Leo Adler

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual assault against four children, including his common-law partner's grandchildren, committed over a period spanning from 2003 to 2013.

The Crown sought designation as a long-term offender with ten years of community supervision.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years custody (with credit for pre-sentence custody resulting in 525 days remaining), followed by a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The court rejected the defence proposal for probation followed by potential preventative recognizance applications, finding that a more robust supervisory regime was necessary given the offender's 40-year history of sexual offending, his paraphilias, and the substantial risk of reoffending.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and relied on impermissible inferences regarding impairment.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the circumstances, including driving conduct, admissions about alcohol consumption, and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected the argument that booking video evidence showing fewer visible signs of impairment required a different conclusion, holding that such evidence must be considered alongside all other evidence.

The inference that alcohol impaired the appellant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a repeat firearms offender subject to a lifetime weapons prohibition, was found guilty of possessing a loaded semi-automatic firearm hidden in a secret compartment of his vehicle.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay one of the overlapping firearms charges.

The court sentenced the accused to 6 years for the firearms offences and 1 year consecutive for breaching the prohibition order, for a total of 7 years.

After applying 16 months of credit for pre-sentence custody and strict house arrest bail conditions, the net sentence imposed was 5 years and 8 months imprisonment.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding language comprehension, that the roadside demand was not made “forthwith,” and that police lacked reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test.

The court held that police took reasonable steps to ensure the accused understood his rights, including arranging consultation with a Punjabi-speaking lawyer before breath samples were taken.

The delay in administering the screening test while awaiting the device was reasonably necessary and did not provide a realistic opportunity to consult counsel prior to the roadside demand.

The officer’s observations of erratic driving, odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and admission of recent drinking constituted objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a jury conviction for multiple firearms offences, the Crown brought a motion to revoke the accused’s judicial interim release pending sentencing.

The court considered the detention grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, focusing primarily on the tertiary ground concerning public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court emphasized the seriousness of illegal firearm possession in urban centres, the circumstances of the offences involving a concealed loaded handgun in a vehicle, the accused’s prior firearms convictions and lifetime prohibition order, and the potential mandatory minimum sentence.

In light of these factors and the jury’s finding of guilt, the court held that continued release would undermine public confidence in the justice system.

The accused’s bail was revoked and detention ordered pending sentencing.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle following a collision with a taxi cab on October 9, 2011.

After consuming three beers at a bar, the accused collided with a taxi, failed to stop, drove the wrong way down a one-way street, and nearly collided with a police vehicle.

The Crown alleged impairment by alcohol.

The defence argued that the accused's observed symptoms could be attributed to shock from the accident and his inexperience as a driver.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that the totality of circumstances—including the collision, subsequent driving errors, officer observations of unsteadiness and incoherence, and the accused's own admission that alcohol was affecting his social functioning—established impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with producing marijuana and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the validity of search warrants executed at his residence and two industrial units, his arrest, and warrantless searches of his person and vehicle.

The court found that the search warrants were validly issued based on reliable information from a confidential informer that was corroborated through police investigation.

The arrest was lawful and the seizure of keys from the defendant's person was a valid search incident to arrest.

The court dismissed the Charter application but excluded evidence seized from the residence under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of police carelessness in drafting the Information to Obtain and the significant impact on the defendant's privacy rights in his home.

Evidence from the industrial units and the keys were admitted.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder and faced three previous trials.

The first trial resulted in a conviction that was overturned on appeal due to a Charter breach.

The second and third trials resulted in hung juries.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings to prevent a fourth trial.

The court considered factors including the length of time elapsed, the time the accused spent in custody, the strength of the Crown's case, and the presumption of innocence.

The court concluded that requiring a fourth trial would stretch the community's sense of fair play and decency beyond the breaking point, constituting an abuse of process under section 7 of the Charter.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

An extradition judge considered whether the evidence contained in the certified record of the case established conduct that would justify committal for trial in Canada under s. 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The requesting state alleged that the respondent arranged for the arson of a furniture store to collect insurance proceeds and later filed an insurance claim.

Applying the evidentiary framework from Ferras, the court held that extradition evidence may be disregarded only if manifestly unreliable or defective and that weaknesses in accomplice testimony did not meet that threshold.

The court found sufficient evidence for committal on the parallel Canadian offences of arson for fraudulent purpose, unauthorized possession of a firearm, and attempted fraud, but not fraud or obstruction of justice.

The respondent was ordered committed into custody to await surrender on the supported offences.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting his child, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of the evidence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s treatment of inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony, reliance on corroborative evidence from a sibling witness, and acceptance of photographic evidence showing bruising that was not observed by police immediately after the incident.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered credibility and reliability, addressed inconsistencies, and was entitled to infer that bruising could develop after the incident.

The appellate court emphasized deference to trial findings of credibility and fact.

The conviction was upheld.

The defendant sought leave to cross-examine five police officers regarding the validity of three search warrants executed on his residence and industrial units.

The Crown conceded that the search warrants were invalid based on the edited Information to Obtain documents and sought to rely on unedited versions under the "step 6 Garofoli" procedure.

The court granted leave to cross-examine the affiant constable broadly, with restrictions on informer privilege, and permitted limited cross-examination of one sub-affiant regarding trespass issues, while denying leave to cross-examine other sub-affiants.

In an extradition proceeding, the person sought applied to introduce additional evidence challenging the reliability of evidence contained in the requesting state’s record of the case.

The court considered the limited role of an extradition judge under the Extradition Act and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Ferras requiring only a limited qualitative assessment of evidence.

The court held that most of the proposed evidence merely challenged the credibility of cooperating co‑conspirators and therefore went to weight rather than admissibility.

Such evidence could not render the requesting state’s evidence manifestly unreliable for the purposes of the committal test under s. 29(1).

Only evidence relating to contradictory statements about citizenship, relevant to the obstruction of justice allegation, was permitted to be introduced.