Matthew Walwyn

The bankrupt, a former real estate developer, sought an absolute discharge from bankruptcy.

The discharge was opposed by the Trustee, the Canada Revenue Agency, and several creditors, who argued that the bankrupt's assets were less than 50 cents on the dollar for reasons he could be held responsible for, and that he failed to perform his duties under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that the bankrupt had engaged in an asset protection strategy, incurred significant personal liabilities without the means to pay them, and failed to disclose his true post-bankruptcy lifestyle and use of a corporate credit card.

The court declined to refuse the discharge entirely but imposed a substantial conditional order requiring the bankrupt to pay $960,000 and fulfill various outstanding duties.

In an oppression application, the applicant sought the production of corporate books and records to prove financial irregularities that allegedly led to his termination as Chief Operating Officer.

At a case conference, the respondents objected that the applicant had not yet served an affidavit.

The court ordered the applicant to serve a preliminary affidavit and a detailed request for production, and scheduled a further case conference to resolve the production issue, noting that case conference judges have the power to make orders to prevent unnecessary delays.

The defendants sought costs of $41,082.45 on a full indemnity basis after successfully dismissing the plaintiffs' defamation action as a SLAPP suit.

The plaintiffs agreed the amount was reasonable but argued it should be reduced by approximately $14,000, which the defendants allegedly raised through a GoFundMe campaign, citing the principle of indemnity.

The court rejected this argument, holding that costs inquiries are restricted to examining the lawyer's bill, not the successful party's means of payment.

The court awarded the defendants $41,000 in costs.

The plaintiffs brought two defamation actions against the defendants arising from tweets and emails that characterized the plaintiffs' own tweets as homophobic and transphobic.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expressions related to matters of public interest and that, while the defamation claim had some merit, the defendants had a valid defence of fair comment given the highly politicized and hyperbolic nature of Twitter.

The actions were dismissed as strategic litigation against public participation.