Lynda Templeton

Parents appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order enforcing a Quebec youth protection order requiring their children to be returned to Quebec after the families relocated to Ontario.

The lower court had relied on the Children’s Law Reform Act to recognize and enforce the Quebec order.

The Superior Court held that a children’s aid society is not a “person” with standing to seek enforcement under the CLRA in this context and that the Act’s enforcement provisions were designed for private custody disputes, not state child protection proceedings.

The court further found that certain parents had not received proper notice of the Quebec proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and the enforcement order requiring the children’s return to Quebec was set aside, with the matter remitted for Ontario child protection proceedings under the Child and Family Services Act.

Media organizations brought a motion seeking access to the transcript and materials from an in camera child protection apprehension hearing after an order excluded the media due to urgent circumstances involving missing children.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governing limits on the open court principle and freedom of the press.

While recognizing the strong presumption of openness, the court held that protection of vulnerable children and the administration of justice justified continued limits where some children remained missing.

However, once several children were safely in the care of the child welfare authority, the continued blanket restriction was no longer necessary.

The court ordered that a redacted transcript be made available to the media, removing identifying information and information relating to children still missing.

In a contentious family proceeding concerning a child born in 2010, the court determined the payor parent's income for child support purposes where the payor resided and earned income in the United States.

Applying s. 20 of the Child Support Guidelines, the court calculated annual income using U.S. wage statements, rental income, allowable deductions, and an average annual exchange rate to convert U.S. earnings to Canadian dollars.

Retroactive child support was ordered to the date the claim was made, with arrears payable over time.

The court also determined the parties’ respective proportional contributions to section 7 childcare expenses after accounting for tax deductions and benefits.

Motions for contempt and for security for costs were dismissed.

The Crown appealed acquittals for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

The trial judge had rejected the accused’s testimony but nonetheless acquitted on the basis that the accused had the opportunity to consume alcohol after driving and before arrest.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge failed to properly consider the statutory presumptions under s. 258(1)(c) and the evidentiary requirements of s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, as well as the governing principles in St‑Onge Lamoureux.

The court found this omission constituted an error of law and that the reasons were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The acquittal on the “over .08” charge was set aside and a new trial ordered, while the acquittal for impaired driving was upheld.

The appellant appealed a 14‑day custodial sentence imposed following a conviction for impaired driving.

The appellate court held that the sentencing judge committed several errors in principle, including failing to properly consider the sentencing principles of proportionality and parity under ss. 718.1 and 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code, rejecting comparable case law without analysis, relying on statistical data independently obtained without notice to counsel, and improperly criticizing the offender for obtaining employment prior to sentencing when denying an intermittent sentence.

These errors undermined the fairness and reliability of the sentencing process.

The custodial sentence was set aside and replaced with a fine, probation with conditions, and a driving prohibition.

In an interim family law motion following a recent separation, the court addressed parenting arrangements for a young child where the parties were engaged in escalating litigation and had not yet established effective communication.

The court found that both parents had been actively involved in the child’s life but were unable to cooperate sufficiently to implement joint custody immediately.

To prevent marginalization of either parent and promote stability for the child, the court ordered a shared parenting regime with divided decision-making authority.

The mother was granted responsibility for medical and educational decisions, while the father was given responsibility for extracurricular activities.

The order also set out a detailed parenting schedule, holiday arrangements, child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, and proportional sharing of section 7 expenses.

Following a motion to change a final order relating to child support, the court addressed issues concerning compliance with an earlier endorsement and the proper calculation and payment of support under the Child Support Guidelines.

The court found the respondent had failed to fully comply with the ordered child support payments for July and August 2012 and clarified that court orders must be followed strictly unless expressly modified.

The court set ongoing child support based on the respondent’s income, required documentary proof of the child’s school attendance and section 7 expenses, and ordered payment of outstanding arrears and expenses.

Despite partial success by both parties, the court declined to award costs, finding the litigation driven by mistrust and animosity rather than complex issues.

Following a family law motion, the court was asked to determine entitlement to costs.

After reviewing the claims, the order granted, the parties’ submissions, and the respondent’s offer to settle, the court found that success on the motion was divided between the parties.

Applying the general principles governing costs in family proceedings, the court concluded that neither party achieved sufficient success to justify a costs award.

Each party was therefore ordered to bear their own costs.

Following a family law motion concerning child support, the court determined costs.

The moving party sought retroactive child support and income imputation against the responding party.

The court found mixed factual success but held that the moving party was ultimately substantially successful in securing ongoing child support without reduction for disability benefits paid for the child.

Applying the success principle and noting neither party acted unreasonably and the issues were not complex, the court awarded partial costs to the moving party.

The Children’s Aid Society sought to further restrict a biological mother’s access to two Crown ward children from supervised biweekly visits to supervised visits every two months.

The court considered the best interests of the children under the Child and Family Services Act, finding that while the mother had undermined the authority of the foster parent and the Society, there was insufficient reliable evidence linking the children’s serious behavioural and emotional challenges to her contact with them.

The court concluded that the children continued to benefit from regular contact with their mother but that closer supervision and structured conditions were necessary.

A staged access regime was ordered beginning with supervised alternating visits with each child, progressing to supervised joint visits and eventually limited unsupervised access if strict compliance with conditions occurred.

Detailed restrictions were imposed on communication, gifts, food, and disclosure of information about the children.