Lawren Murray

The applicant bank sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of an affinity agreement between the bank and a university.

The bank argued the agreement was exempt from disclosure under s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as confidential commercial information.

The adjudicator found the information was not 'supplied' in confidence because it was a negotiated contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's interpretation and application of the Act to be reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner denying a fee waiver for a freedom of information request made to the Ministry of the Environment.

The Adjudicator had reduced the fee but found it was not fair and equitable to waive it entirely, noting the applicant did not work with the Ministry to narrow the request.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The requester sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) to records held by the Children's Lawyer relating to a custody and access dispute involving his children.

The Children's Lawyer refused, arguing the records were not in the custody or control of the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) when acting as counsel for a child.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordered MAG to issue an access decision, finding the records were under MAG's control.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, not correctness, as interpreting s. 10(1) of FIPPA is not a true question of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable and noting that solicitor-client privilege concerns could be addressed through FIPPA exemptions.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding a freedom of information request for an OPP investigation report.

The Commissioner had found that the Ministry repeatedly failed to properly exercise its discretion under the law enforcement exemption, but closed the appeal file claiming he was functus officio and had no further recourse.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commissioner's decisions, finding he erred in law by misapprehending the scope of a prior Supreme Court of Canada remittal order.

The Court remitted the matter back to the Commissioner and issued a declaration that the Ministry had disregarded the Commissioner's proper directions regarding its exercise of discretion.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order directing the disclosure of a draft prosecutorial guideline concerning HIV exposure.

The Commissioner found that while the draft guideline originated in solicitor-client privilege, the privilege was waived when an Assistant Crown Attorney shared it with a municipal public health manager.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Commissioner reasonably concluded the privilege was waived because the Ministry and the public health authority did not share a sufficient common interest.

The applicants, trustees of multi-employer pension plans, sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of confidential actuarial valuation reports to a representative of a rival union.

The applicants argued that disclosure would cause harm during the construction industry's 'raiding season'.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and set aside the commissioner's order, finding that the commissioner applied an overly burdensome standard of proof and an overly stringent test for causation of harm under s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court held that the applicants only needed to establish a reasonable expectation of probable harm, which was met given the highly competitive context of union raiding.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order requiring the disclosure of Change Notices and edited Detailed Feasibility Notices related to a government contract.

The applicant argued the records contained confidential commercial information and their disclosure would cause competitive harm.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the Change Notices were negotiated rather than 'supplied' by the applicant, and that the applicant failed to provide detailed and convincing evidence that disclosure of the edited Detailed Feasibility Notices would result in a reasonable expectation of probable harm.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) dismissing his privacy complaint against the Peel Regional Police Service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the IPC's refusal to investigate a privacy complaint is a legislative function protected by parliamentary privilege.

Alternatively, the Court held that the IPC reasonably concluded the police disclosure to the Children's Aid Society was justified under the duty to report a child in need of protection pursuant to section 72 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) Reconsideration Order.

The IPC had ordered the LCBO to cease collecting the personal information of wine club members when processing special orders, finding the practice contravened s. 38(2) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The LCBO argued the IPC's order forced it to violate liquor laws and that the IPC applied an unreasonably strict test for 'necessity' under FIPPA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the IPC's decision was reasonable, the LCBO was exempt from the relevant liquor law prohibitions, and the IPC correctly applied the established legal test for necessity.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The order required the Ministry to disclose records containing the full names of Family Responsibility Office (FRO) employees to a requester.

The appellants argued that disclosure posed a health and safety risk to the employees and conflicted with a prior Grievance Settlement Board order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the evidence did not establish a reasonable expectation of harm to the employees, and that the disclosure order did not conflict with the prior grievance settlement.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the City of Toronto to disclose portions of a software maintenance log under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant argued the log contained confidential technical information exempt from disclosure under s. 10(1).

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's decision unreasonable, noting that the adjudicator applied the three-part exemption test inconsistently and failed to provide adequate justification for concluding the information was not supplied by the applicant.

The application was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of an adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of parts of a bus services contract between the applicant and a municipality.

The adjudicator found that the third party exemption under s. 10(1) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act did not apply because the information was mutually generated through negotiation, rather than supplied by the applicant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the adjudicator's decision was reasonable and that the applicant failed to establish that the inferred disclosure or immutability exceptions applied.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of certain schedules to a project agreement between the applicant and Infrastructure Ontario.

The applicant argued the information was exempt from disclosure under the third party information exemption in s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC adjudicator reasonably concluded that the disputed information was the product of a negotiation process and was not 'supplied' by the applicant in confidence.

The applicant, an economic development corporation, sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner finding it to be an 'institution' under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

The Commissioner ordered the applicant to respond to a freedom of information request.

The Divisional Court upheld the Commissioner's original decision, finding it was reasonable to interpret the relevant regulation as capturing the applicant, despite the repeal of the underlying statutory provision.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) order directing it to cease collecting personal information from wine club members and to destroy previously collected information.

The LCBO argued the IPC breached procedural fairness by issuing the order without prior notice that such a remedy was being contemplated.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the IPC failed to provide adequate notice of the potential consequences of the privacy complaint investigation, thereby depriving the LCBO of a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of remedy.

The IPC's order was quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding a freedom of information request made to a municipality.

The request stemmed from a line fence dispute and sought banking records and additional reasons from a Provincial Referee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, upholding the Commissioner's findings that she lacked jurisdiction to compel a federally regulated bank to produce records or to order an independent Provincial Referee to create additional reasons.

The Court also found reasonable the Commissioner's conclusion that the municipality had conducted an adequate search for records.

The applicants brought two applications for judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

At the hearing, the applicants requested an adjournment based on irrelevant proceedings and offensive submissions.

The court refused the adjournment and directed the applicants to proceed.

When the applicants refused to proceed, the court dismissed the applications and suggested that the respondents consider bringing a vexatious litigant application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous decision dismissing his action for abuse of process.

He argued that under s. 31 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, only the Appeals Tribunal could determine whether his right to maintain a lawsuit could be taken away.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the previous dismissal of his action was upheld on the alternate ground of abuse of process, as he had claimed compensation from the Board, was denied, and had a right of appeal under the Act which he had not pursued.

The court held he could not circumvent his statutory appeal right by suing in court.

The appellant commenced an action alleging the respondents conspired to falsely accuse him of fraud, while criminal proceedings against him for that fraud were ongoing.

The motion judge struck the claim, characterizing it as malicious prosecution lacking the essential element of a favourable determination in the criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that even if framed as conspiracy to injure, the claim could not proceed in the face of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed and the claim struck in its entirety.