurisdiction to vary a judgment after entered only the enforcement of the terms of the judgment.

[31] In Lawyers' Professional Indemnity v. Nicol, 2014 ONSC 4748, the court considered whether the court had jurisdiction to determine which parties were subject to the garnishment notice. Garnishment proceedings are specifically provided for in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court does have jurisdiction to make such determinations.

[32] In Glover v. Glover, 1980 72 (ON CA), 29 O.R. (2d) 401, contrary to the suggestion, the court did not make an order in "aid of execution":

Even if the Court possesses the inherent jurisdiction to make an order in aid of its judgment, it cannot, in my opinion, make an order of the type or in the manner requested here. The proper procedure at the divorce hearing or on a motion would be to subpoena both the brother-in-law of the defendant and the Bell Telephone Company, together with those records necessary to show incoming calls to the telephone in question. The evidence of both the telephone company officer or employee and Mr. Parkinson would then be taken under judicial supervision, and confidentiality would thereby be preserved to the greatest possible extent. The order made here has no regard for confidentiality, and unnecessarily places the Court in an investigative role.

(emphasis added)

[33] In Chevron v. Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, the court did not pierce the corporate veil after issuance of the judgment. The only issue decided by the court was whether Chevron Canada could be sued in Ontario despite the fact it was not the foreign judgment debtor. The court made it clear that issues such as separate corporate entity and other issues remained unaffected by the court accepting jurisdiction in Ontario to consider the claims advanced against Chevron Canada.

[34] Given the longstanding and valid reasons for the doctrine of functus officio and the lack of any authorities which permit the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to vary its judgment, I conclude this court does not have inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The Court's Jurisdiction under the Family Law Act

[35] Mrs. Blatherwick's counsel submits that this court has jurisdiction to grant the relief under the provisions of the Family Law Act and Family Law Rules.

The Family Law Rules

[36] Mrs. Blatherwick’s counsel points to Rule 2(1) of the Family Law Rules which provides:

2. (1) In these rules,

“case” means an application or any other method allowed in law for bringing a matter to the court for a final order or provisional order, and includes all motions, enforcements and appeals;

[37] Counsel goes on to submit that the enforcement of an order (or judgment) is a matter of procedural law and, as such, is an integral part of the original “case”.

[38] Mrs. Blatherwick’s counsel relies on Figliola v. Ontario (Director of Family Responsibility Office) 2009 ONCJ 275. In Figliola, the court made a refraining order and subsequently ordered costs against FRO. Both orders were issued. As part of the ongoing family proceeding, the court then ordered FRO to attend before it to deal with the unpaid cost order. FRO argued that the court was functus to make such an order. The court was not granting new or equitable relief (see para 30). The court was simply determining whether it had the jurisdiction to enforce an order it made against FRO. That is entirely different than the case before this court where new and different relief is being sought after the Judgment was issued and entered.

[39] Considering s. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, which sets out some of the relief a court may grant for failure to obey an order, there is nothing which expressly or impliedly gives this court jurisdiction to vary the entered Judgment or grant new/different relief than what was granted at the conclusion of the trial.

The Family Law Act

[40] Sections 9 and 33 of the Family Law Act do not assist Mrs. Blatherwick. Both provisions specify the relief that can be granted "in the application".

[41] The difficulty is that in this case, the Judgment was issued on April 27, 2015. Therefore, the application is “spent” meaning it has been judicially decided and the judgment has become final, subject only to the issue of costs.

[42] The court does not have the jurisdiction to return to the application and continue to make additional substantive orders in the case after final judgment. See Royal Bank v. Futurecom Inc., 2010 ONCA 63, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 808 at para 24:

The rule does not contemplate altering a judgment or order to provide for relief never sought in the moving party's pleading. In order to come within the rule, the motion must be one brought "in the proceeding". As a general rule, pleadings lay out the four corners of the dispute and parties are bound by their pleadings: See Kalkinis (Litigation Guardian of) v. Allstate Insurance Co. of Canada (1998), 1998 6879 (ON CA), 41 O.R. (3d) 528 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused, (2000) (S.C.C.). The proceeding continues to be defined by the pleadings even after judgment is obtained. For the motion to be "in the proceeding", therefore, it must be a motion that, even before judgment, was available to the moving party to bring. In this case, even on a generous reading, a motion for judgment declaring the sums to be owing in fraud could not have been brought or succeeded before judgment based on the pleadings as they stand. Rather, the respondent's pleading would have to have been amended to request such relief.

(emphasis added)

[43] There is no jurisdiction in the Family Law Act to grant the relief requested.

The Court's jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure

[44] Mrs. Blatherwick points to Rule 59.06 (d) as jurisdiction to vary the Judgment.

[45] Rule 59.06(2) provides:

59.06 (1) An order that contains an error arising from an accidental slip or omission or requires amendment in any particular on which the court did not adjudicate may be amended on a motion in the proceeding. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.06 (1).

(2) A party who seeks to,

(a) have an order set aside or varied on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or discovered after it was made;

(b) suspend the operation of an order;

(c) carry an order into operation; or

(d) obtain other relief than that originally awarded,

may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed.

[46] Rule 1.03(1) defines order to include a judgment.

[47] Unlike subparagraphs (a) through (c), Rule 59.06(2) (d) does not refer to an order. It is silent. In Lewis v. Prince Edward Island [1999] P.E.I.J. No. 21 the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court was faced with an application for further relief after a Judgment had been issued years earlier:

32 It is also clear that Lewis is not seeking any relief under the provisions of Rule 59.05(2)(a), (b) or (c) which leaves Rule 59.05(2)(d) as the only possible basis for this motion.

33 Rule 59.05(2)(d) states:

59.05 (2)

A party who seeks to,

(d) obtain other relief than that originally awarded,

may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed.

34 There are problems with trying to apply this provision of the Rules to the motion now before the court. It is first of all difficult to understand how Lewis is now seeking other relief than that originally awarded. The only relief he sought at trial was damages, and he was awarded damages at trial. He sought to uphold this award on the appeal. He is still seeking damages, being the same relief he sought at the trial and on the appeal. He is now really seeking a different result, not other relief than that originally awarded.

35 In addition, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Lewis sought leave from the Supreme Court of Canada to appeal the judgment of this court dated February 25, 1998. He, therefore, must have accepted the judgment as a final order of this court, and this court would then be functus officio with respect to the substantive issues. It would require the existence of some exceptional circumstances to justify departure from the general rule that no variation should be sought in such circumstances. There has not been any exceptional or unusual circumstances established on this motion.

[48] Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure sets out in detail the methods for enforcing orders (which includes judgments) and none contemplate the type of relief sought in this case.

[49] I am not persuaded that the Rules of Civil Procedure provide jurisdiction for the court to grant the relief requested.

Conclusion

[50] The motion for a vesting order is dismissed

Ricchetti, J.

Released: October 27, 2016

CITATION: Blatherwick v. Blatherwick, 2016 ONSC 6699

COURT FILE No.: 810/10 (Guelph)

DATE: 20161027

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

RE: BARBARA ANN BLATHERWICK v. BRIAN EARL BLATHERWICK

BEFORE: Ricchetti, J.

COUNSEL: J. Cox for the Applicant

D.I. Kilgour for the Respondent

ENDORSEMENT

Ricchetti, J.

DATE: October 27, 2016