Publication ban

The appellant was convicted of 33 counts of voyeurism based on video recordings found on a USB device seized from a safe in his condominium.

He appealed, challenging the validity of the warrant authorizing the search of the safes.

The application judge had found that the information to obtain disclosed sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuing justice's conclusion that a digital storage device would be found in the safes and would afford evidence of the offences under investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge made no extricable legal error, as his findings were rooted in the evidence and reflected permissible common-sense reasoning rather than speculation or impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The accused applied for the production of private records relating to the complainant, specifically data extracted from the complainant's phone.

Following a Stage One order where the records were produced to the court for review, the court conducted a Stage Two analysis to determine if production to the defence was necessary in the interests of justice.

Balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy rights, the court ordered some records produced, some produced with redactions, and others withheld.

The defendants, a children's aid society and its employees, moved to strike the self-represented plaintiffs' claims arising from a child protection investigation.

The court struck the parents' claims for intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and Charter damages with leave to amend, finding the pleadings lacked necessary material facts.

The negligence claims were struck without leave to amend because a children's aid society does not owe a duty of care to parents.

The court also granted a sealing order to protect the privacy interests of the children involved.

The Crown applied on behalf of the complainant to revoke a publication ban issued under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court noted recent amendments to s. 486.51 intended to respect complainant autonomy.

Finding that the ban's purpose is to protect the complainant, not the accused, and that the accused had notice but did not seek their own ban, the court granted the application and revoked the publication ban.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to produce unredacted copies of the plaintiff's hospital records relating to a recent psychotic episode.

The plaintiffs had redacted portions containing false, delusional allegations of criminal conduct against third parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the redacted information was irrelevant to the personal injury claim and its disclosure would cause significant harm to the plaintiff and innocent third parties.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for a sealing order and anonymization was adjourned to allow compliance with the Practice Direction regarding notice to the media for discretionary publication bans, with an interim publication ban granted.

The defendant in a defamation action brought a motion for the production and preservation of documents from non-parties, as well as a sealing order and publication ban regarding the identities and medical information of two non-party insured individuals.

The court granted the unopposed production orders.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the sealing order and publication ban for one insured whose identity remained anonymous, but dismissed the request for the other insured whose identity was already public and where the scope of the requested health information ban was too vague.

The defence applied for a publication ban on the accused's video-recorded statement to the police and a sealing order for information found on electronic devices seized during a search warrant execution.

The media opposed both orders.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and found that the defence failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice that necessitated a publication ban or sealing order.

The court emphasized the presumption of open court proceedings and the importance of freedom of the press.

Both applications were dismissed, with a temporary extension granted to allow for potential appeals.

The respondent mother brought a motion for a publication ban in a family law appeal concerning the vaccination of the parties' children.

The mother sought an interim publication ban and sealing order pending the hearing of the motion.

The court found that the mother had not provided proper notice to the media under the Practice Direction because she used initials instead of the parties' names.

The court granted an interim publication ban to preserve the mother's ability to argue for the children's privacy interests at the full hearing, and directed her to provide proper notice to the media using the parties' names.

The Crown brought an application seeking a finding of civil contempt against the CBC and Post Media for allegedly breaching publication bans issued in a criminal proceeding.

The media outlets had published articles about related family court proceedings which the Crown argued, when read with prior reporting, could identify the victims (the 'mosaic effect').

The Superior Court found it had inherent jurisdiction to hear the application and that proceeding by application was appropriate.

However, the court dismissed the contempt application, finding that the publication ban was not sufficiently clear due to a confusing warning issued in the family court proceedings.

The court also declined to grant declaratory relief, finding it would have no practical utility.

Following motions regarding child access, contempt, and a publication ban, both parties sought costs.

The father had brought a motion to change access after being criminally charged, and a contempt motion which he later withdrew.

The mother had sought a publication ban and severely restricted access.

The court found divided success, noting the father's contempt motion was inappropriate and the mother's position on access was unreasonable.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

During a jury trial for sexual offences, the Crown sought an order permitting the complainant to testify outside the courtroom using a screen or CCTV pursuant to s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, who had recently turned 18, stated she felt uncomfortable testifying in the presence of the accused and defence counsel and believed remote testimony would allow her to speak more freely.

The court assessed whether the requested accommodation would facilitate a full and candid account while ensuring fairness to the accused and avoiding prejudice before the jury.

The judge concluded the complainant’s fears were not well-founded but determined that use of a screen in the courtroom would balance privacy interests and trial fairness.

The complainant was permitted to testify using a screen, accompanied by jury instructions that the procedure was not indicative of guilt.

Media organizations sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge’s order imposing a partial publication ban and denying access to a video exhibit tendered during a guilty plea for obstruction of justice arising from a detention-centre death.

The applicants argued that the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction and that the order failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The Superior Court held that the judge presiding over the guilty plea had jurisdiction to consider and grant a publication ban related to the proceeding before him.

The court found that the partial ban appropriately balanced open court principles with the fair trial rights of co‑accused facing related charges.

The court concluded that the order was necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice and that no error of law appeared on the face of the record.

During an ongoing criminal terrorism trial, a media organization requested access to an audio exhibit consisting of recorded conversations between the accused and an undercover police officer obtained under a consent wiretap authorization.

The court had previously issued a non-publication order protecting the identity of the undercover officer to preserve his ability to continue working undercover.

The court held that the order extended to the officer’s voice because broadcasting it could reveal his identity.

The media organization was permitted to obtain a copy of the audio recording subject to signing an undertaking and complying with the prohibition on broadcasting or transmitting the officer’s voice.

Media organizations brought a motion seeking access to the transcript and materials from an in camera child protection apprehension hearing after an order excluded the media due to urgent circumstances involving missing children.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governing limits on the open court principle and freedom of the press.

While recognizing the strong presumption of openness, the court held that protection of vulnerable children and the administration of justice justified continued limits where some children remained missing.

However, once several children were safely in the care of the child welfare authority, the continued blanket restriction was no longer necessary.

The court ordered that a redacted transcript be made available to the media, removing identifying information and information relating to children still missing.

The Crown brought a combined application under ss. 486.1, 486.2, and 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a prosecution for alleged sexual offences against a minor.

The Crown sought to permit the complainant to testify by videolink and to introduce the complainant’s videotaped police statement as evidence in chief.

The court permitted testimony by videolink but required cross‑examination to occur from the courtroom rather than in the witness room to avoid intimidation and logistical concerns.

The court dismissed the Crown’s application under s. 715.1, finding that the videotaped statement—recorded approximately three and a half years after the first alleged offence—was not made within a reasonable time.

The court held that the Crown bears the burden on a balance of probabilities to establish the timing requirement under s. 715.1.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought a publication ban under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code to prevent publication of information identifying the deceased victim, primarily to shield an elderly relative from learning distressing details of the death through media reporting.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governs discretionary publication bans even when sought under a statutory provision.

The Crown failed to establish that the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or that a significant public interest justified limiting openness.

The concern raised was characterized as a private interest unsupported by medical evidence demonstrating likely harm.

The interim publication ban was therefore set aside.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of second degree murder and awaiting a further murder trial, sought a publication ban on evidence and credibility findings arising from an earlier application under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code for access to seized funds to pay legal fees.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant a ban and applied the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test balancing freedom of expression against the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The court concluded that publication of the applicant’s admissions of criminal activity and the court’s adverse credibility findings posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice in the upcoming jury trial.

A temporary ban was therefore necessary and proportionate.

The court ordered a time‑limited publication ban on the evidence, the fact of the application, and the earlier decision until completion of the pending murder trial.

Media organizations applied for access to and the ability to publish the contents of an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant in a major police investigation.

The Provincial Crown and an accused sought a publication ban on references to non-consensual intercepted private communications, arguing protection of the wiretap regime and fair trial rights.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that generalized concerns about the wiretap regime and speculative risks to a future jury trial were insufficient to justify restricting openness.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of open courts and the public interest in scrutiny of judicial authorizations and police investigations.

Balancing the competing interests, the court concluded that the salutary effects of a publication ban did not outweigh the significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public accountability.

The accused was charged with sexual assault arising from alleged non‑consensual intercourse with a 17‑year‑old complainant whom he met online and who travelled to Toronto to meet him.

The Crown alleged the complainant awoke to the accused having intercourse with her without a condom and without consent.

The defence maintained the intercourse was consensual following earlier consensual sexual activity.

The court found the complainant to be an unreliable witness due to multiple admitted falsehoods and omissions in her police statement and inconsistencies regarding the events leading to the intercourse.

The accused’s videotaped statement raised a reasonable doubt regarding consent, and the Crown failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.