Leo Adler

The applicants sought leave to appeal their convictions under the Environmental Protection Act following a 14-day trial and a subsequent appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicants were convicted of nine provincial offences related to discharging contaminants into the environment and failing to comply with lawful orders issued following catastrophic propane explosions at their facility that killed one employee and displaced approximately 12,000 residents.

The Court of Appeal considered whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, which requires identification of a pure question of law that is essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.

The court found that the two grounds of appeal raised by the applicants were fact-laden and did not identify pure questions of law transcending the unique factual circumstances of the case.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for multiple regulatory offences under the Environmental Protection Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a massive propane explosion at their facility that resulted in a worker's death and widespread environmental contamination.

The appellants argued the trial judge made numerous factual and legal errors, including rejecting their defence of officially induced error and finding a lack of due diligence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of strict liability principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeals, upholding over $5 million in fines due to the unprecedented magnitude of the damage and the appellants' reckless conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police failed to facilitate contact with his lawyer of choice at the roadside.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by focusing solely on the appellant's due diligence without first determining whether the police had fulfilled their initial implementation duties under s. 10(b).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The offender pled guilty to two counts of trafficking in hashish oil (shatter), a Schedule II substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offender sold single grams of shatter to an undercover police officer on three occasions for $70 each.

The Crown sought to establish aggravating factors related to production and manufacture of shatter, but the court dismissed the Crown's expert evidence application and found insufficient evidence of production involvement.

The offender was a youthful first offender with no criminal record who demonstrated genuine rehabilitation post-arrest, including pursuing law school studies.

The court imposed an absolute discharge, finding that a conviction would be disproportionately harsh given the minor nature of the offences, the offender's location at the bottom of the distribution chain, and his demonstrated rehabilitation and future professional prospects.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from a police sergeant regarding the dangers associated with the production and consumption of cannabis concentrate ("shatter") as aggravating factors in sentencing for drug trafficking.

The defendant opposed the admission of this evidence.

The court conducted an admissibility voir dire and determined that the proposed expert evidence should not be received.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility under the Mohan test, particularly regarding relevance, necessity, and the qualifications of the proposed expert witness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking could not be sustained on the record and requested a substitution for simple possession.

The Court of Appeal rejected the substitution because the drugs were prescription medications for which the appellant had prescriptions, making his possession lawful absent a purpose to traffic.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The Crown sought the forfeiture of a recognizance against the accused and a surety following a breach of a non-communication condition.

The breach occurred under a first recognizance, which was subsequently vacated and replaced by a second.

The Certificate of Default, required under section 770 of the Criminal Code, was mistakenly completed on the second recognizance instead of the one that was actually breached.

The court held that jurisdiction for estreatment requires the Certificate of Default to be endorsed on the specific recognizance that was breached, not a successor.

Due to this procedural error, the court lacked jurisdiction, and the Crown's application for estreatment was dismissed.

The appellant, a former Member of Parliament, appealed his convictions and sentence for exceeding election expense limits, exceeding personal contribution limits, and filing a false electoral campaign return under the Canada Elections Act.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking a longer term of imprisonment.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the definition of election expenses, properly assessed credibility, and correctly applied party liability provisions.

The court also dismissed both sentence appeals, upholding the global sentence of one month in jail, a four-month conditional sentence, and 18 months' probation as proportionate and fit, though it set aside a $10,000 restitution order on consent.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in her blood exceeded the legal limit.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath test results, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the Approved Screening Device demand and that the breathalyser instrument was operated improperly, thereby rebutting the presumption of accuracy.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds for the ASD demand based on observed signs of impairment and the accused's admission of alcohol consumption.

While the court found that the qualified technician improperly operated the Intoxilyzer by performing the calibration check too soon and failing to review printouts, the court determined that the Crown had satisfied the burden of establishing reliability of the results based on the subject test record and the technician's credible explanation for the initial calibration anomaly.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant sought to quash a search warrant executed at his residence and to exclude a firearm and ammunition seized during the search, alleging violations of ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The warrant was based on intercepted communications during a police firearms trafficking investigation, where investigators interpreted coded references in telephone conversations as referring to handguns and ammunition.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain contained misleading statements, insufficient grounds, and improper interpretation of coded language.

Applying the warrant review principles from Garofoli and subsequent jurisprudence, the court held that the reviewing judge’s role was limited to determining whether the issuing justice could have granted the warrant based on reliable evidence.

The court found that any errors in the ITO were minor, made in good faith, and did not undermine the existence of reasonable and probable grounds.

The application to quash the search warrant and exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual assault against four children, including his common-law partner's grandchildren, committed over a period spanning from 2003 to 2013.

The Crown sought designation as a long-term offender with ten years of community supervision.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years custody (with credit for pre-sentence custody resulting in 525 days remaining), followed by a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The court rejected the defence proposal for probation followed by potential preventative recognizance applications, finding that a more robust supervisory regime was necessary given the offender's 40-year history of sexual offending, his paraphilias, and the substantial risk of reoffending.

The applicant, a lawyer facing misconduct allegations, applied for judicial review of a Law Society Hearing Panel's interlocutory decision dismissing his jurisdictional challenge.

The Law Society argued the application was premature.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the statutory appeal mechanism provided an adequate alternative remedy and that the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances justifying early intervention and fragmentation of the administrative process.

The application was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and argued that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed that the full period from charge to completion of trial must be considered in assessing inferred prejudice, including neutral time periods, and noted the trial judge's reasons were open to error on that point.

However, taking both inferred and actual prejudice into account, the court held that no s. 11(b) violation was made out.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the appellant was directed to begin serving the intermittent sentence imposed at trial.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to indefinitely suspend his driver's licence following his third impaired driving conviction.

The applicant argued that his first conviction, which occurred when he was a youth, could not be used to calculate the suspension under the Highway Traffic Act due to the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He also argued that the Registrar was estopped from imposing the indefinite suspension because he had previously received an erroneous notice of a three-year suspension and a notice of eligibility for reinstatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflict between the provincial and federal legislation, and holding that the doctrines of public estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot override the Registrar's mandatory statutory duty to suspend the licence.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping with intent to confine after holding an innocent victim for ransom over a drug dispute.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of a confession made by one appellant, arguing it was involuntary, violated Charter rights, and breached spousal privilege.

They also appealed their sentences, arguing they offended the parity principle compared to a co-accused who pleaded guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the statement or refusal to edit out co-accused names.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the sentences reflected the appellants' respective roles and were not a marked departure from the range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for producing and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity, as well as his nine-month sentence.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge improperly drew a negative inference from his failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence supported the verdict and the trial judge properly applied the law regarding the accused's silence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the nine-month term was fit given the scale of the operation and the need for deterrence.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and relied on impermissible inferences regarding impairment.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the circumstances, including driving conduct, admissions about alcohol consumption, and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected the argument that booking video evidence showing fewer visible signs of impairment required a different conclusion, holding that such evidence must be considered alongside all other evidence.

The inference that alcohol impaired the appellant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a repeat firearms offender subject to a lifetime weapons prohibition, was found guilty of possessing a loaded semi-automatic firearm hidden in a secret compartment of his vehicle.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay one of the overlapping firearms charges.

The court sentenced the accused to 6 years for the firearms offences and 1 year consecutive for breaching the prohibition order, for a total of 7 years.

After applying 16 months of credit for pre-sentence custody and strict house arrest bail conditions, the net sentence imposed was 5 years and 8 months imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and put to bed by friends, who shortly after discovered the appellant having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial judge found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent and rejected the appellant's claim of consensual sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.