Sexual assault

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against a child arising from online communications, inducement to travel to another city under false pretences, and subsequent sexual assaults, and also sought leave to appeal a seven-year global sentence.

The court rejected arguments alleging misapprehension of evidence, improper application of W.(D.), unresolved inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and unfairness arising from the lengthy delay between verdict and reasons.

Applying the presumption of integrity for delayed reasons, the court held that the appellant had not displaced the presumption or shown after-the-fact reasoning.

The court also held the sentence was fit, emphasizing the seriousness of sexual offences against children and the aggravating circumstances of grooming, vulnerability, isolation, and forced intercourse.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and in applying delayed reporting principles to physical assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent after an initial refusal, and made no error in assessing the complainant's credibility regarding her delayed reporting.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge engaged in prohibited propensity reasoning.

The trial judge had used the appellant's admitted infidelity to infer that he would disregard the complainant's rule requiring condom use during intercourse.

The Court of Appeal agreed this was prohibited propensity reasoning and noted the appellant had no notice that his infidelity would be used for this purpose, rendering the trial procedurally unfair.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university adjudicator's decision regarding her sexual assault complaint against another student.

The adjudicator had deferred the outcome of the university's disciplinary appeal to the result of the respondent's pending criminal trial.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the adjudicator unlawfully delegated his decision-making authority and improperly imported the criminal standard of proof into an administrative proceeding.

The decision was quashed and remitted to a different adjudicator.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision overturning the transfer of an employee who had previously been disciplined for assaulting a co-worker.

The hospital argued the transfer was an administrative decision to protect the complainant under the Occupational Health & Safety Act.

The arbitrator found the transfer constituted a second penalty for the same offence, violating the principle of double jeopardy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's decision was reasonable and properly balanced the competing values of workplace safety and protection against double jeopardy.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated a dangerous offender following convictions for multiple offences, including sexual assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment against an intimate partner.

The court found that the respondent's history of escalating domestic violence established a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing severe injury or psychological damage in the future.

The court concluded that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, designated the respondent a dangerous offender, and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a preliminary inquiry justice's decision to commit the accused to trial for assault simpliciter rather than the charged offence of sexual assault.

The preliminary inquiry justice had found that the brief struggle in an apartment vestibule lacked any sexual contact, language, or motive, and that inferring a sexual purpose was mere conjecture.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry justice committed no jurisdictional error in concluding the evidence did not reasonably support an inference of sexual assault.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, facing a retrial for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude voice identification evidence.

The police intended to use a video-recorded interview from a separate investigation to identify the accused's voice on a sex tape.

The accused argued his s. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights were violated during the interview because the police delayed identifying the complainant, constituting a change in jeopardy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no Charter breaches, as the accused generally understood his jeopardy and the police tactic of gradually revealing evidence did not trigger a right to further consultation with counsel.

The offender pleaded guilty to historical offences of break and enter and sexual assault with a weapon committed in 1998, after being linked by DNA evidence in 2013.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of four years, characterizing the offence as a home invasion, while the defence sought a non-custodial or conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's significant Gladue factors, his extensive rehabilitation efforts over the past five years, and the profound impact on the victim.

The court distinguished the case from typical home invasions and sentenced the offender to two years less a day in custody followed by three years of probation.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an interaction with the complainant after a church service.

The complainant alleged the accused attacked her, choked her, and sexually assaulted her outside the church.

The accused testified that the interaction was consensual and related to faith healing, denying any sexual contact.

The court applied the W.(D.) test for credibility and found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including contradictions with video surveillance and prior testimony.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the respondent, an Indigenous man convicted of sexual assault.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record involving 18 violent offences over nearly 30 years.

The court considered Gladue factors but found the respondent's severe childhood trauma did not mitigate the high risk of future violent and sexual re-offending.

The court declared the respondent a dangerous offender based on a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that lesser measures would not adequately protect the public.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident at a house party.

The complainant consumed a significant amount of alcohol and marijuana, becoming highly intoxicated, and fell asleep in the master bedroom.

The accused allegedly had non-consensual intercourse with her while she was asleep or unconscious.

The accused claimed the intercourse was consensual and occurred later in his van.

The court found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to severe intoxication and that the accused sexually assaulted her in the bedroom.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a complainant from a church community who said the accused used asserted spiritual authority to groom and sexually touch her.

The court ordered an acquittal on one count because the Crown failed to prove the complainant's age during the material period.

On the remaining count, the court found significant inconsistencies, implausibilities, and reliability problems in the complainant's evidence, her mother's evidence, and evidence concerning related meetings and surrounding events.

The court also accepted employment evidence undermining the accused's opportunity to commit the alleged repeated assaults.

The Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and acquittals were entered.

The accused was tried for one count of sexual assault.

The complainant alleged that the accused, an old friend, sexually assaulted her in her apartment.

The accused testified and categorically denied any sexual contact, stating he left after the complainant became emotional.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the accused's testimony straightforward and credible, concluding his exculpatory explanation could reasonably be true.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for compensation following an alleged sexual assault.

The Board had rejected the appellant's direct evidence and the expert evidence of two sexual assault nurses, relying instead on hearsay evidence from a police officer who concluded the acts were consensual.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing, finding that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the Board's decision was unreasonable, as it relied heavily on flawed hearsay evidence while failing to explain its rejection of the appellant's and the medical experts' evidence.

The appellant appealed a Master's order refusing to set aside the administrative dismissal of her action for damages for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that because her claim involved sexual assault and was not subject to a limitation period, the Master erred by not applying a more lenient test for setting aside the dismissal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly considered the nature of the claim as a contextual factor but properly concluded that the appellant's failure to move the action forward was unrelated to the nature of the assault, and that the respondents were entitled to expect compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dismissing her claim for compensation for alleged criminal acts by her former boyfriend.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law and discriminated against her based on her mental disability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board made no errors of law and its factual findings regarding the lack of intent for assault and the unreliability of the sexual assault allegations were supported by the evidence.

The Court held the Board properly distinguished between credibility and reliability, and appropriately considered the appellant's mental illness as a factor affecting her ability to accurately perceive and recall events at the time.

The Crown appealed acquittals on multiple sexual offence counts involving two young complainants in a judge-alone trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the Crown's purpose in seeking to rely on the evidence on each count as similar fact evidence across the indictment, wrongly characterizing the purpose as an attack on credibility rather than proof of a pattern refuting coincidence and confirming the complainants' accounts.

The court further held that, in a non-jury multi-count trial where the evidence was already before the court, reasoning prejudice and moral prejudice carried little weight.

The proposed similar fact evidence was highly probative and should have been admitted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from repeated sexual touching and two specific incidents involving a child complainant who was a friend of the appellant's daughter.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the verdicts, alleging physical impossibility, logical inconsistencies in the complainant’s account, and improper treatment of defence expert evidence concerning erectile dysfunction.

Applying the unreasonable verdict standard, the court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings were open on the record and that the identified flaws did not undermine the overall reasonableness of the convictions.

Although one reference to the expert evidence was erroneous, it did not affect the result.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence after pleading guilty to robbery, kidnapping, sexual assault and arson committed while a youth, following transfer of the charges to adult court under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court reviewed arguments that the sentence was harsh and excessive, that mitigating factors and rehabilitation were undervalued, and that consecutive sentences and pre-sentence custody credit were wrongly imposed.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge carefully considered the offence circumstances, the offender's circumstances, and the applicable sentencing principles.

Although the sentence was at the high end for a youthful offender, it remained within range and was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.