Alexandra Cardella

The accused was charged with being a party to sexual assault, sexual interference, and procuring a person under 18 for sexual activity.

The Crown alleged that the accused allowed two masked men to sexually assault her 10-year-old daughter in exchange for cigarettes and cash.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the conflicting testimony of the accused and the child complainant.

The court found the child's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the accused's denials.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference.

Prior to sentencing, defence counsel brought an application to re-open the trial to make further legal argument regarding a close-in-age exception under section 150.1 of the Criminal Code.

The application was based on the defendant's statement to police indicating he believed the complainant to be 15 years old.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the circumstances were not exceptional and that the argument could have been made at trial.

The court also found that even if the application had been granted, there would be no air of reality to the mistake-in-age defence.

The appellant appealed the 45-day impoundment of her motor vehicle under section 50.2 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The vehicle was impounded after being driven by an individual subject to an ignition interlock device condition, while the vehicle was not equipped with one.

The appellant argued the vehicle was stolen and that the impoundment would cause exceptional hardship.

The Tribunal found the appellant failed to prove the vehicle was stolen, as she had relinquished oversight to her daughter and could not establish the driver's intent.

The Tribunal also found no exceptional hardship, as the appellant and her daughter had alternative transportation options available.

The impoundment was confirmed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university adjudicator's decision regarding her sexual assault complaint against another student.

The adjudicator had deferred the outcome of the university's disciplinary appeal to the result of the respondent's pending criminal trial.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the adjudicator unlawfully delegated his decision-making authority and improperly imported the criminal standard of proof into an administrative proceeding.

The decision was quashed and remitted to a different adjudicator.