toxicology

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood following a single-vehicle accident on January 31, 2017.

The Crown established that the defendant was found in the driver's seat of a severely damaged vehicle that had travelled over 150 meters off the road.

The defendant's blood alcohol content was measured at 220 milligrams at 2:10 and 3:01 a.m., which toxicological evidence interpolated back to 220-260 milligrams at the time of the accident.

The court rejected Charter arguments regarding the right to counsel and found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a motor vehicle collision on March 5, 2016.

The defence brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights due to police failure to provide an interpreter to explain the defendant's rights to counsel, given the defendant's limited English proficiency.

The court conducted a blended Charter voir dire and trial.

The court found that while the defendant's first language was not English, there was insufficient objective evidence that the defendant failed to understand his rights to counsel or other information provided by police at the time of detention and arrest.

The court rejected the Charter breach argument and admitted the breath sample results.

The court found the defendant was the driver of the vehicle and convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle while impaired by drug following a RIDE spot check on May 11, 2014.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The court found that the accused displayed multiple indicia of impairment including poor balance, dilated pupils, slurred speech, confusion, unusual behavior, delayed responses, and signs of drowsiness.

Toxicological analysis revealed the presence of lorazepam and THC-COOH (the inactive metabolite of marijuana) in the accused's urine.

The accused admitted to smoking marijuana on the day of arrest and the day before.

A Drug Recognition Evaluation officer opined that the accused's ability to drive was impaired.

The court rejected the defence arguments that the Crown must prove a specific quantity of drugs in the accused's system at the time of driving, that tiredness must be negated as a cause of impairment, and that overwhelming signs of impairment are required.

The court found that the totality of the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by drug consumption.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a collision at a gas station.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment before and after arrest, breath sample analysis, and toxicological evidence.

The defendant raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, the demand for breath samples, interpretation services, and the right to counsel.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts after rejecting all Charter challenges and finding compelling evidence of impairment based on the totality of circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100ml following a collision with a stopped vehicle.

The Crown proved the impaired operation charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on extensive evidence of physical and mental impairment, including the circumstances of the collision, the accused's unsteady gait, disorientation, emotional instability, and extreme intoxication observed by police officers.

However, the Crown failed to prove the over 80 charge because the breath tests were conducted outside the two-hour statutory window, and the court declined to take judicial notice of toxicology calculations to bridge the gap.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The Crown charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while his ability to do so was impaired by drugs on March 31, 2015.

The defendant had consumed multiple prescription medications including OxyNEO, Oxycodone, Clonazepam, and Gabapentin.

An off-duty officer observed erratic driving and called for assistance.

At the roadside, officers observed symptoms consistent with drug impairment.

A Drug Recognition Evaluator conducted Standard Field Sobriety Tests and a Drug Recognition Evaluation at the police station.

A urinalysis detected narcotic analgesics and benzodiazepines.

The defendant argued Charter breaches regarding the timing of the demand for field sobriety tests and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) Charter rights but excluded no evidence under section 24(2).

The court convicted the defendant, finding that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by prescription drugs and that he possessed the requisite mens rea.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug on September 26, 2016 in Burlington.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug, specifically cannabis.

The accused testified that he was not impaired.

The court found the accused guilty based on a constellation of objectively discernible facts including speeding, poor performance on drug recognition evaluation tests, bloodshot eyes, droopy eyelids, confusion regarding time and date, and toxicological evidence of cannabis and other drugs in his system.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle accident.

The Crown's case was overwhelming except for one issue: whether the accused consumed the majority of the alcohol either shortly before driving or after the accident.

The toxicologist testified that assuming driving occurred at 3:45 p.m., the accused's BAC would have been between 350 and 405 milligrams.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the accused drove within two hours of the breath test.

The trial judge found that the issue of bolus drinking (consuming large amounts of alcohol shortly before driving) or post-accident drinking was a live issue on the record.

Given the presence of an open vodka bottle in the accused's purse, the amount of vodka missing from the bottle, the accused's attempt to prevent police from finding the bottle, and the minimal signs of impairment observed by officers at the scene, the trial judge concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had consumed 7.5 ounces or more of vodka at the relevant time.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and operate over 80 following an incident on November 3, 2013.

The Crown established that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that his blood alcohol concentration substantially exceeded the legal limit of 80 mg/100mL.

The defence conceded these facts but argued the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea, claiming he was disabled through no fault of his own from appreciating that he was impaired or that his BAC exceeded the legal limit due to an interaction between Tylenol 3 medication and alcohol.

The court rejected this defence, finding that the defendant's impairment resulted from voluntary consumption of alcohol and that he knew or ought to have known of the risks.

The court convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following observations by police officers on July 6, 2014.

The Crown proved impairment based on erratic driving conduct, physical symptoms observed at roadside, and evidence of alcohol consumption.

Although the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable, depriving the Crown of the statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity, the court found the Crown proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt through viva voce evidence and judicial notice of toxicological principles.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the excess blood alcohol count conditionally stayed as a single delict.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown established that the defendant's profound impairment was caused by drug consumption, not alcohol.

The defendant's breath samples showed no perceptible blood alcohol level.

A Drug Recognition Expert conducted a prescribed evaluation and concluded the defendant was impaired by a central nervous system depressant.

Toxicological analysis of a urine sample confirmed the presence of Lorazepam and Chlorpheniramine, both of which produce effects consistent with the observed impairment.

The court found the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's impairment was caused by drugs.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle motor vehicle collision on an icy road.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and the adequacy of the right to counsel consultation under section 10(b).

The court rejected all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the odour of alcohol, the accused's admission to drinking, the circumstances of the accident, and his apology for committing a DUI.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and incredible.

On the trial on the merits, the court convicted the accused on both counts based on expert toxicological evidence establishing a blood alcohol concentration over 80 at the time of driving, corroborated by observations of impairment and the accused's own admissions.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, following a rear-end collision in Toronto.

The Crown relied on breath test results and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence advanced Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the breath demand, the adequacy of the right to counsel advisement, and the reliability of the expert evidence.

The court found the breath demand lawful, admitted the breath test evidence despite a s. 10(b) breach, and convicted the defendant on both charges based on the expert evidence establishing impairment and excessive BAC at the time of driving.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown presented evidence from a civilian witness, a police constable, and a breath technician showing signs of impairment and breath readings of 190 and 180 milligrams.

The accused testified that he had consumed only two beers before driving and consumed a 13-ounce bottle of vodka after arriving at the Home Depot parking lot.

The court found credible evidence supporting the post-driving consumption of alcohol and, considering all evidence together, harboured a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol (over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood).

The Crown relied on expert toxicology evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, as the breath tests were taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and the statutory presumption of identity could not be applied.

The defence raised evidence of bolus drinking—specifically, that the accused consumed 1 to 2 ounces of Sambuca liqueur (38% alcohol) immediately before driving.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no large quantities of alcohol were consumed within 15 minutes of driving, creating a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit at the time of operation.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on two intoxilyzer breath tests showing readings of 161 and 166 milligrams percent.

The defence argued that the accused's moderate to severe gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), combined with consumption of a large meal and alcohol, could have caused regurgitated stomach alcohol to produce false high readings on the breath tests.

The court found that the defence evidence established a reasonable doubt regarding the proper functioning of the instrument and that the accused's blood alcohol concentration was likely below the legal limit at the time of the offence.

The accused was charged with alcohol-impaired care or control and care or control with excess blood alcohol following an incident on July 29, 2011.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings to establish the over 80 charge.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and whether the Crown could prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court found that while the police proceeded "as soon as practicable" in obtaining breath samples, the Crown failed to prove that the first sample was taken within two hours of the last observed care or control.

The court also found that the Crown proved the absence of bolus drinking based on circumstantial evidence.

The over 80 charge was dismissed due to the Crown's inability to establish the two-hour requirement for the presumption of identity.