Kofi Barnes

A.R. was convicted by a jury of four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his intimate partner (R.V.), and one count of assault (choking) against his young son (K.R.).

The Crown sought a global 22-month sentence, two years probation, and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence and opposed probation and SOIRA.

The court imposed a global sentence of 18 months imprisonment, two years probation, and a DNA order, but declined to impose a SOIRA order, finding a low risk of re-offending despite the serious nature of the domestic violence.

This was a trial to change a final order concerning decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support.

The applicant mother alleged the respondent father's substance misuse and violent behavior created an unsafe environment, leading to the children's alienation.

Investigations by the OCL, police, and DCFS found no basis for the safety allegations.

The court found both parents contributed to the children's alienation from the father due to high hostility and inappropriate involvement of the children in the dispute.

The court ordered a phased approach to the father's parenting time, starting with supervised visits and progressing to unsupervised, with mandatory counselling for both parents and children, and random urine screens for the father.

The mother was granted sole decision-making responsibility with consultation.

The father was ordered to pay ongoing and retroactive child support, and secure life insurance.

The mother's request for section 7 expenses was dismissed due to lack of prior consent, and spousal support was terminated.

This case involved a dispute between former real estate investment partners regarding the nature and scope of their oral agreement.

The plaintiffs, Anish Gupta and Gurpal Sani, sought a declaration that a second property, Torbram Road, was part of their partnership with the defendants, Kamaljit Chauhan and Gurbir Chauhan, and that the defendants had misappropriated partnership funds.

The court found that an oral partnership agreement existed for both properties (Para Place and Torbram Road), and that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by selling Torbram Road and using the proceeds to purchase their personal residence (Burlwood Road) without accounting to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs were declared beneficial owners of Burlwood Road via a resulting trust and awarded damages.

A claim for punitive damages was dismissed due to the absence of an independent actionable wrong.

The applicant, facing firearms charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to racial profiling during a police search and detention.

The court found that the safety search and subsequent search of his person, belongings, and vehicle were unlawful and tainted by unconscious racial bias, constituting breaches of ss. 8 and 9.

While the initial 10(b) rights during the Cannabis Control Act investigation were suspended due to brief roadside detention, the post-arrest delay in providing access to counsel was an unreasonable breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly given the serious nature of the racial profiling and the systemic issues it represents.

The firearm was excluded.

Her Majesty the Queen appealed the acquittal of Nicholas Bennett on a charge of driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol.

The trial judge had excluded breath test results, finding a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Prosper warning.

The respondent had initially invoked his right to counsel, but police conduct led him to believe further attempts to contact a lawyer would be futile.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding of a Charter breach and the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the seriousness of the police conduct, which effectively rendered the right to counsel meaningless, outweighed other factors, notwithstanding the minimally intrusive nature of breath samples.

The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was affirmed.

The appellant, Salim Mohamad, appealed his sentence of 16 months custody for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider his post-conviction diagnosis of schizophrenia and its impact on sentencing, and erred in finding premeditation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's mental illness and its treatment, and that the finding of premeditation was supported by the evidence.

The court affirmed that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount sentencing principles, and a conditional sentence was insufficient given the serious nature of the offence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Moses Odemi, on a charge of refusing to comply with a breath demand under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded evidence (ASD test result and refusal) under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to an unlawful ASD demand (s. 8 Charter breach) and a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The appeal court upheld the exclusion of evidence, finding the police officer's embellishment of grounds for the ASD demand to be a serious Charter breach, which outweighed other factors in the Grant analysis.

The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal stood.

Heeralal Ramdeo was convicted after a judge-alone trial for kidnapping, use of an imitation firearm to commit assault, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public peace.

The Crown alleged Ramdeo masterminded the kidnapping of Dharwant Gill to locate Paul, who had stolen drugs from Ramdeo.

Gill's testimony, though inconsistent and from an unsavoury witness (treated as Vetrovec), was corroborated by other evidence.

The court found a conspiracy proven beyond a reasonable doubt and Ramdeo's probable membership.

Ramdeo's defence was rejected as unreasonable.

He was found guilty on most counts but acquitted of uttering threats due to reasonable doubt regarding the specific content of threats.

The accused, Samuel Oduro, brought a pre-trial application to exclude cocaine evidence found in his car, alleging a violation of his Section 8 Charter rights.

He argued the search warrant was unlawfully obtained due to baseless generalizations, incomplete disclosure, failure to meet telewarrant preconditions, and insufficient information regarding the confidential informant's credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the affiant made minor errors, they were in good faith and did not mislead the issuing justice.

The court concluded that the information to obtain the warrant, as amplified and redacted, provided reasonable grounds for its issuance, rendering the search lawful and no Charter breach.

J.G. was convicted of sex trade-related offenses (influencing/directing, advertising, obtaining material benefit from a minor's sex trade) and child pornography offenses (possession and distribution).

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and six months.

Key legal considerations included the unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for the sex trade offenses, the inadmissibility of the accused's unrequested disciplinary records from custody, and the application of systemic racism as a mitigating factor in sentencing Black offenders.

The court found mandatory minimums unconstitutional, excluded the disciplinary records, and took judicial notice of systemic racism's deleterious impacts as a mitigating factor.

Credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown days due to COVID-19 was also applied.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and Criminal Code offences.

The case proceeded as a blended Charter proceeding and trial.

The court found that the police used the Highway Traffic Act as a ruse to conduct a criminal investigation, thereby breaching the accused's section 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention.

Although the court found the police officers acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable, the seriousness and deliberate nature of the Charter breach, and its significant impact on the accused's rights, led to the exclusion of all evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, with no evidence, the accused was found not guilty of all charges.

The applicant, Richard Ireland, jointly charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder alongside Trayon Johnson, sought to sever his trial from Johnson's.

Ireland argued that Johnson's police statement, which heavily implicated Ireland and expressed fear of him, would cause incurable prejudice despite excisions of prior discreditable conduct.

The Crown opposed the severance.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the presumption of joint trials for co-accused, even with "cut-throat" defences.

It held that proper jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice, and that the interests of justice, including efficiency and avoiding inconsistent verdicts, favoured a joint trial.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought an order under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause.

He proposed augmenting the traditional *Parks* questions with multiple-choice options to address subconscious racial bias against men of African ancestry.

The court acknowledged the existence of racial stereotypes and unconscious bias, finding that appropriately-constructed multiple-choice questions could be more effective than standard "yes/no" questions in identifying such biases.

The proposed multiple-choice questions were approved to ensure an impartial jury.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, applied to introduce his exculpatory police statement made on October 20, 2017, under the *Edgar* exception.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite instances of dishonesty and manipulation during the 12-hour interview, a contextual analysis left doubt regarding the spontaneity of the statement.

In such cases, the statement should be admitted for the jury to assess its weight and the accused's credibility, not for the truth of its contents.

The jury will be instructed on how to use the statement to assess Johnson's reaction and credibility when confronted with the allegations.

This decision addresses jury instructions on modes of participation for two accused, Richard Ireland and Trayon Johnson, in a joint jury trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown's application for Ireland as a principal (s. 21(1)(a) Criminal Code) and Johnson as an aider (s. 21(1)(b) Criminal Code) was granted.

The Crown's application for Johnson as a co-principal (s. 21(2) Criminal Code) was dismissed, as was Johnson's request for the jury to be instructed only on s. 21(2) and thus preclude a second-degree murder verdict for him.

The court found an air of reality for Johnson's conviction as an aider but not as a co-principal for second-degree murder.

The applicant, T.D., sought a review of a detention order that had been upheld on tertiary grounds.

The application was brought during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was accepted as a material change in circumstances.

The court assessed the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, considering a new bail plan that included three sureties (parents and girlfriend) and electronic monitoring.

The court found the proposed plan sufficient to address concerns about public protection, noting the sureties' track records and the applicant's lack of prior breaches.

For the tertiary ground, the court balanced the seriousness of the offence (possessing a loaded firearm) against the applicant's personal circumstances (asthma, heightened COVID-19 risk in detention, no violent record or compliance breaches).

The court concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail review was granted, and the applicant was ordered released on a $320,000 recognizance with conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order.

The court found material changes in circumstances due to a psychological report detailing the applicant's intellectual deficits and the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, the proposed release plan, including an unsuitable primary surety and insufficient details on electronic monitoring, failed to adequately address secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court dismissed the bail review application, finding continued detention warranted to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, despite the applicant's asthma making him vulnerable to COVID-19.

The Crown sought a bail review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused, A.K., on a $1,500 surety release with conditions, following a charge of uttering threats to cause death.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred by denying cross-examination of the proposed surety and that the release decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly given A.K.'s criminal record for violent offences and the reverse onus situation.

The reviewing judge found no error in denying cross-examination, affirming that leave is required and was not arbitrarily denied.

The judge also found the release decision not clearly inappropriate, but varied the security amount from $1,500 to $3,500 due to A.K.'s past violent convictions.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought to admit his protected statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for the truth of their contents to support a not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) defence.

He also challenged the constitutionality of section 672.21(3)(e) of the Criminal Code, arguing that its interpretation, which prohibits the literal admission of such statements for their truth, violates his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that common law evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule and confessions rule, apply to protected statements.

While preposterous statements are admissible as original evidence of mental state, and protected statements can be used to challenge the basis of an expert's opinion or for credibility if the accused testifies, they are not admissible for the truth of their contents in an NCRMD hearing without meeting specific common law exceptions.

The court found this interpretation consistent with parliamentary intent to balance truth-seeking and accused protection, and not in violation of Charter sections 7, 11(c), 11(d), or 12.

Malcolm Williams was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court determined the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the quantity of cocaine (28 grams), commercial motive, and public location, and mitigating factors including no prior criminal record, strong family support, and admission of facts.

The Crown sought 18 months, while the defence sought 9 months minus pre-trial credit.

The court imposed an 11-month sentence after applying a reduction for exceptional circumstances, including 15 months under restrictive house arrest.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and DNA order were also issued.