Signe Leisk

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its application for compensation regarding Block 203, a land parcel transferred to the City of Brampton pursuant to a Subdivision Agreement.

The appellant argued that Block 203 was conveyed on condition that it be used as a road and sought compensation after the City did not use it for that purpose some 20 years later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the Subdivision Agreement contained no condition requiring reconveyance or compensation for Block 203, unlike other parcels covered by the agreement.

The court also dismissed the appellant's challenge to the costs award of $53,667.

The applicant developer conveyed a block of land to the respondent municipality for future road purposes pursuant to a 1998 subdivision agreement.

The applicant sought compensation or reconveyance of the land, arguing that the municipality would be unjustly enriched if it conveyed the land to a third-party developer without compensating the applicant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the subdivision agreement was a comprehensive contract that did not include provisions for the reconveyance or cost-sharing of the specific block in question, precluding claims of resulting trust or unjust enrichment.

Developers holding registered title to a parkette appealed a declaration that a municipality was the legal and beneficial owner of the land.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge’s finding that a 1973 subdivision agreement requiring conveyance of the parkette to the municipality superseded an earlier 1972 agreement that included a potential re‑conveyance clause.

The court further held that the land’s administrative conversion to the Land Titles system did not extinguish the municipality’s equitable interest because the developers had actual notice of that interest.

The municipality’s claim was not statute‑barred under the Real Property Limitations Act because it had remained in continuous possession of the park since the 1970s.

In the alternative, the doctrine of dedication and acceptance independently supported municipal ownership after decades of public use.

Following a successful application regarding the ownership of a parkette, the successful municipality sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent developers argued that no costs should be awarded as the matter involved public interest and was litigated in good faith.

The court rejected the public interest argument, finding the developers were seeking a private windfall.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case and the developers' vexatious conduct during discovery, the court awarded the municipality $210,000 in costs.

The Town of Caledon and Waterstone Properties Corporation (and Wyndcliffe Developments Inc.) brought cross-applications concerning the beneficial ownership of a 2.8-acre parkette.

Waterstone claimed beneficial ownership based on a 1972 subdivision agreement with a re-conveyance clause, arguing its inclusion in a subsequent 1973 agreement was a mistake.

The Town asserted ownership based on the unconditional transfer provision in the 1973 agreement, and alternatively, through adverse possession or dedication and acceptance.

The court found the 1973 agreement superseded the 1972 agreement, that the inclusion of the parkette in the 1973 agreement was not a mistake, and that the Town was the beneficial owner.

The court also found that the Town would have succeeded on adverse possession and dedication and acceptance.

Waterstone's application was dismissed, and the Town's application was granted.

The City of Port Colborne sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board, which found that Nyon Oil Inc. had standing to appeal the City's refusal to amend its official plan and zoning by-law.

The City argued the Board lacked jurisdiction and erred in finding Nyon was an 'applicant' under the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the Board had jurisdiction to determine its own scope and reasonably concluded that the City acted as Nyon's agent in applying for the amendments.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The appellants, landlords in Oshawa, appealed a judgment ordering them to cease using their properties as lodging houses.

They argued their properties operated as single dwelling establishments for groups of tenants, primarily students.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the properties were rented on a room-by-room, short-term basis, functioning as lodging houses rather than single housekeeping establishments.

The court also rejected the argument that s. 35(2) of the Planning Act precluded considering the relationship among renters.

The appeal was dismissed.

The City of Oshawa appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that repealed an interim control by-law prohibiting the establishment of methadone clinics in the Central Business District.

The by-law was passed following ratepayer resistance to the respondent's proposed clinic.

The OMB found no legitimate planning rationale for the by-law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the OMB had jurisdiction to determine the planning rationale and that its decision, reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, was supported by the evidence and established policies.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that upheld the validity of the respondent municipality's interim control by-law.

The moving party argued that the municipality failed to meet the statutory requirements of section 38(1) of the Planning Act because it acted on staff advice that further planning studies were unnecessary.

The court found that the issue of compliance with section 38 gave rise to serious legal debate and granted leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b).