Raivo Uukkivi

The Court of Appeal considered whether a beach easement was expressly extinguished by an application to the Registrar of Land Titles.

The lower court had found the deletion was an error and ordered rectification.

The appellate court determined that the application judge erred in law by misinterpreting the application as lacking an express release, despite the dominant owner's clear intent and request to delete the easement.

The appeal was allowed, the rectification order set aside, and the original application dismissed, confirming the easement's extinguishment.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant, a municipal councillor and later mayor, appealed a decision finding he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by attempting to influence the location of a municipal project near his commercial property.

The application judge ordered his removal from office and a two-year disqualification.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction, the finding of a pecuniary interest, the admission of expert evidence, the penalty, and the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the application judge's objective assessment of the conflict, her reliance on the expert valuation report, or her discretionary decisions on penalty and costs.

The defendant, Van Drunen and Sons Gravel Limited, brought a motion for a non-suit in a provincial offences case, seeking dismissal of a charge for encumbering a highway contrary to a municipal by-law.

The court granted the motion, finding that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case.

The judge determined that the bin in question did not encumber the roadway, the identity of the responsible party (defendant vs. bailee) was ambiguous, and the municipal permit specifically allowed equipment (like the bin) to occupy the road during the relevant hours.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed appeal did not meet the three-part test for granting leave.

In accordance with the parties' agreement, costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The applicant apartment association applied to quash City of Toronto By-laws 1121-2019 and 1750-2019, which required apartment owners to provide emergency accommodations to displaced tenants and imposed a full cost recovery fee on landlords if the City provided those services.

The court held that the City lacked the legislative authority to require landlords to provide emergency social services regardless of the cause of the building becoming uninhabitable.

The court quashed the specific provisions imposing the fee and the requirement to provide emergency social services, while upholding the remainder of the by-laws.

The appellants, previously found in contempt of an injunction and fined $1 million, brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

They also sought to introduce a new ground of appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, based on a misapplication of criminal practice directions to a civil proceeding.

The court granted the motion to set aside the dismissal and extend time, but imposed strict conditions, finding the ineffective assistance of counsel argument weak in a civil context.

The moving party, a municipal councillor, sought a stay pending her appeal of a judgment that found she violated the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act and declared her council seat vacant.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal.

While finding a serious issue to be tried, the court found no irreparable harm because it ordered the municipality not to fill the vacancy pending the appeal.

The balance of convenience favoured the public interest in municipal integrity, and the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The Integrity Commissioner appealed a decision imposing a reprimand on a city councillor who breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council meeting regarding a debt owed to a non-profit corporation of which he was a director.

The Commissioner argued the only appropriate penalty was removal from office.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that recent amendments to the Act broadened judicial discretion regarding penalties, and the application judge made no error in principle in imposing a reprimand given the mitigating factors.

Following an application regarding the continuation of a legal non-conforming use, the applicant sought costs of $60,186.30 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued for each party to bear their own costs due to divided success, or alternatively $20,000.

The court found there was genuinely divided success as the applicant was successful on the declaration but overreached on the injunction, which the respondent successfully resisted.

Applying Rule 57.01, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $38,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant sought declarations regarding the continuation of legal non-conforming uses on his property, affirmation of an existing injunction against the Town, and an order to register court judgments on title.

The court granted declarations affirming that the property's uses, including a motor vehicle compound, were a continuation of previously recognized legal non-conforming uses.

The court dismissed the requests for an affirmation of the injunction, finding no contravention by the Town, and for an order to register judgments, deeming it a matter for the Land Titles system.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal that struck 8 of 15 issues from a draft Issues List during a case management conference.

The moving parties argued they were denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal on the basis that it was premature, without prejudice to the moving parties raising the issues at an appropriate time in the future.

The plaintiff hotel sought an injunction to restrain the neighbouring defendant tire shop from servicing commercial vehicles, alleging the noise constituted a nuisance and breached municipal by-laws and the Environmental Protection Act (EPA).

The court found that the noise from servicing commercial vehicles likely caused an adverse effect, breaching s. 9(1) of the EPA and, consequently, the municipal zoning by-law.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted an injunction restraining the defendant from servicing commercial vehicles between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. to prevent irreparable harm to the hotel's reputation.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to prevent the Town of Caledon from enforcing a work order requiring the removal of 5,500 tonnes of illegal fill from his property, as well as an order of mandamus for document disclosure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, noting the high hurdle for enjoining a public authority enforcing its by-laws in the public interest.

Finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the Town, the court dismissed the motion for injunctive relief and mandamus.

The appellants sought to develop land pursuant to an amended development agreement with the Town of Ajax.

The agreement contained repurchase terms that could be invoked if the developer failed to take reasonable steps to proceed with construction by a specified deadline, provided it was not awaiting comments or confirmation of approval on any application from the Town.

The Town terminated the agreement and exercised its repurchase rights, claiming the developer's revised site plan application was incomplete and the construction deadline had passed.

The trial judge found in favour of the Town.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in failing to apply the Planning Act's definition of a complete site plan and in conflating completeness with readiness for approval.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the site plan application was incomplete as a matter of contract interpretation because the developer had not submitted all requested materials and was not awaiting Town approval but rather the Town was awaiting responses from the developer.

The appellant town appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that its large-scale commercial aggregate extraction operation on property located in the respondent township was a permitted use under the township's zoning by-law or alternatively constituted a legal non-conforming use under the Planning Act.

The application judge found that the extraction operation was not permitted under the zoning by-law and did not qualify as a legal non-conforming use because the historical use of the property was as a municipal park with only incidental and ancillary extraction for municipal purposes.

The court found that the expansion from incidental extraction to large-scale commercial extraction constituted a change in the type of use rather than a mere intensification.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiffs, Central Park Ajax 1 Developments Phase 1 Inc. and LeMine Real Estate Consulting Inc., brought a claim for $300 million in damages and declaratory relief against The Corporation of the Town of Ajax and Rob Ford, alleging breach of contract, defamation, and unlawful interference.

The core dispute revolved around the Town's right to repurchase development lands due to the plaintiffs' alleged failure to commence construction by a contractual deadline.

The court was asked to determine two key issues: (1) whether LeMine was awaiting approval for a site plan application from the Town on or prior to July 17, 2017, which would invalidate the repurchase notice, and (2) if not, whether the Town had the right to repurchase the lands due to LeMine's failure to start construction by July 16, 2017.

The court found that LeMine had not submitted a complete site plan application sufficient for council consideration and was therefore not "awaiting confirmation of approval." Furthermore, the court interpreted the development agreement, considering both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, to conclude that LeMine was contractually obliged to commence construction by July 15, 2017, and failed to do so.

Consequently, the Town's repurchase notice was deemed valid, and the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on these issues.

Following a municipal building enforcement dispute, the applicant sought rescission of stop work and compliance orders issued by a municipal chief building official regarding patios constructed without a permit.

Parallel provincial offences proceedings resulted in the applicant’s acquittal on all charges and the municipality subsequently rescinded the orders, rendering the application moot.

The court considered whether the applicant was entitled to costs and whether substantial indemnity costs were justified.

While the applicant was effectively successful because the orders were withdrawn, the court found no evidence of bad faith or reprehensible conduct by the municipality.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore awarded in a reduced amount reflecting excessive time and disbursements claimed.

The appellant municipality discovered an 1854 by-law purporting to establish a public road along the shoreline of Georgian Bay.

It registered the by-law in 2007 and sought a declaration that the road was a public highway owned by the municipality.

The respondents, who own cottage properties on the purported road, successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that summary judgment was appropriate, the 1854 by-law lacked sufficient certainty to establish a road, and the unregistered by-law was void against the respondents who had no actual notice of it.

Two applicants sought judicial review of municipal by-laws implementing a volume-based solid waste user fee and associated rebate program introduced by the City of Toronto.

The applicants argued that the waste collection charge was in substance an unlawful tax affecting provincial tax ratio rules and that the rebate constituted an impermissible redistribution of property taxes contrary to the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court held that the waste charge was a valid user fee because a sufficient nexus existed between the amount collected and the cost of providing waste services.

The court further held that the rebate was properly characterized as a municipal grant authorized under s. 83 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 rather than a tax rebate.

The applications to quash the relevant by-law provisions were dismissed.