I. MacKinnon

The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation over Twitter posts alleging the plaintiff made women uncomfortable at a social event.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the statements were true.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court used its fact-finding powers to assess credibility on the paper record.

The court found the defendant established the defence of truth on a balance of probabilities, noting corroborating affidavits and the plaintiff's own bizarre and derogatory affidavit evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The applicants, facing three separate first-degree murder trials, sought an unprecedented publication ban on all evidence to be adduced at their first trial (the Bosma murder) until the completion of their subsequent trials, arguing that pre-trial publicity would prejudice future juries.

Alternatively, they sought to extend the statutory publication ban on pre-trial motions.

The court dismissed the request for a blanket ban on trial evidence, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious risk to trial fairness and that jury safeguards would be sufficient.

However, the court granted the alternative request, extending the publication ban on pre-trial motions until the conclusion of the subsequent Babcock trial due to the high risk of prejudice from overlapping inadmissible evidence.

A media coalition applied for an order allowing the publication of certain pre-trial motions in a high-profile first-degree murder case, arguing that the statutory publication ban under s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code should not apply to all pre-trial motions.

The Crown and the accused opposed the application, arguing that s. 648(1) provides a blanket statutory ban on all reporting of any information concerning pre-trial applications brought before the designated trial judge.

The court dismissed the media's application, holding that the statutory ban under s. 648(1) is mandatory and applies to all pre-trial motions adjudicated by the trial judge, whether litigated before or after a jury is selected.

The plaintiff, a witness in a sexual assault re-trial, sued a newspaper and its reporter for negligence after her identity was published in breach of a court-ordered publication ban.

The court found that while breach of a publication ban does not automatically result in civil liability, the newspaper owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.

The reporter breached the standard of care of a reasonably prudent journalist by failing to verify the scope of the publication ban.

The court concluded that the publication caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable psychological injury, including social anxiety disorder and agoraphobia, and awarded $40,000 in general damages against the newspaper.

The action against the reporter personally was dismissed on consent.

Media organizations applied for access to and the ability to publish the contents of an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant in a major police investigation.

The Provincial Crown and an accused sought a publication ban on references to non-consensual intercepted private communications, arguing protection of the wiretap regime and fair trial rights.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that generalized concerns about the wiretap regime and speculative risks to a future jury trial were insufficient to justify restricting openness.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of open courts and the public interest in scrutiny of judicial authorizations and police investigations.

Balancing the competing interests, the court concluded that the salutary effects of a publication ban did not outweigh the significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public accountability.

Media organizations applied for access to portions of a sealed information to obtain (ITO) used to secure a search warrant in a criminal investigation.

The Crown had released a version with extensive edits, including redactions relating to innocent third parties.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck test under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code, the court held that the Crown failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice justifying continued secrecy.

Assertions that the redacted material constituted non‑essential narrative or could harm innocent persons were unsupported by evidence.

The court ordered disclosure of the redacted material subject to limited exceptions for personal identifiers, certain references involving the mayor’s spouse, and portions potentially affecting the accused’s fair trial rights.

Multiple media organizations applied under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code to vary sealing orders relating to search warrants, general warrants, and production orders obtained during a terrorism investigation.

The court considered the open court principle and the Dagenais‑Mentuck framework governing restrictions on publication and access to court records.

While recognizing the strong presumption of openness once search warrants are executed, the court found that publication of certain highly incriminating and potentially inadmissible material in the Informations to Obtain posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice and to the accused persons’ fair trial rights given the extensive publicity surrounding the terrorism allegations.

The court therefore permitted access to the materials but imposed time‑limited publication bans on evidence supporting the charges and maintained sealing for portions relating to ongoing investigations and identifying information of innocent third parties.