Sexual assault

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that improper cross-examination, erroneous jury instructions regarding his criminal record, and limitations on cross-examining a Crown witness undermined his credibility and rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged several errors by the trial judge and Crown counsel, including improper suggestions during cross-examination and incorrect instructions on the use of the appellant's criminal record.

However, the Court concluded that these errors did not affect the fairness of the trial or cause a miscarriage of justice, given the overwhelming Crown case and the appellant's incredible testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was fit given the severe trauma caused by the assault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence, failed to recognize inconsistencies, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and concluding that the reasons were careful, thorough, and satisfied the requirements in R. v. Shepherd.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons suggested a credibility contest, misstated the standard of proof, and misapprehended key evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not adhere to model jury instructions and made a factual error regarding a cell phone, the instructions as a whole made it clear how the jury could use the prior inconsistent statements to assess credibility, and the error was not prejudicial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the events as described by the complainant were mechanically impossible and could not have occurred without her waking up earlier.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant's version of events was not implausible, especially given that she had been drinking before falling asleep.

The court concluded that the trial judge's finding of sexual assault was not unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault against his wife.

During deliberations, the jury asked to review the testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge permitted the jury to watch an unofficial video recording of the trial proceedings in the jury room without counsel present and without controlling which portions were viewed.

The Court of Appeal held this was a fatal error, as responses to jury questions must occur in open court to ensure the accused's right to be present and the judge's control over the proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. principles and adequately explain the reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and had ample evidence to convict.

The Crown appealed the sentence, and while the Court agreed the sentence constituted an error in principle, it declined to set it aside as the sentence had already been fully served.

Both the appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued the unlawful confinement verdict was inconsistent with a co-accused's acquittal and unreasonable, and maintained his innocence regarding the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supported by the evidence and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on potential collusion between the complainant and her son, and on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and noting the lack of objection at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered and rejected a long-term offender designation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an incident with his former fiancée.

At trial, the complainant's family doctor testified for the defence that she examined the complainant shortly after the incident and did not observe any injuries to her breasts, contradicting the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, concluding the doctor must have missed the injury.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's testimony regarding the medical examination and failed to properly weigh it against the doctor's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife and appealed his conviction.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior discreditable conduct with his wife and similar fact evidence from his former common law wife.

The Court of Appeal held the prior discreditable conduct was admissible to provide context, show motive, and explain the complainant's delay in reporting.

While the trial judge erred in the basis for admitting the similar fact evidence, the Court applied the Handy framework and found the evidence was properly admissible as its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and sexual assault on several grounds, including inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, flawed pre-trial identification, an alibi that he was out of the country, discrepancies regarding his physical appearance, and the trial judge's reliance on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly addressed the evidentiary issues and that any minor errors did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, an aboriginal offender, appealed his 9-year sentence for a brutal and planned sexual assault involving a home invasion and stabbing.

He argued the trial judge failed to give due consideration to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the trial judge properly applied Gladue principles and found that for such a violent and serious offence, the sentence for an aboriginal offender would be similar to that of a non-aboriginal offender.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a minor complainant, arguing the trial judge failed to properly assess the complainant's evidence and ignored contradictory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inconsistencies in the evidence were not so significant as to require specific mention by the trial judge, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting a young foster child in his care and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to credibility issues with the complainant, and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the jury's assessment of credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle by declining a conditional sentence and imposing incarceration.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

After discharging his counsel, he sought a physical copy of the complainant's videotaped statement.

The Crown refused to provide the physical tape but offered supervised viewing at the Crown's office.

The accused was convicted at trial.

On appeal, the summary conviction appeal court granted a stay of proceedings, finding the Crown's restriction on access unjustified.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused in sensitive cases are satisfied by providing supervised access to the videotape.

The conviction was restored and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The plaintiff brought an action against a priest and a diocese for sexual assault.

The parties settled the main action, but a third party action continued regarding insurance coverage.

The trial judge found that the appellant insurer had a duty to defend the claims under its policy.

The insurer appealed, arguing the policy did not cover sexual assaults by an employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the policy language broad enough to cover the claims.

On cross-appeal, the Court upheld the trial judge's allocation of defence costs among the insurers but allowed the cross-appeal regarding costs of the third party proceedings, holding that the insureds were entitled to costs on a solicitor-and-client basis due to the insurer's wrongful denial of the duty to defend.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault against his 13-year-old sister-in-law and sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering his youth record for sexual assault, contrary to s. 45 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed this was an error in principle.

However, upon reassessing the sentence, the Court found that actual imprisonment remained the most appropriate disposition given the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young offender appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and sexual assault and was sentenced to time served plus 16 months secure custody and 8 months open custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive and failed to account for his difficult upbringing, pre-trial custody, and progress in rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence at the upper end of the range but appropriate, and noted that the appellant's progress would be better assessed during a Youth Court sentence review.