Social media

The moving defendants brought motions under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike claims for disclosing no cause of action.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent and social media content creator, alleged that she was defamed by two other real estate agents through social media posts.

She sued the brokers of record, branch managers, and brokerages for negligence and vicarious liability.

The court found that the negligence and vicarious liability claims were viable and disclosed reasonable prospects of success.

However, the court struck the claims for punitive damages on a theory of vicarious liability, as punitive damages cannot flow vicariously to an employer.

Leave was granted to amend the pleading to better plead aggravated and punitive damages against the individual defendants.

A police inspector brought a defamation action against a law student for an X post commenting on allegations of discriminatory treatment of officers on mental health leave at the Thunder Bay Police Service.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion).

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the defendant established a valid defence of justification based on publicly available information from news articles and Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario proceedings.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression on matters of significant public concern outweighed any harm to the plaintiff's reputation.

The motion was granted and the defamation action was dismissed.

The appellants, operators of a long-term care home, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion).

The respondent had posted approximately 100 tweets over three years on anonymous accounts alleging elder abuse and serious wrongdoing at the facility.

The motion judge found the tweets related to a matter of public interest and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made reviewable errors in her section 137.1(4) analysis by failing to properly assess whether the defamation claim had merit and whether the appellants had suffered harm, and by assuming the respondent's expression had value without conducting the necessary preliminary analysis.

A defamation action brought by a not-for-profit housing corporation against a tenant who conducted an extensive social media campaign alleging fraud, conspiracy, and criminal conduct by the housing provider and its staff.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion), claiming the statements related to a matter of public interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while systemic issues relating to social housing could theoretically be matters of public interest, the defendant's expression was intended to manufacture concern about an issue lacking genuine public debate or notoriety.

The court found the expression was rooted in a private dispute and was a personal attack cloaked in the guise of public concern, intended to foster animosity toward the housing provider without regard for truth.

This case involved cross-claims for defamation between two former friends, Cassidy LeBlanc and Taylor Carvello-Crotty, arising from internet posts.

The court found both parties defamed each other, but most claims were dismissed due to expired limitation periods.

Taylor's counterclaim for defamation regarding Cassidy's TikTok posts and for public disclosure of private facts was successful.

The court awarded Taylor $30,000 in damages and issued mutual injunctions prohibiting further defamatory statements and ordering removal of existing defamatory posts.

This anti-SLAPP motion sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim by Iron Horse Corporation and Robin St. Martin in the "Yates Action" and a separate action (the "St. Martin Action") for malicious prosecution and defamation against Robin Yates and Larry Yates.

The court found that the Yates' expressions related to matters of public interest, including gendered harassment by a powerful individual and the functioning of the justice system.

While the defamation counterclaim in the Yates Action was found to have substantial merit and was not dismissed due to the ongoing litigation, the St. Martin Action was dismissed.

The court concluded that the St. Martin Action lacked substantial merit, particularly the malicious prosecution claims, and was primarily strategic, with the public interest favoring its dismissal.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change seeking sole decision-making and a week-about parenting schedule.

The respondent father sought sole decision-making, reduced parenting time for the mother, child support adjustments, a restraining order, and a declaration that the mother is a vexatious litigant.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's escalating confrontational behavior, failure to follow court orders, and inappropriate social media posts.

The court awarded sole decision-making to the father, reduced the mother's parenting time to every second weekend, imputed income to the mother for child support purposes, granted a restraining order, and declared the mother a vexatious litigant.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that the applicant was in contempt of court for breaching a prior order.

The order required the applicant to regularly update the respondent on their child's activities and to remove all references to the respondent from her social media accounts and abstain from further references.

The court dismissed the allegation regarding updates on the child's counselling and psychiatrist, finding insufficient evidence of deliberate breach.

However, the court found the applicant in contempt for failing to remove and continuing to post videos that indirectly referenced the respondent on social media, interpreting "reference" broadly to include content identifiable by those acquainted with the parties.

The applicant's credibility was found to be very poor.

A hearing for sanction and costs was scheduled.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte order against Facebook, Inc. that validated service and granted Norwich, take-down, and refraining relief regarding allegedly defamatory posts.

Facebook moved to set aside the order under Rule 37.14, arguing it was not properly served and the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure.

The court agreed, finding that service via Facebook's 'Report Post Portal' was invalid and the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a bona fide claim for defamation, copyright infringement, or cyberbullying.

The ex parte order was set aside, and the plaintiff's cross-motions for contempt and to examine Facebook's counsel were dismissed.

The plaintiff, a university instructor, brought a motion for default judgment in a defamation action against a former friend who posted false and malicious tweets accusing her of being a sexual predator.

The defendant did not defend the action.

The court found the tweets were highly defamatory, widely published, and motivated by malice.

The court awarded $75,000 in general and aggravated damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, and ordered a permanent injunction and a 60-day retraction on the defendant's Twitter account.

The plaintiffs brought two defamation actions against the defendants arising from tweets and emails that characterized the plaintiffs' own tweets as homophobic and transphobic.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expressions related to matters of public interest and that, while the defamation claim had some merit, the defendants had a valid defence of fair comment given the highly politicized and hyperbolic nature of Twitter.

The actions were dismissed as strategic litigation against public participation.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the defendant for breaching a permanent injunction prohibiting him from publishing defamatory statements about the plaintiff.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally published numerous defamatory posts on WeChat, breaching the clear order of which he had actual notice.

The court found the defendant guilty of civil contempt.

Although the plaintiff sought a 90-day jail term, the court declined to order incarceration, noting the defendant's change of heart and first-time offender status.

Instead, the court imposed a $35,000 fine, awarded full indemnity costs, ordered the deletion of the posts, required a public apology, and issued a further permanent injunction.

The respondent, having been wholly successful on the underlying application, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the applicant's unreasonable conduct and abusive social media posts.

The applicant, who was unrepresented, did not provide costs submissions.

The court found that while the applicant's conduct and use of foul language on social media could not be condoned, substantial indemnity costs were not warranted.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the all-inclusive amount of $27,466.60.

The plaintiffs, owners of a shoe restoration business, brought a motion for an interim injunction to compel the defendant, a former employee, to remove social media posts alleging that the plaintiffs were racist and had terminated her for supporting the Black Lives Matter movement.

The court applied the stringent test for injunctive relief in defamation actions, which requires the moving party to show that the words are clearly defamatory and that any defences of justification or fair comment will inevitably fail.

The court found that, based on the evidence presented, it would not be perverse for a trier of fact to find that the defences of justification or fair comment had been made out.

The motion for an interim injunction was dismissed.

The appellant, a corporation operating a Canadian Tire store, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge found that a Facebook post and media article by the respondents describing poor customer service at the store related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding factual error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for gang sexual assault to admit the expert testimony of an emergency room physician and a sexual assault nurse-examiner.

The proposed evidence concerned the effects of alcohol and drugs on the complainant's consciousness and capacity to consent, as well as the interpretation of her physical injuries.

The accused opposed the physician's evidence, arguing she lacked toxicological expertise and was biased due to her advocacy for sexual assault survivors.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant, necessary, and reliable, and held that the physician's social media posts did not demonstrate an inability to provide impartial evidence.

A 31-year-old mother pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessities of life to her 18-month-old son, contrary to section 215(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, resulting in the child's death by drowning in a bathtub.

The mother left the child unsupervised while engaged in an 11-minute Facebook conversation.

The Crown sought a 9-month jail sentence; the defence sought a 4-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed 90 days jail to be served intermittently on weekends, plus 24 months probation, finding that actual incarceration was necessary to meet the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the aggravating circumstances involving abuse of a child and the emerging issue of distracted parenting through social media.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2011 consent order to terminate or reduce spousal support and health benefits payable to the respondent mother, and sought a restraining order.

The father had lost his employment after changing jobs to escape the stress of the mother's relentless campaign of disparagement and parental alienation, which included contacting his employers and posting defamatory comments on social media.

The court found a material change in circumstances, declined to impute income to the father as his job change was reasonable, and reduced spousal support to $274 per month subject to a six-month review.

The court also granted a restraining order prohibiting the mother from posting disparaging comments about the father or his partner and from coming within 500 metres of his home or workplace.

The appellants (Fortress and its principals) appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their defamation and breach of contract claims against the respondent, Ben Rabidoux, under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge found that Rabidoux's tweets related to matters of public interest and that the appellants failed to demonstrate that the harm caused was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting freedom of expression.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the costs award on a full indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, upheld the full indemnity costs award, and varied the costs order only to add HST.

The applicants, a consortium of media organizations, sought to lift sealing orders and prevent a publication ban on judicial authorizations, including a search warrant, related to an investigation into Vice-Admiral Mark Norman for allegedly leaking cabinet confidential information.

Vice-Admiral Norman and the Crown argued for a publication ban to protect his fair trial rights, while interveners (Chantier Davie Canada Inc. and Federal Fleet Services Inc.) sought to maintain sealing orders for commercially sensitive pricing data.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found no serious risk to the proper administration of justice or fair trial rights from extensive publicity, noting that jurors are presumed capable of impartiality and that the alleged misconduct did not create an "unshakable stigma." The court also considered the impact of social media on the efficacy of publication bans.

The application to lift sealing orders and deny a publication ban was largely granted, with the exception of specific commercial pricing information from the interveners and uncontested redactions for cabinet confidentiality and third-party personal information.