Sexual assault

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The convictions were based on the testimony of a single complainant regarding historical sexual activities.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the criminal standard of proof, noting her inadequate treatment of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and her problematic formulation of her ultimate conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a social worker, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault involving two former patients.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that consent was vitiated by an abuse of trust, that the trial judge's interventions compromised trial fairness, and that improper use was made of a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence and that the trial was fair.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting three complainants and administering a stupefying drug to one of them.

The complainants alleged they felt ill after drinking wine provided by the appellant.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence that GHB was found in one of the wine bottles.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence showing that GHB occurs naturally in all red wine, including the specific brand and vintage seized.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably be expected to have affected the jury's assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, obstruct justice, assault with a weapon, and assault, as well as his sentence of four years and four months.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on prior consistent statements and by improperly applying Gladue principles during sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice regarding the prior statements.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of granting credit for 34 days of pre-sentence custody, varying the sentence on one count to one month consecutive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the Crown's closing remarks to the jury resulted in an unfair trial.

The appellant contended that the Crown inappropriately invited the jury to put themselves in the position of a victim, commented on the complainant's demeanour, and offered unproven facts regarding the complainant's mother's feelings of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that while some of the Crown's comments were inappropriate and best left unsaid, the trial judge's balanced and fair charge to the jury was sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of domestic abuse against his wife, including assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to warn the jury against propensity reasoning regarding the multiple counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence on each count was admissible context for the others and that a limiting instruction would have required explaining the proper uses of the evidence, which would have operated against the appellant's interest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the global sentence was fit given the aggravating domestic context.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and sexual assault-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly balanced the risk of prejudice against the public interest in a single trial, as the evidence for both sets of charges was inextricably intertwined and demonstrated a similar modus operandi.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year global sentence due to the cruelty and torture involved in the offences.

The young person appealed findings of guilt on two counts of sexual assault involving two child complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, considering collusion, and applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge adequately scrutinized the evidence and properly rejected collusion.

Although the trial judge erred at the second step of the W.(D.) analysis by asking if the appellant's evidence 'could not reasonably be true', the Court applied the curative proviso, concluding the Crown's case was overwhelming and the rejected evidence could not have left a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the Crown improperly split its case by cross-examining him on a segment of his police statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial did not object to the cross-examination, did not object to the jury instructions, and specifically declined the trial judge's offer of a mistrial.

The court found no basis to conclude the trial was unfair.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly grappled with the central issue of the complainant's lack of consent and reasonably accepted expert evidence regarding forced sexual intercourse.

The court concluded the reasons were sufficient and the verdict was supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his 30-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in her credibility findings and failed to consider a conditional sentence on compassionate grounds due to his poor health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principles and conducted a fair assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's medical needs could be adequately managed in custody.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a sexual assault conviction where the Crown had proceeded by indictment.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence was illegal under section 742.1 of the Criminal Code and set it aside.

However, given the respondent's positive rehabilitative steps, time spent on bail, and time served under house arrest, the Court substituted a sentence of time served.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that designated the respondent as a long-term offender rather than a dangerous offender.

The respondent had a serious criminal record for sexually-motivated offences and was diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD).

The sentencing judge accepted defence expert evidence that the respondent's FASD symptoms could be treated, allowing him to participate in sex offender programs and reducing his risk of re-offending to an acceptable level in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's preference for the defence expert's evidence or her exercise of discretion.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on two counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge had found that sexual intercourse occurred but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was without consent, basing this conclusion largely on isolated passages from a poem written by the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the poem as a whole and in the context of the complainant's sworn testimony denying consent.

The Crown met its burden of showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same but for the error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, an ordained minister, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his four-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately correct the Crown's misstatement that a relationship of trust alone vitiates consent under s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions as a whole correctly required proof of an abuse of the position of trust.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, the four-year sentence remained fit given the serious breach of trust against a vulnerable complainant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The offences involved the severe beating and sexual assault of his former common-law partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court upheld the finding that the appellant, a diagnosed psychopath with a history of domestic abuse, posed a substantial risk of reoffending that could not be reasonably controlled in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, sexual assault, and criminal harassment of his former partner, as well as his 54-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to admit evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant, by allowing evidence of his prior discreditable conduct to show motive, and by failing to leave the defence of mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the procedural requirements for admitting prior sexual history, properly instructed the jury on the highly probative discreditable conduct evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering and committing sexual assault, arguing his guilty plea was not voluntary and informed due to the incompetence of his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's conduct throughout the multi-day trial, including his failure to object to the facts read-in and his own testimony, belied his claim that he did not intend to plead guilty to the offence as charged.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainants' credibility regarding consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony about her lack of consent and concluding that the trial judge did not engage in impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography, sexual interference, and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the destruction of a videotaped interview prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek a stay, failing to request counselling records, and failing to advance a fabrication defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the lost videotape, no merit to the ineffective assistance claims, and no error in the trial judge's consideration of evidence or the sentence imposed.