Jennifer Savini

The applicant City brought an application for an order directing the respondent property owner to comply with a property standards order requiring the removal of derelict vehicles from his property.

The respondent argued the City lacked jurisdiction over private property and that the vehicles were not derelict.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the City had clear statutory authority under the Building Code Act, 1992 to enact and enforce property standards by-laws.

The court also found, based on the respondent's own evidence, that the eight vehicles on the property were inoperative.

The application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to remove the vehicles within 30 days.

The applicant Medical Officer of Health sought an ex parte injunction under section 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act to restrain the respondent restaurant owner from contravening a section 22 order.

The respondent had repeatedly refused to comply with COVID-19 regulations regarding masking, contact tracing, and proof of vaccination for indoor dining.

The court found a clear breach of the enactment and granted an interim interlocutory injunction for 10 days, scheduling a return hearing to allow the respondent an opportunity to participate.

The applicants, who lease advertising signs, challenged a municipal by-law amendment that eliminated off-premise portable signs.

They argued the amendment infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, was ultra vires, and was tainted by bias.

The court found that while the by-law infringed s. 2(b), it was a reasonable limit saved by s. 1, as it addressed pressing aesthetic and traffic safety concerns.

The court also dismissed the ultra vires and bias claims, finding the municipality acted in good faith and within its statutory authority.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, an incorporated association managing a recreational park, applied to vacate a 1997 court order that established a two-manager governance system.

Three respondent members brought a counter-application challenging the applicant's corporate standing and seeking an external financial audit.

The court found that the applicant lacked standing because the park's constitution was never properly amended to authorize incorporation.

The court partially vacated the 1997 order, removing provisions related to the defunct two-manager system but leaving other substantive provisions intact.

The request for an external audit was dismissed for failing to meet the statutory threshold under the Corporations Act and lacking majority member support.

Following a successful motion for leave to appeal, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs agreed the amounts were reasonable but argued payment would create a tremendous financial burden due to their impecuniosity.

The court fixed the costs as requested but, exercising its discretion under Rule 57.03(1), ordered that the costs be payable following the final resolution of the matter by the Divisional Court.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application regarding the maintenance of a private drive, the successful respondent sought costs of $14,161.93.

The respondent relied on an offer to settle that would have provided the applicants with more than they achieved at the hearing.

The applicants argued the offer was not sufficiently certain to trigger Rule 49.

The court found the offer was valid and should be considered.

Applying the principle of reasonableness, the court fixed costs payable by the applicants to the respondent at $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants, property owners on a lakefront, sought a declaration that a private road leading to their properties had become a municipal roadway through the doctrine of dedication and acceptance.

The municipality had performed casual winter maintenance on the road pursuant to historical agreements that explicitly stated the road remained private.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the road was on Crown land, was not dedicated to public use, and that the municipality's maintenance work did not constitute a clear and unequivocal intention to assume responsibility for the road.