V. Rivers

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine and heroin, and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and heroin.

During a police raid, the offender was found hiding in a bathtub, refused to comply with police directions, and was tasered, resulting in facial injuries.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the significant quantity of drugs and a lengthy criminal record, against mitigating factors such as mental health issues and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, charged with possession of controlled substances and assaulting a police officer, brought Charter motions alleging breaches of his s. 7 and s. 8 rights during the execution of a search warrant.

The court found that the police use of force, including a Conducted Energy Weapon, was reasonable given the applicant's resistance and the belief he might be armed, dismissing the s. 7 claim.

While the court found a s. 8 breach occurred when an officer searched the applicant's jacket for identification after a safety pat-down, the evidence of drugs was admitted under s. 24(2) as the officer acted in good faith to assist the applicant.

The offender, a 24-year-old first offender, was convicted of possessing a loaded restricted firearm and possessing heroin and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered the aggravating factors of the firearm and drugs, and mitigating factors including the offender's youth, lack of record, remorse, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a total sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, after accounting for pre-sentence custody and totality, followed by 24 months of probation.

The accused was stopped by police for driving with an unlit rear license plate.

During the stop, an officer spotted a knife on the passenger seat, leading to the accused's arrest.

A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded 12.12 grams of crack cocaine, $1,300 in cash, and a digital scale.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), finding the stop, arrest, and search lawful.

At trial, the court rejected the accused's claim that the drugs were for personal use and convicted him of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a prohibited weapon, but acquitted him of possession of proceeds of crime and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The applicants, charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The anticipated delay from charge to the end of trial was over 48 months.

The Crown argued that much of the delay was attributable to the applicants' co-accused and should be counted as defence delay.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, finding that the delay of one accused cannot be automatically attributed to co-accused.

The court found that the applicants were responsible for very little delay and had repeatedly asserted their desire to move the matter forward.

The net delay significantly exceeded the 30-month ceiling for superior court trials, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify it.

The application was granted and the proceedings were stayed.

The offender was convicted of possessing 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking after accepting a controlled delivery package.

The offender acted as a low-level conduit or 'mule' for financial gain while also participating in fraudulent schemes.

The court weighed the highly addictive nature of heroin and the profit motive as aggravating factors against the offender's lack of a prior criminal record.

A global sentence of four years was imposed, reduced to 22 months of further custody after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought a publication ban under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code to prevent publication of information identifying the deceased victim, primarily to shield an elderly relative from learning distressing details of the death through media reporting.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governs discretionary publication bans even when sought under a statutory provision.

The Crown failed to establish that the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or that a significant public interest justified limiting openness.

The concern raised was characterized as a private interest unsupported by medical evidence demonstrating likely harm.

The interim publication ban was therefore set aside.