Leo Adler

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and disguise with intent, arguing the trial judge erred in finding him guilty as a party to the offences.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge reasonably inferred the appellant's participation and intent from his involvement in planning, wearing a mask, remaining at the scene during the attack, and fleeing with the principal perpetrator.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges of accessing and possessing child pornography.

The trial judge had excluded statements made by the respondent to the police, finding the Crown had not proven they were voluntary due to an incomplete and inaccurate record and the lack of credibility and reliability of the police officers' evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's determinations on voluntariness.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding language comprehension, that the roadside demand was not made “forthwith,” and that police lacked reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test.

The court held that police took reasonable steps to ensure the accused understood his rights, including arranging consultation with a Punjabi-speaking lawyer before breath samples were taken.

The delay in administering the screening test while awaiting the device was reasonably necessary and did not provide a realistic opportunity to consult counsel prior to the roadside demand.

The officer’s observations of erratic driving, odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and admission of recent drinking constituted objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a jury conviction for multiple firearms offences, the Crown brought a motion to revoke the accused’s judicial interim release pending sentencing.

The court considered the detention grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, focusing primarily on the tertiary ground concerning public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court emphasized the seriousness of illegal firearm possession in urban centres, the circumstances of the offences involving a concealed loaded handgun in a vehicle, the accused’s prior firearms convictions and lifetime prohibition order, and the potential mandatory minimum sentence.

In light of these factors and the jury’s finding of guilt, the court held that continued release would undermine public confidence in the justice system.

The accused’s bail was revoked and detention ordered pending sentencing.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a collision with a taxi cab on October 9, 2011.

After consuming three beers at a bar, the accused collided with a taxi, failed to stop, drove the wrong way down a one-way street, and nearly collided with a police vehicle.

The Crown alleged impairment by alcohol.

The defence argued that the accused's observed symptoms could be attributed to shock from the accident and his inexperience as a driver.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that the totality of circumstances—including the collision, subsequent driving errors, officer observations of unsteadiness and incoherence, and the accused's own admission that alcohol was affecting his social functioning—established impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with producing marijuana and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the validity of search warrants executed at his residence and two industrial units, his arrest, and warrantless searches of his person and vehicle.

The court found that the search warrants were validly issued based on reliable information from a confidential informer that was corroborated through police investigation.

The arrest was lawful and the seizure of keys from the defendant's person was a valid search incident to arrest.

The court dismissed the Charter application but excluded evidence seized from the residence under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of police carelessness in drafting the Information to Obtain and the significant impact on the defendant's privacy rights in his home.

Evidence from the industrial units and the keys were admitted.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder and faced three previous trials.

The first trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal due to a Charter breach.

The second and third trials resulted in hung juries.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings to prevent a fourth trial.

The court considered factors including the length of time elapsed, the time the accused spent in custody, the strength of the Crown's case, and the presumption of innocence.

The court concluded that requiring a fourth trial would stretch the community's sense of fair play and decency beyond the breaking point, constituting an abuse of process under section 7 of the Charter.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

An extradition judge considered whether the evidence contained in the certified record of the case established conduct that would justify committal for trial in Canada under s. 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The requesting state alleged that the respondent arranged for the arson of a furniture store to collect insurance proceeds and later filed an insurance claim.

Applying the evidentiary framework from Ferras, the court held that extradition evidence may be disregarded only if manifestly unreliable or defective and that weaknesses in accomplice testimony did not meet that threshold.

The court found sufficient evidence for committal on the parallel Canadian offences of arson for fraudulent purpose, unauthorized possession of a firearm, and attempted fraud, but not fraud or obstruction of justice.

The respondent was ordered committed into custody to await surrender on the supported offences.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting his child, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of the evidence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s treatment of inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, reliance on corroborative evidence from a sibling witness, and acceptance of photographic evidence showing bruising that was not observed by police immediately after the incident.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered credibility and reliability, addressed inconsistencies, and was entitled to infer that bruising could develop after the incident.

The appellate court emphasized deference to trial findings of credibility and fact.

The conviction was upheld.

The defendant sought leave to cross-examine five police officers regarding the validity of three search warrants executed on his residence and industrial units.

The Crown conceded that the search warrants were invalid based on the edited Information to Obtain documents and sought to rely on unedited versions under the "step 6 Garofoli" procedure.

The court granted leave to cross-examine the affiant constable broadly, with restrictions on informer privilege, and permitted limited cross-examination of one sub-affiant regarding trespass issues, while denying leave to cross-examine other sub-affiants.

In an extradition proceeding, the person sought applied to introduce additional evidence challenging the reliability of evidence contained in the requesting state’s record of the case.

The court considered the limited role of an extradition judge under the Extradition Act and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Ferras requiring only a limited qualitative assessment of evidence.

The court held that most of the proposed evidence merely challenged the credibility of cooperating co‑conspirators and therefore went to weight rather than admissibility.

Such evidence could not render the requesting state’s evidence manifestly unreliable for the purposes of the committal test under s. 29(1).

Only evidence relating to contradictory statements about citizenship, relevant to the obstruction of justice allegation, was permitted to be introduced.

Sentencing following conviction for participation in a large-scale mortgage fraud involving 22 funded mortgages, over $5.5 million advanced, and quantified institutional losses of approximately $3.916 million, with additional harm to homeowners affected by title fraud and redirected mail.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount, but found the offender's role, while significant, was not proven to be at the same level as the principal organizers.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence, credited pre-sentence custody at 2:1 for pre-2010 detention, and reduced the remaining sentence to 16½ months.

Restitution was ordered, but only in the amount of $250,000 rather than the much larger jointly and severally framed amount sought by the Crown, based on proportionality, the offender's lesser involvement, and the evidentiary record.

Following a merits decision finding the respondents engaged in a fraudulent boiler room investment scheme that raised over US $2.2 million from investors, the Ontario Securities Commission held a hearing to determine sanctions and costs.

The Commission ordered permanent trading and market prohibitions against all respondents, with a limited RRSP carve-out for one respondent.

The individual respondents were ordered to pay administrative penalties ranging from $100,000 to $350,000, reflecting their respective roles in the fraud.

The Commission also ordered disgorgement of the funds obtained from investors, totaling over $2.1 million, and apportioned Staff's hearing costs of $85,758.94 among the respondents.

The monetary sanctions were ordered to be allocated for the benefit of third parties, including the defrauded investors.

The appellant was convicted of possession of an unlicensed firearm and careless storage after a sawed-off shotgun was found under his bed.

At trial, he testified that an acquaintance had stayed at his condominium and left the gun.

The trial judge rejected this explanation because the appellant had not disclosed it to the police earlier, treating it like an alibi defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by using the appellant's pre-trial silence to reject his credibility, violating his section 7 Charter right to silence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The respondent pleaded guilty to a third drinking and driving offence, which was treated as a second offence for sentencing purposes.

Due to an administrative error, the Ministry of Transportation also treated it as a second offence, suspending his licence for three years instead of indefinitely.

After the respondent completed the requirements, the Registrar reinstated his licence.

Two years later, the Ministry discovered the error and suspended the licence indefinitely.

The Divisional Court granted mandamus to reinstate the licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Ministry's appeal, holding that the Ministry could not disavow the Registrar's earlier exercise of statutory authority to reinstate the licence after the respondent had relied on it.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and the resulting sentences, including a restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the identity of the vehicles involved, nor any inconsistency in the verdicts.

The court held that misrepresentations in insurance documents justified the fraud conviction and upheld the restitution order as a proper exercise of discretion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, facing mortgage fraud charges, was subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiry of a co-accused.

He moved to quash the subpoena, arguing the Crown was on a fishing expedition for his own trial and that testifying would prejudice his right to silence.

The motion judge refused to quash the subpoena, finding the appellant likely had material evidence and was fully protected by derivative use immunity under the Canada Evidence Act and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant and his co-accused were engaged in a joint venture to cultivate and traffic in marijuana and to possess firearms in furtherance of that enterprise, justifying the committal for trial.

The appellant and two co-accused were jointly charged with sexual assault.

The jury convicted the appellant but acquitted the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdicts were unreasonably inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that independent confirmatory evidence against the appellant, including DNA evidence and after-the-fact conduct, provided a rational basis for the jury to distinguish his culpability from that of his co-accused.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to cross-examination on prior sexual history, the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and the admission of post-offence conduct.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized materials during the execution of a search warrant.

The warrant was partially invalid as it authorized a search for a 'pedophile collection' based only on suspicion.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 489(1) of the Criminal Code and the plain view doctrine, and alternatively under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the seizure was unlawful as it amounted to an exploratory search, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach serious and the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.