D. Scott

The plaintiff sought a declaration that she suffered a catastrophic impairment following a 2013 motor vehicle accident, entitling her to enhanced statutory accident benefits.

The defendant insurer argued her impairment stemmed from pre-existing mental health and addiction issues.

The court applied the 'but for' test for causation, finding that despite her pre-existing vulnerabilities, the accident triggered a conversion disorder that catastrophically impaired her functioning.

The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to attendant care benefits even if she had not actually paid for them out of pocket, as requiring an insured to finance their own care would defeat the remedial purpose of the legislation.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial to avoid administrative dismissal under Rule 48.14.

The motion was adjourned to proceed as a status hearing.

However, before the dismissal deadline, the plaintiff filed a trial record and abandoned her motion.

The defendant argued this was an abuse of process and sought to proceed with the status hearing.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to file the trial record before the deadline, pre-empting the status hearing.

However, because the action was not actually ready for trial, the court struck it from the trial list to allow the defendant to complete discoveries.

The accused was tried for one count of sexual assault.

The complainant alleged that the accused, an old friend, sexually assaulted her in her apartment.

The accused testified and categorically denied any sexual contact, stating he left after the complainant became emotional.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the accused's testimony straightforward and credible, concluding his exculpatory explanation could reasonably be true.

The accused was acquitted.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, the court assessed the costs payable to the successful defendants on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had settled costs with the Accountant Defendants for $550,000.

The court reviewed the bills of costs submitted by the Lawyer Defendants, the Katz Defendants, and the Leikin Group Inc. The court made several reductions to the amounts claimed, noting issues with top-heavy staffing, excessive time spent on documentary discovery, and duplication of effort.

The court ultimately awarded substantial indemnity costs totaling $2,340,485.75 across the three remaining sets of defendants.

The accused was charged with sexual touching of a young person while in a position of trust contrary to s. 153(a) of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, aged 16, and the accused, aged 40, admitted they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on one occasion.

The central issue was whether the accused occupied a position of trust toward the complainant through their involvement in the horse-riding community.

Applying the principles in R. v. Audet, the court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised authority, control, or a mentorship relationship giving rise to a position of trust.

The evidence showed a friendship without coercion, grooming, or ongoing control, and the complainant did not view the accused as having power over her.

The accused was acquitted.

The plaintiffs, selling shareholders in a family-owned group of companies, brought an action against the non-selling shareholders, the companies' lawyers, and accountants.

They alleged breach of fiduciary duty, oppression, and knowing assistance arising from a share redemption transaction.

The plaintiffs claimed the defendants failed to disclose material information regarding the potential sale of a core asset to a third party at a higher value.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the share redemption was a product of self-interested negotiations where both sides had independent advice.

No ad hoc fiduciary duty was owed by the non-selling shareholders, lawyers, or accountants to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' expectations were not reasonable under the oppression remedy.